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A bstract
Data about individuals is being increasingly collected and disseminated for purposes 
such as business analysis and medical research. This has raised some privacy concerns. 
In response, a number of techniques have been proposed which attem pt to transform 
data prior to its release so tha t sensitive information about the individuals contained 
within it is protected. A>Anonymisation is one such technique that has attracted 
much recent attention from the database research community.
A;-Anonymisation works by transforming data in such a way that each record is 
made identical to at least A: — 1 other records with respect to those attributes that 
are likely to be used to identify individuals. This helps prevent sensitive information 
associated with individuals from being disclosed, as each individual is represented by 
at least k records in the dataset. Ideally, a /c-anonymised dataset should maximise 
both data utility and privacy protection, i.e. it should allow intended data analytic 
tasks to be carried out without loss of accuracy while preventing sensitive information 
disclosure, but these two notions are conflicting and only a trade-off between them 
can be achieved in practice. The existing works, however, focus on how either utility 
or protection requirement may be satisfied, which often result in anonvmised data 
with an unnecessarily and/or unacceptably low level of utility or protection.
In this thesis, we study how to construct A:-anonymous data that satisfies both 
data utility and privacy protection requirements. We propose new criteria to capture 
utility and protection requirements, and new algorithms that allow Ar-anonymisations 
with required utility/protection trade-off or guarantees to be generated. Our extensive 
experiments using both benchmarking and synthetic datasets show that our methods 
are efficient, can produce A:-anonymised data with desired properties, and outperform 
the state of the art methods in retaining data utility and providing privacy protection.
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tC hapter 1
Introduction
Data about individuals is being increasingly collected, analysed and disseminated. 
Examples include the Electronic Patient Record [61] (a large database containing 
British patients’ demographics, test results and billing information), the UK National 
DNA Database [9] (containing the genetic profile of more than 4 million citisens 
involved in criminal actions) and DoubleClick's database (containing more than 100 
millions of customer profiles) [2]. The collected data can contribute significantly to 
studies such as medical research [30] and business intelligence [21].
Due to its sensitive nature, however, such data may compromise individuals’ pri­
vacy, for example, as a result of accidental data loss (e.g. the recent HM Revenue 
and Customs case where over 25 million individuals’ data was lost [5]), security in­
frastructure breaches [55, 107, 104. 67] (e.g. the UKvisa case where applicants’ per­
sonal data was made visible on the web [7]) or adversarial data  analysis and mining 
[15, 22. 106] (e.g. the case reported in [117] where a supermarket planned to use 
mined information about a custom er’s frequent alcohol purchases against him dur­
ing trial). Such incidents have raised many privacy concerns. According to a recent 
study [120], 86% of internet users stated that their permission should be gained before 
their data was collected, while 94% of individuals would want privacy violators to be
1
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punished. Furthermore, there is evidence that individuals have attem pted to protect 
privacy themselves by disabling cookies in their web-browsers, using fake personal 
data, or avoiding to disclose consumer preferences, detailed demographic or contact 
information [62, 70, 12].
1.1 Privacy and Its P rotection
While privacy may be understood intuitively, it is a rather difficult term to define 
and analyse. Aristotle was the first to distinguish between "the public sphere of 
political activity and the private sphere associated with family and domestic life’’ 
[8]. while Romans further developed these ideas and protected privacy legally [108]. 
Modern philosophers also agree that privacy is a meaningful and valuable concept. For 
example, Westin views privacy as “the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how and to what extent information is communicated 
to others” [119], while Gavison argues that the concept of privacy is related to limited 
accessibility to individuals, noting that privacy can be achieved by solitude (the lack of 
physical access to an individual), secrecy (the lack of information about an individual), 
and anonymity (the lack of attention to an individual) [52].
It is interesting to observe how many modern privacy-preserving technologies have 
been developed based on these views. WORM-based solutions1 [134, 118], for exam­
ple, ensure that private data cannot be altered, while encryption [60, 20] attem pts to 
restrict access to it. Thus, both of these approaches may be seen as providing solitude. 
A popular system based on the WORM paradigm is Sun's StorageTek VolSafe [14], 
while PGP is a famous encryption-based program [50]. On the other hand, secrecy 
can be achieved based on cryptography [112, 129, 28, 93, 37] or access control models
'W ORM  (W rite-Once Read-M any) is a paradigm according to which data can only be written 
once. WORM may be used to provide im m utable versioning and secure logging.
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[55, 107, 104, 102], which guarantee tha t unauthorised parties cannot interfere com­
munication or access data. For example, cryptography is extensively used in systems 
ranging from satellite TV decoders to public key infrastructure systems (PKI) [72]. 
Finally, anonymous communication systems [101, 38, 122], such as the Anonymizer 
[1, 74] and data masking techniques [42, 22, 106, 110], such as data suppression [46], 
attem pt to protect privacy through anonymity.
While preserving all these notions of privacy is important and necessary, this thesis 
focuses on a specific type of threat to anonymity called individual identification, which 
occurs when an attacker is able to infer the identity of an individual along with his 
or her sensitive information from data.
1.2 P reventing Individual Identification
Preventing individual identification has been a long-standing problem, and is re­
quired by some relevant legislation, such as the European Union Directive 95/46/EC 
[11] or the United States Healthcare Information Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) [4]. These laws enunciate the need for an “appropriate level of security" 
so that the published data does not provide “a reasonable basis to identify an indi­
vidual". However, neither of these rules specify what form of identification should 
be prevented, how protection from identification should be achieved and what level 
of protection should be considered to be adequate. Thus, there is a large scope for 
considering how specific technologies may be developed for individual identification 
protection in practice.
There are two common scenarios under which individual identification may be 
examined [48, 110. 20]. The first involves an untrusted data collector/user, who 
attem pts to identify individuals by combining collected data with other data [128, 15], 
bypassing security mechanisms [38, 87] or performing data analysis or mining [20]. A
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real-world case of individual identification under this setting is reported in [3], where 
Electronic Privacy Information Center, a U.S. public interest research center, alleged 
that a company called DoubleClick is “unlawfully tracking the online activities of 
Internet users (through the placement of cookies) and combining surfing records with 
detailed personal profiles contained in a national marketing database” . Here, the goal 
of protecting privacy is to prevent the data collector from identifying individuals. The 
second scenario assumes a trusted data collector/publisher, who wishes to release 
data in a privacy preserving way, either for profit (e.g. selling customer data) or 
for benefiting the society at large (e.g. releasing demographic or medical data for 
research). In this case, the goal is to publish the data, but make it difficult for data 
users to identify individuals from the data. This thesis considers the second scenario.
Publishing data that prevents individual identification is not a straightforward 
task in the second scenario, since naive methods such as "data de-identification” , i.e. 
removing information such as names or phone-numbers tha t may explicitly identify 
individuals, are not sufficient in practice. To demonstrate this, Sweeney [110] linked 
a voters list with some publicly available de-identified medical data containing “in­
nocuous” information about patients, such as their date of birth, zip code and sex, 
and inferred medical information about William Weld, a former governor of the state 
of Massachusetts. It was also suggested that more than 87% of U.S. citisens can 
be identified as a result of data linkage [110]. To illustrate how this may happen, 
consider the data about individuals contained in Table 1.1, for example. Assume 
also that this data is to be released, but no one should be able to infer the salary of 
any individual. De-identification will simply remove individuals’ names, releasing the 
data as shown in Table 1.3. However, if we assume that these individuals' names can 
be found on a possible external dataset (e.g. a voters list), such as the one depicted 
in Table 1.2, then bv performing a simple join between Tables 1.2 and 1.3, one can 
reveal the salary of an individual pretty precisely.
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N a m e P o s tco d e Sa lary  (K )
John NW10 10
Mary NW10 10
Alex NW11 10
George NW12 10
Mike NW28 37
Anne NW30 40
Tony NW30 39
Helen NW30 38
Table 1.1: Original data
N a m e P ostcode
John NW10
Mary NW10
Alex NW11
George NW12
Mike NW28
Anne NW30
Tony NW30
Helen NW30
P ostcode Sa la ry  (K )
NW10 10
NW10 10
NW11 10
NW12 10
NW28 37
NW30 40
NW30 39
NW30 38
Table 1.2: External dataset Table 1.3: The result of de-identifying 
related to Table 1.1 Table 1.1
1.3 k-A nonym isation  and Research Challenges
Recognising the limitation of data de-identification, Sweeney proposed a technique 
called A>anonymisation [110]. To illustrate this technique, we assume that individu­
als’ data (referred to as microdata [106]) is stored as a relational table T  such that 
each tuple corresponds to one individual, and is comprised of three different types of 
attribute:
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i
•  Identifiers (IDs): These attributes can be used to uniquely identify indi­
viduals. Examples include Social Security Numbers, UK National Insurance 
Numbers (NINs), and phone numbers.
•  Quasi-identifiers (QIDs): These attributes may be used in combination to 
identify a small group of individuals [32]. Examples include age and gender.
•  Sensitive attributes (SAs): These attributes contain sensitive values about
individuals, for example individuals’ income levels or medical conditions.
Informally, A-anonymisation is a process that attem pts to convert T  into T* (pos­
sibly through some data transformation), such that each tuple in T * is identical 
to at least A — 1 other tuples with respect to QIDs. For example. Table 1.4 is a 4- 
anonymisation of Table 1.1, assuming that Name is an ID, Postcode a QID and Salary 
an SA. Here, a tuple having a value AW[28 — 30] in Postcode may be associated with 
any of the 4 individuals having a Postcode between N W 28 and ATU30 in Table 1.1. 
As such, even if an external dataset exists, one will not know for certain which SA 
value in a A-anonvmous dataset is associated with which specific individual, since this 
tuple corresponds to at least k individuals in the original dataset.
While forming groups of at least k tuples and transforming them to satisfy A- 
anonymity is not difficult, finding a “good” A-anonymisation is challenging [106]. 
First, there is a need to understand and define what makes a good A-anonymisation. 
Generally speaking, a good A-anonymisation should preserve data utility. Since trans­
forming data to satisfy A-anonymity can excessively distort QID values, the resultant 
data may become practically useless. For instance, Table 1.4 may be considered as 
preserving data utility reasonably well, since postcode values are not “too” distorted, 
i.e. there are only a “few” possible postcode values covered by each anonymised 
value. Unfortunately, the notion of data  utility is difficult to define [54], and finding a
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P ostcode S a la ry  (K ) P ostcode S a la ry  (K )
NW[10-12] 10 NW[10-30] 10
NW[10-12] 10 NW[10-30] 10
NW[10-12] 10 NW[10-30] 37
NW[10-12] 10 NW[10-30] 40
NW [28-30] 37 NW[10-30] 10
NW[28-30] 40 NW[10-30] 10
NW [28-30] 39 NW[ 10-30] 39
NW [28-30] 38 NW[10-30] 38
Table 1.4: A 4-anonymisation Table 1.5: Another 4-
of Table 1.1 anonymisation of Table 1.1
Ar-anonymisation with optimal data utility is both conceptually and computationally 
hard [91, 19. 127, 35].
Second, A>anonymised data should also make linking sensitive information to in­
dividuals difficult. Unfortunately, as first pointed out by Machanavajjhala et al. [85], 
A>anonymity alone may fail to prevent an attacker from inferring an individual’s ac­
tual SA value. This may occur when an attacker can identify a /c-anonymous group 
that contains this individual’s tuple and all SA values contained in this group are 
identical. For example, knowing that Mary lives in an area with a postcode N W 10, 
one can infer that the tuple representing Mary is contained in the first anonymous 
group of Table 1.4, and that Mary's salary is 10K, since all the tuples contained 
in this group have the same salary value. Also, some sensitive information may be 
inferred through “ranges” [80. 71]. For instance, assume that an attacker knows that 
Tony lives in an area with a postcode JVW30. Using Table 1.4, this attacker can infer 
that the tuple representing Tony is in the second anonymised group and that Tony’s 
salary is in a small range [37A' — 40/f]. Thus, robust protection measures must be 
considered when A:-anonymising data.
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Third, generating an optimal A-anonymisation with respect to both data utility 
and privacy protection is computationally impossible, since they are conflicting re­
quirements [85, 124]. Thus, a possible strategy for a data publisher (anonymiser) is 
to release A-anonymisations with a “good” trade-off between data utility and privacy 
protection. An example of such an anonymisation for Table 1.1 is shown in Table 
1.5. Here, data utility may be preserved fairly well, since one may still use Table
1.5 to learn how many individuals live in an area with a postcode between ATF10 
and NW 30, for example. Furthermore, one is not likely to infer an individual's exact 
salary or a small range in which this individual's salary lies using Table 1.5, since 
each tuple in this table is associated with at least 3 different salary values that form 
a relatively wide range. Allowing A-anonymisations to be generated with a desired 
utility/protection trade-off, or with a controlled level of utility and protection, is ex­
tremely important for applications, since data publishers and users often have diverse 
utility and protection requirements [51, 4, 99]. For example, when a pharmaceutical 
company uses data published bv a healthcare trust, it may require the data to have 
a minimum level of utility with respect to a certain measure, e.g. classification ac­
curacy, while the trust may require the anonymised data to have a minimum level 
of protection in order to ensure that it will not be possible for the company to infer 
sensitive information about patients included in the data. Developing techniques that 
allow such flexibility in A-anonymising data is a significant challenge.
Finally, datasets of different characteristics must also be considered. However, 
existing A-anonymisation methods do not work well with high-dimensional [16] or 
sparse [86] datasets, since it is difficult to find good groupings without incurring 
excessive information loss. Preventing individual identification in presence of data 
updates is also difficult, as an attacker may be able to identify individuals by observing 
A-anonymisations of incrementally updated tables [36, 125].
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In this thesis, we address primarily the third challenge. Although it may seem 
surprising, despite the need for generating anonymised data that has a ‘‘good” level 
of data utility and protection in practice, existing A-anonymisation approaches do 
not consider how this may be achieved. They optimise either data utility or privacy 
protection [76, 77, 85, 80], and as a result the anonymisations they generate may 
not achieve a good balance between the two, or guarantee that a minimum level of 
data utility or privacy protection is achieved. Our aim is to develop A-anonymisation 
methods that can balance or guarantee these two properties.
1.4 Research Contributions
This thesis makes the following contributions:
•  We propose new criteria to quantify data utility and protection that are founded 
on well-established notions of utility and protection. Our utility criteria are 
based on how original values may be reconstructed from generalised data 
[127, 64], and capture the accuracy of a number of tasks that are commonly 
performed on A-anonvmised data, while our protection criteria consider the risk 
of private information disclosure through linking individuals to specific values or 
ranges of values. These criteria are applicable to both numerical and categorical 
attributes, and capture utility and protection uniformly. This allows them to be 
used for different types of dataset, and be employed as optimisation heuristics 
in our approach to generating A-anonymisations with required utility/privacy 
trade-off or guarantees.
•  We develop an efficient algorithmic framework for A-anonymising data. Our 
method works by performing top-down data partitioning, followed by a greedy
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clustering guided by heuristics tha t allow both data utility and protection re­
quirements to be incorporated into the anonymisation process. Important char­
acteristics of our method include its effectiveness, its low time complexity, its 
ability to deal with data skewness, and its flexibility.
•  We introduce two new A'-anonymisation approaches. The Trade-Off Constrained 
(TOC) approach can generate /c-anonymised data with an optimal trade-off 
between data utility and privacy protection, whereas the Utility and Protection 
Constrained (UPC) approach can guarantee tha t anonymised data will satisfy 
the required level of data utility and privacy protection. Both our approaches 
use optimisation heuristics based on our utility and protection criteria, and 
employ our algorithmic framework to generate A:-anonymised data.
Extensive experiments using both benchmarking and synthetic data show that 
our approaches can generate A'-anonymisations with good utility/protection trade­
off or guarantees. More specifically, the data utility and privacy protection of the 
constructed anonymisations are comparable to those generated by the best-so-far 
methods, and the performance scales very well to large datasets.
1.5 Thesis O rganisation
Chapter 2 reviews the related A'-anonymisation literature focusing on data utility and 
privacy protection measures and algorithms. Furthermore, we briefly survey relevant 
techniques that attem pt to provide protection for individual identification.
Chapter 3 discusses our new approach to A’-anonymisation. We introduce our 
criteria for capturing data utility and privacy protection uniformly, and present our 
method that is capable of achieving A'-anonymisations with a utility/protection trade­
off.
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In Chapter 4, we perform an extensive experimental study of the method de­
scribed in Chapter 3 using both benchmarking and synthetic datasets. We evaluate 
the effectiveness of our method in terms of producing /c-anonymisations with the re­
quired utility/protection trade-off, and compare the level of data utility and privacy 
protection offered by /r-anonymisations generated by our method to some benchmark 
A:-anonymisation methods [77, 35] using a number of alternative quality indicators 
[25, 77]. We also study the efficiency and scalability of our method.
In Chapter 5, we suggest further enhancement to the basic method presented in 
Chapter 3. In particular, we formally define the problem of range disclosure, intro­
duce our Range Diversity criterion, and present our UPC approach to constructing 
anonymisations with a guaranteed amount of data utility and protection from range 
disclosure.
In Chapter 6, we empirically evaluate the enhancements proposed in Chapter 5 by 
comparing the enhanced method to three well-known mechanisms that are designed 
to optimise protection [85, 124, 80], our TOC method and benchmark algorithms 
[77, 35], using both benchmarking and synthetic datasets. We examine the quality 
of generated anonymisations using a number of utility and protection criteria, as well 
as the runtime performance.
Finally, we conclude the thesis and discuss directions for future work in Chapter
7.
Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter, we present an overview of the A--anonymisation literature and discuss 
relevant privacy preserving techniques that can be used to guard against individual 
identification.
2.1 A;-Anonymisation: Concepts and Techniques
Informally. A>anonymisation is a process to find groups having a minimum of k tuples, 
and then to transform the QID values in each group so that they become indistin­
guishable. Formally, A>anonymisation is explained in Definition 2.1.1.
D efinition 2.1.1 (A>Anonymisation). k-Anonymisation is the process in which a 
table T (a \ , . . . ,  a^), where a*,z = 1 , . . . , m  are quasi-identifiers (QIDs) and a ^ i  = 
(m +  1), . . .  ,d  are sensitive attributes (SAs), is partitioned into groups {g \ , . . .  ,<?/,} 
s.t. \gj\ > k, 1 < j  < h, where \g3\ denotes the size of g3, and tuples in each g3 are 
made identical w.r.t. QIDs.
While the concept of A;-anonymity is simple, what constitutes a ‘‘good” fc-anony- 
misation and how such an anonymisation may be derived turn out to be not so
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easy to answer. In the following sections, we will review the existing works on k- 
anonymisation, analysing how they have attem pted to address these two questions. 
We classify existing works on Ar-anonymisation using the scheme illustrated in Figure 
2 . 1.
K-Anonymisation
MethodsQualitym easurem ent
Utility Protection Optimisation Value
1 strategies objectives recoding
Figure 2.1: The problem space of /c-anonymisation
Quality measurement is concerned with the metrics tha t can capture “how good” 
a /c-anonymisation is in terms of data utility and privacy protection. We discuss 
data utility and protection measures in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2 respectively, k- 
Anonymisation methods attem pt to produce high quality anonymisations by per­
forming data grouping and value recoding (to form groups of at least k tuples and 
to make QID values in each group identical). We review methods for Ar-anonymising 
data in Section 2.1.3. examining specifically strategies for forming groups, objectives 
to achieve during group formation, and ways in which QID values are recoded to 
satisfv A’-anonvmity.
2.1.1 U tility  Criteria
One of the key requirements for A’-anonymised data is that it should remain useful 
when used in applications [106]. For example, Table 2.2 is a valid 4-anonymisation 
of Table 2.1, which is derived by replacing all values in Postcode by a most gen­
eralised symbol Clearly, the amount of information loss or data distortion is
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Id P o s tco d e S a la ry  (K )
t\ NWIO 10
NW15 10
*3 NW12 10
4^ NW13 10
*5 NW20 20
6^ NW30 40
h NW30 40
ts NW25 30
Table 2.1: Original data
I d P ostcode S a la ry  (K )
ti * 10
£2 * 10
3^ * 10
*4 * 10
*5 * 20
h * 40
t7 * 40
ts * 30
Table 2.2: A 4-anonymisation of Table 2.1
Id P ostcode S a la ry  (K )
t\ NW[10-15] 10
t-2 NW[10-15] 10
t'S NW[10-15] 10
tA NW[10-15] 10
tb NW[20-30] 20
h NW [20-30] 40
tl NW [20-30] 40
ts NW [20-30] 30
Table 2.3: Another 4-anonymisation of Table 2.1
severe in this case, making the anonymised data practically useless. In contrast, 
the 4-anonymisation shown in Table 2.3 for the same data is intuitively better from
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the utility point of view. To capture the amount of information distortion in k- 
anonymised data, a number of criteria have been proposed.
C riteria based on inform ation loss
One way to capture utility is by measuring the level of information loss incurred in 
A> anonymisation. Proposed measures can be classified into three groups according to 
how they capture information loss.
First, a larger group may incur more information loss, as more tuples are made 
indistinguishable after anonymisation. Based on this observation, Bayardo et al. [25] 
proposed the Discernability Metric (DM ),  and LeFevre et al. [77] suggested the 
Normalised Average Equivalence Class Size Metric (Cavg ), respectively.
D efin itio n  2.1.2 (Discernability Metric (DM)). Assume that a table T  comprised 
of m  QIDs {oi , . . .  , a m} is partitioned into groups {gi,g 2 , • • • ,9h}, such that \gj\ > 
k, 1 < j  < r, and \gj\ < k ,r  < j  < h. Tuples in each gj, 1 < j  < r, will have the 
same values in each QID after anonymisation, and tuples in each g j,r  < j  < h, will 
not appear in the anonymised result. The D M  o fT  under this partitioning is defined 
as
where \gj\ and \T\ denote the size of g3 and T  respectively.
According to Definition 2.1.2, each tuple is penalised by the size of the group to 
which it belongs, while every tuple that belongs to a group containing less than k 
tuples is assigned a penalty of |T|.
D efinition 2.1.3 (Normalised Average Equivalence Class Size Metric (Cavg))* As- 
sume that a table T  comprised of m  QIDs { a i , . . . , a m} is partitioned into groups
r h
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• • • . 9h}> such that |pj| > k, 1  < j  < h, and tuples in each will have the 
same values in each QID after anonymisation. The Normalised Average Equivalence 
Class Size Metric C a v g  of T  under this partitioning is defined as
r  m<^ AVG = h x k
where |T| denotes the size of table T.
Both D M  and C a v g  do not consider how data is transformed when measuring 
information loss. So, according to these measures, Tables 2.2 and 2.3 are considered 
to be equally useful. Intuitively, however, Table 2.3 retains significantly more infor­
mation than Table 2.2, since it contains more detailed postcode values. To capture 
this, a number of measures have been proposed to quantify information loss by taking 
into account the way original QID values are transformed to anonymise data. As will 
be elaborated later in the section, original QID values are often replaced by more 
general ones to achieve A:-anonymity. For example, the value ATT10 in t\ in Table 2.1 
is replaced by ATT[10— 15] wdien this table is anonymised to Table 2.3. Furthermore, 
data transformations are often conducted with respect to Domain Generalisation Hi­
erarchies (DGHs) [106, 110, 19, 127]. For example, a possible DGH for Postcode is 
given in Figure 2.2.
NW [1(M 5] NW [16-19] NW[20-30]
NW10^NW11 NW15 NW16 NW17 NW?8 NW19 NW20 NW21 NW30
Figure 2.2: A DGH for Postcode in Table 2.3
Aggarwal et al. [19] measured information loss by considering DGHs. The closer 
a generalised value in the hierarchy to the leaves of a DGH is, the less information
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loss is considered to have been incurred. For example, the values A W [10 — 15] and 
N W [20 — 30] have a lower height than the value * does in the DGH given in Figure 
2.2, so Table 2.3 is considered to be more useful than Table 2.2 according to this 
principle. Based on this idea, a measure called Generalisation Cost (GENC) was 
proposed in [19]. A reformulation of this measure is illustrated in Definition 2.1.4.
D efinition 2.1.4 (Generalisation Cost (GENC)). Assume that a table T  comprised 
of m QIDs { a i , . . . , a m} is partitioned into groups {g\, g2 , . . . .  gh}, such that \gj\ > 
k, 1 < j  < h, and tuples in each gj will have the same values in each QID after 
anonymisation. Let tt at{9j) denote the projection of gj on a categorical QID attribute 
aif i = 1 ,..., m, u(7rai(gj)) be the generalised value of 7rai{gj), and f  : u(nai(gj)) —> N 
be a function that returns the level to which u(nai(gj)) lies at Hat, the DGH of at . 
The Generalisation Cost (GENC) is defined as
where | / / a,| is the height of Ha,-
Although the GENC measure considers how values are transformed when captur­
ing information loss, it requires DGHs to work. Recent research [96, 25] has shown 
that the use of DGHs may cause excessive value distortion for numerical QIDs, so 
this measure is only appropriate for handling categorical attributes in practice.
To overcome this limitation, a number of works [127, 64, 96, 124] proposed to 
capture information loss based on the probability of reconstructing an original value 
from anonymised data. For instance, given the first group {£i, ...,£4 } in Table 2.3, we 
can infer (based 0 1 1  the principle of indifference [65]) that the original postcode value 
for any individual represented in this group is a value in {ATVTO, N W 1 1 , ..., ATF15} 
with an equal probability of | .  Generally, the probability of reconstructing a value
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in a QID a* using a A>anonymous group gj is
r ( * a , ( g j ) )  +  l
, where nai(gj) denotes the
projection of tuples in gj on a*, and r(irat(gj)) gives the length of the range of 7rQi(pj) 
when cii is numerical or the number of distinct values in 7rai{9j) when at is categorical. 
Intuitively, larger ranges incur more information loss, since we are less certain about 
original values. Note that this is fundamentally different from measuring information 
loss using the height of DGHs. That is because QID values having the same height 
in a DGH do not necessarily have the same ranges. For instance, iVW[10 — 15] is 
narrower than N W [20 — 30] in the DGH shown in Figure 2 .2 , implying that the 
first group in Table 2.3 incurs less information loss than the second group {^5, ..., £8}. 
Based on this principle, a measure called Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP) was 
proposed in [127]. A reformulation of the NCP measure is illustrated in Definition 
2.1.5.
D efin ition  2.1.5 (Normalised Certainty Penalty (NCP)). Assume that a table T
comprised of m  QIDs {a j am} is partitioned into groups {pi,p2 , • • • > 9h}, such
that |pj| > k, 1 < j  < h, and tuples in each gj will have the same values in each 
QID after anonymisation. Let r : V —* N be a function that, given a set of values 
V\ returns the length of the range of values (number of distinct values) in V . The 
Normalised Certainty Penalty measure (NCP) is defined as
where 7ra,(9j) ant  ^ 0^) denote the projection of gj and T  on a QID attribute al
respectively.
Several utility metrics that are conceptually similar to NCP, such as the Loss 
Metric [64], the Ambiguity Metric (AM) [96] and the Information Loss Metric [124]
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were also proposed. These measures use slightly different definitions for the range- 
mapping function r, and they are all applicable to both numerical and categorical 
attributes.
Criteria based on the accuracy o f tasks
Another way to capture utility is based on measuring the accuracy of a specific task 
performed on anonymised data. Iyengar [64] observed that anonymisation can make 
it difficult to build an accurate classification model. To see this, assume that an 
anonymiser releases Table 2.4. A classifier is to be built using Postcode as a predictor 
attribute and Mortgage as the class attribute, where Y  indicates that an individual 
has a mortgage and N  does not. Building an accurate classification model using 
Table 2.4 is possible, as this table contains unperturbed information about classes. 
The result is illustrated in Table 2.5. Now assume that the anonymiser releases instead 
a 2-anonymised version of Table 2.4 as shown in Table 2.6, where Age and Postcode 
are QIDs, and Salary is an SA. In this case, it can be difficult for an accurate classifier 
to be built, as we can no longer be certain whether a class label of a tuple is Y  or 
N  due to anonymisation. For instance, the class label of a tuple in the first group of 
Table 2.6 can be either Y  or N , depending on its original postcode value shown in 
Table 2.4.
Clearly, anonymised data helps building a classification model when it contains 
groups with a single class label. Thus, to capture data utility, Iyengar introduced the 
Classification Metric (CM )  [64], which is expressed as the number of tuples whose 
class labels are different from that of the majority of tuples in their group, normalised 
by the table size.
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Id Age Postcode Salary (K ) Mortgage
ti 15 NW10 1 0 Y
I2 30 NW15 1 0 N
30 NW12 1 0 Y
«4 15 NW13 1 0 N
40 NW20 2 0 Y
h 80 NW30 40 N
h 80 NW30 40 N
40 NW25 30 Y
Table 2.4: Table used for classification
Function Mortgage
(10 < postcode < 13)v(20 < postcode < 25) Y
(13 < postcode < 20)V(26 < postcode < 30) N
Table 2.5: A classification derived from Table 2.4
Id Age Postcode Salary (K ) M ortgage
t\ 15 NW[10-13] 1 0 Y
U 15 NW[10-13] 1 0 N
^ 2 30 NW[12-15] 1 0 N
30 NW[12-15] 1 0 Y
h [40-80] NW [20-30] 2 0 Y
^ 6 [40-80] NW [20-30] 40 N
h [40-80] NW [20-30] 40 N
h [40-80] NW [20-30] 30 Y
Table 2.6: A 2-anonymisation of Table 2.4
D efinition 2.1.6 (Classification Metric (CM)). Assume that a table T  comprised 
of m QIDs { a i , . . . . a m} is partitioned into groups {<7 1 , <7 2 , • • •, 9h), such that \gj\ > 
k , l  < j  < h. and tuples in each gj will have the same values in each QID after 
anonymisation, and let y . gj —> N be a function that given a group gj, computes the 
number of tuples that have a different class label from the majority of tuples in gj. 
Classification Metric (C M ) can be defined as
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where |!T| denotes the size o fT .
A large C M  score indicates that the table may not support classification induc­
tion well, as most groups will have more than one class label. For example, Table 
2.6 may not be considered as useful for classification, since the C M  score for this 
table is =  | .  On the other hand, Table 2.7 is considered to be more useful
for classification, as its C M  score is Q-t Q+°+Q =  0. While C M  can capture the accu­
racy of classification, it may not indicate the level of information loss incurred when 
anonymising data, as it does not take into account the way QIDs are transformed. 
For example, Table 2.6 retained more information than Table 2.7 (the A M  scores for 
Tables 2.6 and 2.7 are 0.164 and 0.252 respectively), despite having a higher (worse) 
C M  score.
Id A ge P ostcode S a la ry  (K ) M o r tg a g e
t\ [15-30] NW[10-12] 1 0 Y
h [15-30] NW[10-12] 1 0 Y
t2 [15-30] NW[13-15] 1 0 N
u [15-30] NW[13-15] 1 0 N
H [40-80] NW[20-25] 2 0 Y
t% [40-80] NW [20-25] 30 Y
t& [40-80] NW[30] 40 N
f 7 [40-80] NW[30] 40 N
Table 2.7: A 2 -anonymisation of Table 2.4 that helps classification
LeFevre et al. [77] considered measuring the utility of anonymised data when used 
for aggregate query answering. Consider for example, the following query on Table 
2.3:
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Q: select COUNT(*)
from  table
w here Postcode = NWIO
Clearly, only the tuples in the first group can be used to answer this query. How­
ever, since these tuples have a value of NW[10 — 15], we cannot be sure about the 
exact number of tuples having a value N W  10, so Q can only be answered through 
estimation [124]. On the other hand, using Table 2.1 we can produce an answer to 
Q precisely. By measuring the normalised difference between the answers to a query 
using the anonymised and original data, we may quantify data utility. Intuitively, a 
smaller difference implies that anonymised data is more useful.
D iscussion
We classify the metrics discussed above as shown in Figure 2.3 and compare them 
using three criteria that are particularly important in applications [127, 96]: whether 
these metrics can handle both numerical and categorical QIDs, capture the accuracy 
of tasks performed using anonymised data, and be incorporated into anonymisation 
methods. We summarise the characteristics of existing measures with respect to our 
criteria in Table 2.8.
Ideally, a utility metric should be applicable to both numerical and categorical 
QIDs, since many datasets that contain mixed attributes need to be anonymised 
in practice [35, 124]. As can be seen from Table 2.8, the measures that are based 
on group size, reconstruction probability and aggregate query answering offer this 
flexibility. Furthermore, it is important for a measure to capture data utility in terms 
of performing tasks using anonymised data. Since anonymisers often do not know how 
anonymised data will be used, e.g. in cases where multiple data users have diverse
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z Group size
Based on ----- DGH height
Inf. Loss A
" Reconstruction Probability
/  Classification
Based on
task accuracy A -  A7 '  Aggr. Query Answering
Figure 2.3: A classification of utility metrics
Reference Utility criterion Type of QID Task Optimisation
[25. 77] Group size any any no
[19] DGH height categorical any yes
[127, 64] 
[96, 124]
Reconstruction
probability any any yes
[64] Classification categorical classification yes
[77]
Aggregate Query 
Answering any
query
answering yes
Table 2.8: Summary of existing utility metrics
data analysis requirements, the applicability of the task-based measures [64, 77], 
which assume one type of task, is limited. On the other hand, the measures that are 
based on reconstruction probability can capture the accuracy of many data mining 
tasks, such as classification, param eter estimation, hypothesis testing and regression 
[69]. Finally, besides being used for evaluating the quality of anonymised data, utility 
measures should also be easy to be incorporated into A:-anonymisation algorithms as 
heuristics, so that /c-anonymisations with intended utility quality may be produced. 
W ith the exception of those based on group size, all utility measures have been used 
as optimisation criteria in /;-aiionyinisation methods [78, 127, 35, 96, 64, 124].
From the above analysis, we conclude that measures based on reconstruction prob­
ability are most useful in practice, while group size measures should only be used to
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roughly indicate data utility. We also see the need for further research in developing 
task-based measures for a wide range of tasks beyond classification and aggregate 
query answering.
2.1.2 Protection  Criteria
As discussed in Introduction, individuals can still be identified when de-identified 
data is linked to publicly available data (illustrated by link (1) in Figure 2.4). k- 
Anonymisation attem pts to weaken link ( 1 ) by grouping tuples together and making 
QID values in each group identical. Teng et al. [Ill] proposed several measures 
to quantify the strength of this link based on how “easily’’ an attacker can infer 
the original QID value of an individual. However, making the inference of a QID 
value hard does not completely eliminate the possibility of identifying sensitive infor­
mation about individuals. For instance, when there is a strong correlation between 
anonymised QIDs and SAs (link (2) in Figure 2.4), an attacker may infer the sensitive 
values of individuals using additional background information about the QID values
[85].
Individual identification
De-identified dataPublicly released data
SAsIdentifiers
Figure 2.4: Individual identification through data linkage
We refer to this problem as value disclosure. Consider Table 2.3 again, for example. 
Knowing that an individual lives in an area with Postcode =  AUTO, one can infer 
that this individual’s salary is 10A', as all tuples with a postcode value between
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ATF10 and N W  15 have a salary value of 10K.  On the other hand, even when one 
knows tha t an individual lives in an area with Postcode =  NW3Q, he/she cannot be 
certain about this individual’s salary, as any of the three distinct salary values, which 
appears in the second anonymised group of Table 2.3, is possible.
A principle against value disclosure called /-diversity was proposed in [85], re­
quiring each anonymised group to contain at least I “well represented” values in an 
SA attribute. There are several instantiations of /-diversity [85], the most flexible of 
which is given in Definition 2.1.7.
D efin itio n  2.1.7 (Recursive (c, l)-diversity). Assume that a table T  comprised of m  
QIDs { a i , . . . ,  am} is partitioned into groups {pi, p2, . . . ,  gn), such that \gj\ > k, 1  < 
j  < h, and tuples in pj will have the same values in each QID after anonymisation, 
and sa is an SA. T  is (c, l)-diverse when
ri < c x (n  +  n+i +  . . .  +  rn)
holds for every gj, where ri,i =  l , . . . , n  is the number of times the i-th frequent SA 
value appears in gj, n is the total number of distinct SA values in gj, and c,l are 
anonymiser-specified constants.
This measure requires a group to contain a large number of distinct SA values, 
none of which should appear "too” often. For example, assume that both c and / 
are set to 2 and we want to examine whether the second group of Table 2.3 satisfies 
recursive (2 .2)-diversity. This group contains 3 distinct values whose frequencies in 
descending order are n  =  2 , r2 =  1 and r 3  =  1 (ri corresponds to the most frequent 
value 40/C r2 to the second most frequent value 30K  and r 3  to the third most frequent 
value 20K). Since / and c are equal to 2 , we check whether r\ < c x (r 2  +  r 3) or 
equivalently whether 2 < 2 x ( 1  + 1). As the inequality holds, the second group 
of Table 2.3 satisfies recursive (2, 2)-diversity. The idea behind Definition 2.1.7 is
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simple. To infer the actual SA value of an individual, an attacker has to associate 
an individual with a value in the group, and assuming that any tuple in a group can 
represent an individual equally likely [85, 124], he/she is more likely to succeed when 
a specific SA value appears many times in the group.
Other criteria that attem pt to provide protection for value disclosure by enforcing 
different frequency-based constraints on SA values include (a,/c)-anonymity [1 2 1 ] and 
p-sensitive-A>anonymity [113]. Both criteria require each group of SA values to have 
less than a specified number of distinct values. Chen et al. [39] recently proposed a 
value disclosure measure that takes into account some interesting types of background 
knowledge that an attacker may have when measuring protection. This includes 
knowledge about SA values that an individual I  does not have, knowledge about SA 
values belonging to another individual, and knowledge tha t a group of individuals in 
which /  is included has a certain SA value.
Li et al. [80] argued that to determine whether a fc-anonymised group poses a 
risk of disclosing sensitive information, the distribution of data in the whole dataset 
should be taken into account. Suppose, for example, that we have a dataset in which 
60% of tuples have the value Flu  in an SA Disease, and we form a A;-anonymous group 
G i which also has 60% of its disease values as Flu. Then, although an attacker can 
infer that an individual in G\ suffers Flu  with relatively high confidence (i.e. 60%), 
Li et al. [80] consider that Gi is well protected, since this fact can be inferred from 
the dataset itself. On the other hand, a ^-anonymous group G2  having 80% of its 
disease values as Flu  is considered to be at risk of disclosing sensitive information, as 
it reveals some additional information that is not available from the dataset. Here, 
the privacy leak is caused by some semantic inference on data distribution. This 
is in contrast to value disclosure measures, which consider the frequency of values 
occurring in a group only. We refer to this type of disclosure as semantic disclosure. 
To capture these semantic inferences, Li et al. [80] proposed to measure the level of
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semantic similarity between the SA values in a group. This is done using a measure 
called Acloseness that is based on the distance between the probability distribution 
of the SA values in an anonymised group and that of SA values in the whole dataset. 
The smaller the distance the higher the level of protection achieved. For instance, G\ 
is considered to be better protected than G2 according to this measure.
Some privacy criteria attempted to prevent sensitive information to be given away 
in the form of ranges. Consider for example a A:-anonymous group comprised of 
three tuples containing the values 10K, U K  and 12K  in a numerical SA Salary. 
As discussed in Introduction, knowing tha t an individual’s tuple is contained in this 
group, an attacker can learn that this individual’s salary is in the range of [10A — 12K]. 
Clearly, when this range is small, the disclosure may be considered as sensitive. We 
call this problem range disclosure. A number of works proposed to capture the level of 
protection against range disclosure offered by anonymised data, using the maximum 
range [71] or the variance [78] of SA values in a group. Intuitively, groups with 
small SA ranges (e.g. containing salary values in [10K  — 1 2 K]) may allow sensitive 
information to be inferred.
Xiao and Tao [124] suggested that range disclosure may be prevented by general­
ising SA values. Although they do not require /c-anonymity to be satisfied, as we will 
explain in Section 2 .2 . 1 , their protection criterion is applicable to /c-anonymised data. 
For example, consider a group containing the values 20K  and 29K  in a categorical 
SA Salary. This makes it possible for an individual represented in this group to be 
associated with a small range [20K  — 29K]. To protect this disclosure, the method 
proposed in [124] will generalise the salary values in this group with respect to the 
hierarchy shown in Figure 2.5, i.e. it will replace these values with a general value 
[20A' — 40A']. Protection for range disclosure is measured by calculating the proba­
bility of associating an individual with a specific range using anonymised data. For 
example, the level of protection offered by anonymising the SA values in the group
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as described above is since the probability of a tuple having a generalised value 
[20K  — 40/f] to actually have a value of 20K  or 29K  is |  according to the hierarchy 
illustrated in Figure 2.5 l .
*
[0K-15K] [20K-40K]
K ^
OK 10K 15K [20K-29K] [30K-40K]
/ \  / \
20K 29K 30K 40K
Figure 2.5: A hierarchy for Salary in Table 2.3
D iscussion
We classify the protection criteria discussed above as illustrated in Figure 2.6 and ex­
amine two important properties that these criteria should satisfy in order to be useful 
in applications: whether they can handle both numerical and categorical QIDs and 
whether they can capture protection for different types of disclosure. We summarise 
the characteristic of existing measures w.r.t. these criteria in Table 2.9.
As can be seen, with the exception of ^-closeness [80], all protection measures are 
applicable to either numerical or categorical SAs, and thus cannot handle datasets 
having mixed SA attributes.
Ideally, a measure should be able to offer protection from all types of attack, 
since it is not practical to anticipate what kind of knowledge an attacker may have. 
However, with the exception of the measure proposed in [124], all measures can only 
provide protection for one specific type of disclosure. In what follows, we explain why
‘This probability is computed as the fraction between the number of values that belong to the 
subtree rooted at [20A' -  29A'] and the number of values that belong to the subtree rooted at 
[20A' -  40A'] in the hierarchy illustrated in Figure 2.5
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Value disclosure
Protection  sem antic disclosure
m easures \
R ange disclosure
Figure 2.6: A classification of protection metrics
Reference Type of disclosure Type of SAs
[85, 121, 113, 39, 124] Value disclosure categorical
[80] Semantic disclosure any
[71, 78] Range disclosure numerical
[124] Range disclosure categorical
Table 2.9: Summary of existing protection metrics
existing measures fail to guard against different types of disclosure from the one they 
assume.
We first consider existing measures that are designed to guard against value dis­
closure. As discussed above, these measures may not provide protection against 
semantic disclosure, as they do not take semantic information associated with SA 
values into account. Furthermore, value disclosure-based measures may not provide 
protection for range disclosure, as SA values in a group may form a small range after 
anonymisation even though they are all distinct.
We also observe that preventing semantic disclosure using ^-closeness [80] may 
not provide protection against value disclosure. For instance, consider a dataset 
comprised of one million tuples having two values {Flu, H IV }  in an SA Disease, and 
that we have 30% of individuals suffering H I V  and 70% suffering Flu. Assume also 
that the goal is to prevent an attacker from inferring if an individual suffers H I V . 
As explained in Section 2.1.2, a group G 3  containing 30 individuals suffering H I V  
and 70 individuals suffering Flu  offers optimal protection from semantic disclosure,
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as the data distribution of SA values in this group is the same as the one in the whole 
dataset. Now consider another group G 4  containing 10 individuals suffering H I V  
and 90 individuals suffering Flu. The data distribution of the SA values in G 4 is 
different from the one in the whole dataset, and thus G4 is considered to offer worse 
protection for semantic disclosure than G 3 . However, G4  provides better protection 
for value disclosure than G 3 , as the probability of inferring that an individual suffers 
H I V  using G 4  is lower than that when G 3  is used. Similarly, it can also be shown 
that the measure proposed in [80] does not prevent range disclosure, as “mirroring” 
the distribution of SA values in a dataset that allows range disclosure will result in 
creating badly protected groups. While Li et al. [80] claimed that such inferences 
could be allowed as they can be made from using the entire dataset anyway, there 
are applications in the medical or financial domain where protection against these 
inferences should be guaranteed in any case [124].
Furthermore, we note that providing protection for range disclosure using the 
measures proposed in [71, 78] may not eliminate the value disclosure problem. This 
is because, maximising the range [71] or variance [78] of SA values in a group, may 
not lower the probability of inferring an SA value, as the frequency of this value 
occurring in the group is not limited. For example, consider a 3-anonymous group 
that contains 1  value of OK and 2 values of 40K  in an SA Salary. These values lie in a 
large range [OK — 40K] and have a large variance of 355.55. However, they still allow 
an attacker to infer tha t an individual has a salary value 40K  with a probability of 
| .  In contrast, the method introduced in [124] can provide protection for both range 
and value disclosure, since an attacker may not observe the frequency of the actual 
SA value of an individual if SA values in a group are generalised. For instance, the 
generalised value [20K  — 40A'] does not allow one to infer the number of individuals 
tha t have an actual salary value 20K  or 40K  in the group. However, by generalising 
SA values, the method proposed in [124] may increase the amount of information
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loss incurred when anonymising data. In addition, all the existing range disclosure- 
based measures cannot provide protection from semantic disclosure. This is because, 
the distribution of original SA values in the entire dataset is not taken into account 
when measuring protection, and thus semantic inferences using the distribution of SA 
values in anonymised groups may not be prevented.
So, with the exception of 2 -closeness, the existing protection measures are still 
rather limited in terms of their applicability in practice, since they cannot handle 
both types of SA attribute. Furthermore, offering protection for more than one type 
of disclosure while allowing original SA values to be released is clearly useful, as 
using the approach proposed in [82] may incur excessive information loss as a result 
of generalising SA values.
2.1 .3  k-A n on ym isation  A lgorithm s
To derive a A:-anonymisation, an algorithm should form groups of at least k tuples in 
a way that optimises one or more of the criteria discussed in Sections 2.1.1 and 2.1.2, 
and recode QID values to make tuples in these groups identical. In the following, we 
review existing A:-anonymisation techniques in terms of search strategies, optimisation 
objectives and value recoding models.
S earch  s tra teg ie s
Finding an optimal A:-anonvmisation with respect to the criteria discussed in Section 
2.1.1 is an NP-hard problem [91, 19, 127, 35]. Thus, many methods employ heuristic 
search strategies to form groups. Samarati [106] proposed a binary search on the 
height of DGHs, LeFevre et al. [76] suggested a search similar in principle to the 
Apriori [21] used in association rule mining, and Iyengar [64] used a genetic algo­
rithm. Partitioning has also been used to form groups in /c-anonymisation. LeFevre
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et al. [77, 78] examined several partitioning strategies including techniques origi­
nally proposed for kd-tree construction [47], while Iwuchukwu et al. [63] developed 
a set of heuristics inspired from R-tree construction [57]. One of the most popular 
data grouping strategies is clustering [43, 17, 18, 127, 96, 79]. The main objective of 
clustering-based /c-anonymisation methods is not to derive “natural” groups or struc­
tures in data, as traditional clustering algorithms do [58, 132], but to form groups that 
optimise a particular objective criterion (e.g. the NCP measure illustrated in Defini­
tion 2.1.5 [127]). In order to do so, they perform greedy search constructing groups 
in a bottom-up [43, 17, 96, 79] or a top-down fashion [127]. Figure 2.7 summarises 
existing search strategies.
Search strategies
Apriori
search
Genetic
search
Binary
search
Partitioning Clustering
Kd-tree R-tree Bottom-up Top-down
type type
Figure 2.7: A classification of search strategies
Reference Search strategy Quality Efficiency
[106] Binary Search very low exponential
[76] Apriori search very low exponential
[64] Genetic search very low exponential
[77, 78] Kd-tree type partitioning low log-linear
[63] R-tree type partitioning low log-linear
[43, 17, 96, 79] Bottom-up clustering high quadratic
[127] Top-down clustering high quadratic
Table 2.10: Summary of existing search strategies
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Using a certain search strategy to anonymise data may affect both the quality of 
the resultant anonymisation as well as the efficiency of producing it, as illustrated 
in Table 2.10. In particular, experimental studies [127, 77, 17] showed that binary, 
apriori and genetic-based methods are worse in terms of both effectiveness and ef­
ficiency compared to partitioning and clustering-based ones. This is because these 
methods explore a much smaller search space than partitioning and clustering-based 
methods, while their worst-case time complexity is exponential w.r.t. the cardinality 
of the dataset. Thus, more recent research has focused on developing methods that 
use partitioning or clustering-based search [127, 96, 77]. Furthermore, it was also 
shown in [127, 96] tha t partitioning-based methods tend to produce anonymisations 
of lower quality compared to those constructed by clustering-based methods, as they 
attem pt to form groups by splitting data based on one attribute at a time, rather than 
considering all attributes together as clustering-based methods do. As a result, these 
methods are sensitive to the choice of splitting attribute and tend to perform poorly, 
particularly when the dataset is skewed [35, 96]. However, partitioning is faster than 
clustering by orders of magnitude, requiring 0 (n  x log(n)) time to derive an anonymi­
sation, as opposed to 0 ( n 2) for clustering, where n is the cardinality of the dataset. 
Clearly, it is desirable to have methods that allow high-quality anonymisations to be 
derived efficiently.
O p tim isa tio n  O b jec tiv es
Existing grouping strategies fall into three groups regarding their optimisation ob­
jectives. The goal of some of the earlier k-anonymisation methods is to achieve a 
maximum level of data utility subject to a minimum group size requirement expressed 
as k [76, 25, 77, 78, 127, 35]. We refer to these methods as group-size constrained. 
Gedik and Liu [53] noted that the level of information loss incurred during anonymi­
sation should be bounded, so as to ensure that data remains useful for applications
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such as location privacy preserving services. We refer to this approach as utility con­
strained. However, as first pointed out by Machanavajjhala et al. [85], both group-size 
and utility constrained methods may result in an unacceptably low level of privacy 
protection. As a result, some protection constrained methods [85, 124, 80, 71] were 
proposed, introducing additional protection constraints that released data must sat­
isfy. These constraints can be a minimum score in /-diversity or other protection 
criteria discussed earlier in Section 2.1.2.
Reference Optimisation objective Utility Protection
[76, 25, 77] 
[78, 127, 35]
group-size constrained optimal
[53] utility constrained guarantee
[85, 124, 80, 71] protection constrained optimal guarantee
Table 2 .1 1 : Summary of existing grouping strategies w.r.t. their objectives
We now summarise the approaches discussed above as shown in Table 2.11 and 
compare them using two criteria that are important in applications [51, 4, 99]: whether 
they can optimise or guarantee data utility and whether they can optimise or guar­
antee privacy protection. As can be seen, the protection constrained approach is the 
only one that attem pts to satisfy both data utility and privacy protection require­
ments, by achieving optimal utility for a certain protection requirement. However, it 
does not consider how utility and protection can be balanced, as it treats protection 
as a constraint anonymised data needs to satisfy and not as an optimisation objective. 
Furthermore, it can also be observed tha t none of the existing approaches can provide 
both data utility and protection guarantees.
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V alue reco d in g
There are three major techniques to recode QID values in data groups: bucketisation 
[123], microaggregation [43, 44] and generalisation 2 [110, 106]. Bucketisation works 
by releasing two separate tables Tq and Ta which contain the values of T  in QIDs 
and SAs respectively, and a group membership attribute Group-id which specifies 
the associations between tuples in Tq and Ts. For example, Tables 2.12 and 2.13 are 
a pair of tables that together form a bucketisation of Table 2.1. Bucketisation allows 
data linkage between Tq and an external dataset, and achieves Ar-anonymity linkage 
between Group IDs.
Id P os tcode G roup-id
ti NW10 1
I2 NW15 1
I3 NW12 1
U NVV13 1
h NW20 2
te NW30 2
h NW30 2
Is NW25 2
Id G roup-id Salary  (K )
t\ 1 10
£ 2 1 10
£ 3 1 10
U 1 10
£ 5 2 20
2 40
h 2 40
2 30
Table 2.12: Table containing Table 2.13: Table containing
QIDs (Tq) SAs (Ts)
In contrast to bucketisation, microaggregation and generalisation explicitly distort 
QID values to make data linkage difficult. Microaggregation involves replacing a group 
of values in a QID using the group centroid [43] or median value [44] for numerical 
and categorical QIDs respectively. Generalisation suggests replacing QID values by 
more general but semantically consistent ones. Two generalisation models, called 
global and local recoding, have been proposed in the literature. In what follows, we
2We view suppression, i.e. tuple removal, as a special case of generalisation following [19].
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briefly discuss these models and refer the reader to [76, 81] for more details and formal 
definitions.
Global recoding involves mapping the domain of QIDs into generalised values [76, 
25], often consistently with DGHs. One such method uses full domain generalisation 
[106], where the entire domain of each QID is mapped to a more general domain, in a 
consistent way, i.e. all original QID values are mapped to generalised ones that lie at 
the same level of the given DGH for this QID. An example of this recoding model is 
shown in Figure 2.8. Given the hierarchy for Postcode shown in Figure 2.2, the values 
AW 10 and N W 12 are mapped to ATF[10 — 15], N W 16 to AW[16 — 19], and ATF20 
and AW21 to AW[20 — 30]. Observe that all of the generalised values lie at the same 
level of the DGH shown in Figure 2.2. Iyengar [64] considered a more flexible model 
called full subtree generalisation, according to which the path from each original value 
to the root in the DGH contains no more than one generalised value. For instance, 
when the full subtree model is employed, the values AW10 and NW 12  are mapped 
to ATF[10 — 15], but ArlF16 is mapped to AW[16], as shown in Figure 2.8. This 
is because A W  16 is the only value in the path from N W  16 to * according to the 
hierarchy illustrated in Figure 2.2.
These models have been shown to enhance the efficiency of fc-anonymisation 
methods by pruning the search space of generalisations, and to ensure semantical 
consistency of anonymised data. But they may incur excessive information loss 
[96, 25]. Thus, recent research has dropped the restrictions imposed by DGHs. 
Bayardo et al. [25] proposed an ordered set-partitioning model which uses a to­
tal order instead of a DGH. According to this model, generalised values in a QID 
need to define a partition according to the total order associated with this QID. 
For instance, given a totally ordered set {NW1Q, NW12, N W \6 ,  NW20, N W 2 1 } , 
the values in Postcode shown in Figure 2.8 can be generalised using a partition
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{ {N W 1 Q ,N W 1 2 } ,{N W 1 6 } ,{N W 2 Q ,N W 2 1 }} .  Li et al. [81] considered an un­
ordered set-partitioning scheme in which generalised values in this QID need to de­
fine a partition in the domain of this QID. In this model, a DGH or total order for 
a QID is not required. For example, the postcode values shown in Figure 2.8 can be 
generalised as {{AUTO, :VHT6 }, {AHV12}, {NW 20, NW21}}. Values in a QID are 
recoded by sets when ordered or unordered set-partitioning models are used.
P o stc .o d c
XWlO
XWlJ
nwk;
XW'IG
X\Y2o
XW21
| NWI10-151 NW[16-19] NW[20-30]|
Full domain
NWI10-15] NWI16] NW120-30] |
Full subtree
{NW10.NW12} {NW16} {NW20.NW21}
Ordered set-partitioning
| {NW10.NW16} I {NW12} [ {NW20.NW21} | 
Unordered set-partitioning
Figure 2.8: Global recoding under different single-dimensional models
All of the recoding models discussed so far are single-dimensional, i.e. they recode 
the domain of each QID separately. A multi-dimensional generalisation model that 
recodes the m ulti-attribute domain of QID values was proposed by LeFevre et al. [77] 
to further enhance utility. The main difference from the single-dimensional models 
is that two tuples having the same value in a QID attribute may be generalised 
differently. For instance, the postcode value N W 16  in Figure 2.9 is generalised both 
as ArH”[10 — 16] and *, when multi-dimensional global recoding is used.
Some works use local recoding, mapping QID values of individual tuples into gen­
eralised ones on a group by group basis [127]. Similarly to the multi-dimensional 
global recoding model, tuples with the same value in a QID attribute can be gen­
eralised differently in different groups when local recoding is used. However, local 
recoding differs from the multi-dimensional global recoding model in that it allows
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A««‘ P o s f t UM l c
10 NW10
10 NW12
10 NW16
10 NW16
20 NW16
20 NW20
20 NW21
A P i m t c t H l c
10 NW[10-16]
10 NW[10-16]
10 NW[ 10-16]
10 NW[10-16]
20 *
20 *
20 *
A«t- P u s t c w l f
10 NW[10-16]
10 NW[10-16]
10 NW[10-16]
* NW16
* NW16
20 NW[20-21]
20 NW[20-21]
Multi-dimensional Local recoding
global recoding
Figure 2.9: Multi-dimensional global and local recoding models
tuples with the same values in all QIDs to be placed into different groups. For exam­
ple, as illustrated in Figure 2.9, the two tuples having values 10 and N W 16  in Age 
and Postcode respectively belong to different groups after anonymisation. Local re­
coding is a more general model than global recoding and was shown to achieve better 
data utility among all generalisation models [127, 35, 96]. Figure 2.10 summarises 
the discussed recoding models for generalisation.
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Recoding models for generalisation 
global recoding local recoding
single-dimensional multi-dimensional
full-domain full-subtree set-partitioning
ordered unordered
Reference Recoding model
[106] Full-domain
[64] Full-subtree
[25] Ordered set-partitioning
[81] Unordered set-partitioning
[77] Multi-dimensional
[127] Local recoding
Figure 2.10: A classification of generalisation recoding models
2.2 R elated Privacy-Preserving Techniques
As we pointed out in Introduction, apart from A:-anonymisation, other privacy- 
preserving techniques exist. These are designed either to prevent individual iden­
tification by ensuring that data published by a trusted data collector/publisher is 
sufficiently protected, or to guard against an untrusted data collect or/user attem pt­
ing to breach privacy by bypassing security mechanisms and mining data in a certain 
way. We refer to the first case as "privacy-preserving data publication” and the sec­
ond as "privacy-preserving data usage” , and we briefly review them in Sections 2.2.1 
and 2 /2 . 2  respectively.
2.2.1 P rivacy-P reserving D a ta  P ub lication
Generally speaking, protecting privacy in the data publication scenario is typically 
achieved by masking data before its release. Techniques that do so by seeking to
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release specific data about each individual [110, 124, 123, 95], or by attempting to 
preserve aggregate information (e.g. statistical information [1 0 0 ] or data distribution 
[2 2 ]) in the released data have been proposed.
Techniques of the first category are closely related to fc-anonymisation since they 
share the same goal: hiding individuals’ identity while enabling examination of data 
representing an individual. The most commonly used of these technologies is de­
identification [73]. That is, replacing identifying attributes (e.g. names or phone 
numbers) by a generated key (e.g. a unique positive integer). De-identification is 
simple to perform and compliant with many privacy rules, such as the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration [10] or HIPAA guidelines [13]. However, as mentioned in 
Introduction, this technique is unable to protect privacy when public data can be 
linked to de-identified one.
Ar-Anonymisation exerts the same amount of privacy for the data about each indi­
vidual contained in the dataset. However, individuals may want to specify the level 
of data protection that they will receive from anonymised data based on their per­
sonal preferences. In response, Xiao and Tao proposed Personalised anonymity [124]. 
This privacy model differs from A;-anonymisation in that the group size is not lower- 
bounded by k , i.e. anonymised groups can contain any number of tuples. Thus, this 
approach may not provide as strong protection from data linkage as /c-anonymisation. 
since a released tuple may correspond to a single individual in the original dataset. 
Furthermore, Personalised anonymity applies generalisation to SA values in order to 
increase protection, and thus it may incur excessive information loss compared to 
approaches that allow original SA values to be released [85, 71, 80].
Techniques that attem pt to publish protected data that preserves aggregate infor­
mation are also important. However, they should not be considered as alternatives 
to A>anonymisation for two reasons. First, they may perturb data in a way that 
an individual’s record cannot be examined separately, e.g. by releasing values that
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are not semantically consistent with this individual’s original values. Second, despite 
hiding individuals’ personal information, these techniques do not attem pt to prevent 
data linkage.
Techniques falling into this category include data suppression, synthetic data gen­
eration, data swapping and randomisation. Data suppression [46, 23] works by re­
moving unique or rare attribute values that are likely to breach privacy before data 
release, while synthetic data generation does not release the original dataset, but a 
synthetic one that preserves order statistics (e.g mean and variance) instead [105, 89]. 
However, much of the useful information included in the original data may be lost 
when either of these techniques is used. Data swapping [42, 100, 97] addresses this 
limitation by swapping the values so that much useful information, such as count 
and order statistics, are preserved. Randomisation involves adding noise to data in a 
way that “accurate models without access to precise information in individual data 
record” can be constructed [22]. Agrawal et al. [22] were the first to show how data 
distribution may be estimated fairly accurately from randomised data. A number of 
works considered applying randomisation to allow data mining tasks, such as classi­
fication [131], association rule mining [103] and top-k query answering [126], to be 
performed in a privacy-preserving way.
2.2.2 P rivacy-preserving D ata  U sage
We now briefly consider techniques that attem pt to prevent an untrusted data collec­
tor/user to breach data privacy. Detailed discussion on these techniques, which are 
orthogonal to A>anonymisation, can be found in [15, 116].
One way to guarantee data privacy in this setting is to prohibit illegitimate access 
to data. This is often achieved by using encryption [20, 60] or access control methods 
[55, 107, 104, 102]. Encryption has been used in numerous applications, such as to 
protect outsourced data from an untrusted service provider [60] (e.g. a company that
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modifies data stored by clients in its database or sells it to third parties) or to enable 
privacy preserving data integration [20]. Access control has been used in applications 
ranging from traditional database systems [55, 107] to multi-level secure ones, where 
users are grouped according to their security clearance level and can only manage 
data appropriate to their level [27].
Alternatively, some works attem pt to control how data is used by employing query 
auditing [15, 6 8 ] or secure function evaluation [129]. Generally speaking, query audit­
ing attem pts to check whether a collection of queries which may compromise privacy 
have been performed, while the goal of secure function evaluation is to enable a num­
ber of parties to learn the result of a function while keeping their input private [129]. 
Techniques based on secure function evaluation were recently used to solve a number 
of data mining problems in a privacy-preserving way [114, 115, 6 6 , 128, 34].
We classify the existing privacy-preserving technologies in Figure 2.11 and sum­
marise their characteristics in Table 2.14.
Privacy-preserving techniques
Data publication Data usage
individual-specific
information
preservation
aggregate
information
preservation
access
restriction
data use 
control
Figure 2.11: A classification of privacy-preserving techniques
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Reference Privacy Goal Technique
[73] indiv. inform, preserv. de-identification
[124] indiv. inform, preserv. personalised anonymity
[46, 23] aggreg. inform, preserv. data suppression
[105, 89] aggreg. inform, preserv. synthetic data generation
[42, 100, 97] aggreg. inform, preserv. data swapping
[22, 131, 103, 126] aggreg. inform, preserv. randomisation
[2 0 , 60] access restriction encryption
[55, 107, 104, 102, 27] access restriction access control
[15, 6 8 ] data use control query auditing
[129, 114, 115, 6 6 , 128, 34] data use control secure function evaluation
Table 2.14: Summary of privacy-preserving techniques
2.3 Sum m ary
In this chapter, we surveyed the existing A;-anonymisation techniques that have been 
developed for privacy-preserving data publishing. We discussed existing utility and 
protection metrics, and considered three main components of a A>anonymisation al­
gorithm: search strategy, optimisation objective and value recoding strategy. We also 
reviewed other privacy-preserving technologies that can help provide protection for 
data publication and data usage. We have seen that some data publication tech­
niques. such as de-identification, allow publishing specific data about each individual, 
while others, such as randomisation, attem pt to preserve aggregate information about 
individuals. Different from &-anonymisation, these techniques cannot provide strong 
protection for data linkage. Finally, we described a number of technologies that a t­
tempt to provide protection for data that may be used by an untrusted user.
Despite the progress that has been made in /c-anonymisation in terms of quality 
measures and optimisation methods, there are still issues outstanding. In terms of 
utility measurement, with the exception of those based on reconstruction probability, 
most utility measures cannot capture the accuracy of a wide range of tasks that need
to be performed using anonymised data. In terms of protection measurement, exist­
ing criteria focus largely on value disclosure, and those providing protection for range 
disclosure are either applicable to numerical attributes only, or can incur excessive 
information loss. Moreover, current fc-anonymisation methods use partitioning or 
clustering to form groups, and tend to focus on either execution efficiency or quality 
of produced anonymisations, rather than aiming to achieve both. Finally, existing 
approaches tend to optimising utility or guaranteeing protection, and have not con­
sidered how anonymised data with a ugood” level of both data utility and protection 
may be produced. The ability to meet these requirements in /c-anonymisation is 
desirable for many applications.
Chapter 3 
Trade-Off Constrained  
A>Anonymisation
The requirement for a good A>anonymisation is two-fold. On the one hand, the sen­
sitive information associated with individuals contained in the dataset needs to be 
protected, and on the other hand released data should be useful in analysis. Ideally, 
anonymisations should maximise both protection and utility, but this is computation­
ally impossible [85]. Many existing works follow a ‘‘protection constrained'’ approach,
i.e. they attem pt to satisfy utility and protection requirements by providing a suffi­
cient level of protection while minimising information loss [85, 80, 71].
While minimising information loss is generally beneficial to data users, we claim 
that it may not represent the best interest of anonymisers or the individuals contained 
in the data. Suppose, for example, that there are 3 /c-anonymisations (a, b and 
c) possible for a dataset, as shown in Figure 3.1. If the only requirement for the 
anonvmisation is that it satisfies a minimum level of protection, then a is preferred as 
it offers more utility. This is what the protection constrained methods are designed 
to deliver. However, in some applications both data users and anonymisers may 
demand that data utility and privacy protection be kept as high as possible. For
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example, in location privacy preserving systems, location information of mobile users 
(e.g. mobile phone holders) is anonymised before being released to location-based 
service providers. Naturally, the data anonymiser in this case would like to link the 
current location of a mobile user to as a large geographical region as possible in 
order to provide adequate protection for him (i.e. having anonymisation b in Figure 
3.1). Equally, the service providers in this case would prefer to have the geographical 
region associated with the mobile user as small as possible, so that they can provide 
more targeted service for him (i.e. having anonymisation a in Figure 3.1). In such 
scenarios, we argue that it is important to consider how to achieve a balance between 
data utility and privacy protection. That is, we should aim to derive c instead of a 
or b in Figure . which offers a good utility/protection trade-off.
high low
utility
protection
high low
minimum level o f  protection required
Figure 3.1: A'-Anonymisation approaches
A Trade-O ff C onstrained ^-A nonym isation  M ethod
In response, we propose a method that allows this flexibility. Different from the 
protection constrained approach, our approach can represent an anonymiser’s best 
interest in achieving an “optimal" trade-off between utility and protection. Consider 
Table 3.1 for example. We assume that Id is a tuple identifier which we use for 
illustration purposes, Age and Postcode are QIDs and Salary is an SA. Tables 3.2
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and 3.3 illustrate two different 4-anonymisations of Table 3.1. Intuitively, Tables 3.2 
and 3.3 can be considered as having exercised a different trade-off between utility 
and protection. For example, approximating the postcode value for the individual 
represented by 11 using Table 3.2 is easier than doing so based on Table 3.3, as the 
number of possible postcode values this individual may have is smaller using Table
3.2. However, Table 3.2 can be considered as less protected than Table 3.3, as for 
instance, more accurate sensitive salary information can be inferred for the individual 
represented by t\ when Table 3.2 is used. Knowing that this individual is aged 30, 
Table 3.2 would allow one to infer tha t this individual’s salary is 10K, while one can 
only infer a much larger range [10K  — 40K) when Table 3.3 is used.
Id Age Postcode Salary (K )
30 NW10 1 0
h 32 NW15 1 0
t3 37 NW12 1 0
U 40 NW13 1 0
h 45 NW20 2 0
*6 46 NW30 40
t7 57 NW30 40
h 60 NW25 30
Table 3.1: Original data
Id Age Postcode Salary (K )
t \ [30-40] NW[10-15] 1 0
t2 [30-40] NW[10-15] 1 0
h [30-40] NW[10-15] 1 0
t-4 [30-40] NW[10-15] 1 0
h [45-60] NW[20-30] 2 0
*6 [45-60] NW [20-30] 40
*7 [45-60] NW [20-30] 40
ts [45-60] NW [20-30] 30
Table 3.2: A 4-anonymisation of Table 3.1
A TRADE-OFF CONSTRAINED K-ANO NYM ISATION METHOD 48
Id Age Postcode Salary (K)
t\ [30-46] NW[10-30] 1 0
t2 [30-46] NW[10-30] 1 0
[30-46] NW[10-30] 2 0
h [30-46] NW [10-30] 40
h [37-60] NW[12-30] 1 0
<4 [37-60] NW[12-30] 1 0
*7 [37-60] NW[12-30] 40
ta [37-60] NW[12-30] 30
Table 3.3: Another 4-anonymisation of Table 3.1
The above example suggests one way of realising the utility/privacy trade-off: 
by balancing information loss in QIDs for data utility and range formation in SAs 
for privacy protection. Our approach to achieving an anonymisation with a util­
ity/protection trade-off is based on this observation. Since data contains QID and 
SA values that can be grouped in many different ways depending on the quality 
requirements [44]. we first need to consider how utility and protection can be cap­
tured using quality measures. We then need to consider how anonymised data with 
“good'’ quality in terms of both utility and protection can be generated by incor­
porating these measures in an optimisation algorithm. Furthermore, it is essential 
that we can handle QIDs and SAs on equal terms, since this makes it possible to 
achieve a utility/protection trade-off. For instance, trading-off classification accuracy 
of anonymised data using the C M  measure (see Definition 2.1.6) with /-diversity 
(see Definition 2.1.7) is theoretically possible, but is difficult in practice since these 
measures treat QIDs and SAs very differently.
In this thesis, we develop distance-based criteria that can capture the util­
ity/privacy trade-off and treat QIDs and SAs uniformly. We show that our notion of 
distance on QIDs attem pts to capture information loss based on the accuracy of re­
constructing original values from generalised data, and it is applicable to both numer­
ical and categorical QIDs. We explore the relation between adversarial background
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knowledge and the protection offered by k-anonymisation, and propose a measure to 
capture protection based on the maximum range of SA values in a group. Intuitively, 
when this range in a group is small, it is more likely for an attacker to establish the 
sensitive information associated with the individuals represented in this group.
We also propose an efficient algorithmic framework for /c-anonymising data. Our 
method has a number of useful features:
• It produces anonymisations writh a desired utility/protection trade-off. This is 
achieved by controlling the weighted sum of the amount of generalisation of 
QIDs and the amount of protection of SAs, as they are captured using our 
quality criteria.
• It uses a local recoding strategy to generalise QID values [127, 35]. This model 
considers a much larger number of different anonymisations [44] than the full- 
domain global recoding model employed by most protection constrained meth­
ods [85, 80], and thus can achieve better data utility [77, 121].
• It achieves both quality and efficiency in the /c-anonymisation process by com­
bining clustering with partitioning-based grouping strategies.
• It is practical to use, since it can be configured using fast and accurate sample- 
based heuristics and employs a flexible strategy to handle data skewness.
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. In Section 3.1 we discuss how 
data utility and privacy protection are captured. We present our basic algorithmic 
framework and sample-based heuristics for it in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 respectively. 
Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.
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3.1 O ptim ality Criteria
This section presents optimality criteria for utility and protection. For each criterion, 
its relation to existing criteria is also discussed.
3.1.1 U tility  C riterion
Generalised data contains less information than original data, hence may affect the ac­
curacy of some tasks that are performed on it. As discussed in Chapter 2, data utility 
is captured by either assessing how well anonymised data supports an intended task 
(e.g. classification accuracy [49]) or by directly measuring information loss incurred 
by generalisation [106, 25, 127, 96].
We propose measuring utility by quantifying information loss based on the accu­
racy of reconstructing original values from generalised data. To illustrate this idea, 
observe that tuple i\ in Table 3.1 can be mapped to a point {nAge(ti),n s a l a r y {t\)) in 
the 2D space defined by Age and Salary, where and salary{ti) denotes the
projection of t\ on Age and Salary respectively.
Id Age Salary (K )
t\ [30-40] 1 0
t2 [30-40] 1 0
t3 [30-40] 1 0
U [30-40] 1 0
tb [45-60] 2 0
*6 [45-60] 40
<7 [45-60] 40
ts [45-60] 30
Table 3.4: A 4-anonymisation of Table 3.1
Now assume that Table 3.1 has been anonymised to Table 3.4. Due to generali­
sation, we can no longer be sure of ti 's  original value, but we can model t\ using a
O P T IM A L IT Y  CRITERIA  51
I
probability density function f (x) ,  where x  is a random variable in the 2D space de­
fined by Age and Salary. W ithout additional information and following the principle 
of indifference [65], it is assumed that the real age values in Table 3.4 are uniformly 
distributed and attributes are independent. Thus, f ( x )  can be computed as
Yi > itAgeix) € [30 -  40] and 7rSa/ary(x) = 10
f i x )  =
0 , otherwise
since the value of t\ in Age lies in any point in [30 — 40] with equal probability. 
Intuitively, the wider the interval in which /KAge{x) lies, the less accurately we can 
reconstruct the value of t\ w.r.t. Age.
Generalising the previous example, assume a table T (a1? ...,ad) comprised of d 
attributes, m  of wrhich are QIDs and the remaining are SAs, and a A;-anonymisation 
T * of T. Furthermore, consider a tuple t belonging to a fc-anonymous group r  in 
T*. For each QID ai,z =  1, tuple t has a generalised value 7rai(r) which is an
interval enclosing the original value of t in a,, and for each SA = (m + 1), ...,d, 
t has its original value 7ra,(t). Given a random variable x in the d-dimensional space 
R defined by a i,...,ad , t can be modelled using a probability distribution function 
g(x) : R  —> [0, l]d such that
9(x) = <
P , 7Ta.(-r) e  na,(T), Vi = 1,..., m  and 7ra,(x) =  na,(t),Vi =  (m + 1), ...,d 
0 , otherwise
where p denotes the probability x takes the original value of t in each attribute or 
equivalently the probability of reconstructing the original values of t in all attributes 
using r. To compute p , we observe that r  can be represented as a d-dimensional hyper­
rectangle H( t ), having a side length |7ra, ( r ) |  that is equal to the number of possible
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values a tuple in r  may have w.r.t. a*, for i = 1, m, and to 1, for i = (m  +  1 ) , d.
m
Let also V(H(r) )  be the volume of H(r) ,  which is given by V ( H ( t )) =
i=i
Using this notation, p can be computed as
P
f l k a i W I
1 = 1
Thus, when the number of QID values that generalised tuples may have is large, 
reconstructing the values of these tuples become less accurate, and hence data utility 
becomes low.
Q -d iversity
To quantify information loss, we first introduce Q-diversity, a measure that captures 
the distance between a set of QID values.
D efin ition  3.1.1 (Q-diversity). Assume that a is a QID, the domain of a is Da, and 
Ua C Da is a subset of values obtained from a. The Q-diversity of Va, denoted by 
qd(Va), is defined as
maxima)-mzn(Va) numerical values 
maxi  D a ) —mini  u a )
qd(Va)=  ;
fbV-T categorical values
where max(Va), m in(Va), m ax(D a) and m in(D a) denote maximum and minimum  
values in Va and Da respectively. I f  a DGH h exists for a, then s(Va) is the number 
of leaves of the subtree of h rooted at the closest common ancestor of the values in Va. 
Otherwise, s(Va) is the number of distinct values in Va. \Da\ is the size of domain
Da.
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For a numerical QID, distances are naturally captured using the Euclidean dis­
tance. For a categorical attribute, however, there is no ordering among its values 
and distance between them is often defined in terms of their semantic relationships 
specified by a user-defined DGH. Given a DGH, we define distance between a group
closest common ancestor of these values to the domain size, subtracting 1 from each 
term to achieve a range of [0,1]. If there is no hierarchy for a categorical attribute, 
we assume a flat DGH comprised of two levels: the ground level containing original 
values and the top level containing a generalised value.
Based on Q-diversity. we define Utility Measure (UM) to be the average Q-diversity 
across groups over all m  QIDs, assuming attribute independence.
D efin ition  3.1.2 (Utility Measure (UM)). Assume that a table T  comprised of m  
QIDs { a i , . . .  ,a m} is partitioned into groups {pi,p2, . . . , gh}, such that \gj\ > k, 1 < 
j  < h, and tuples of gj will have the same values in each QID after anonymisation. 
The Utility Measure is defined as
where qd(irQi(gj)) denotes the Q-diversity of group gj w.r.t. ai; 1 < j  < h and 
1 < i < m.
UM measures the perimeter of the hyper-rectangle of a generalised group (nor­
malised by the number of dimensions). Since a hyper-rectangle with a small perimeter 
has also a small volume, a small UM score implies that the values of generalised data 
can be reconstructed accurately, and thus the level of data utility provided by this 
data is high. We note that we do not measure the volume of the hyper-rectangle of a 
group, since this may not achieve a uniform handling of all QIDs. This is because the
of categorical values as the ratio of the number of leaves of the subtree rooted at the
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volume of the hyper-rectangle of a group is biased towards QIDs with small domains 
[26]. Example 3.1.1 illustrates how UM can be computed.
E x am p le  3.1.1. Consider Table 3.2. Age is a numerical QID and Postcode a cate­
gorical QID whose values have been generalised according to the DGH shown in Figure
3.2. We first show how the Q-diversity score for the first group in Table 3.2 w.r.t. 
Age is computed. The ranges in Age for this group and the entire Table 3.2 are 
[30 — 40] and [30 — 60] respectively, thus the Q-diversity score for this group w.r.t Age 
is =  5 q- We can also compute the Q-diversity score w.r.t. Postcode for the
same group in Table 3.2. According to the DGH in Figure 3.2, the closest common 
ancestor of values in this group is ATU[10 — 15], and the node iVW[10 — 15] in Fig­
ure 3.2 has 6  children (i.e. N W  10, N W l l , ..., N W l b ) ,  while the entire DGH has 21 
leaves in total. Thus, the Q-diversity score w.r.t. Postcode for the first group in Table
3.2 is = ^j. Similarly, we can compute the Q-diversity scores w.r.t. Age and 
Postcode for the second group in Table 3.2, which are ^  and respectively. Thus, 
the UM score for Table 3.2 is avg{\ x (|2 +  A), I x (1| +  12)) _  |2_
London
NW[10-151 NWJ16-19] NW(20-30]
NW10^NW11 ^ .^ N W 15 NW16 NW17 NW18" NW19 NW 20^NW 2T^TlslW 30  
Figure 3.2: A DGH for Postcode in Table 3.2
R e la tio n  o f U tility  M easu re  to  e x is tin g  u tility  m easures
As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, the Discernability Metric [25] and the Normalised 
Average Equivalence Class Size Metric [77] penalise a tuple based on the size of 
the group it belongs. However, the group size alone may not accurately capture
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information loss, since groups of the same size may be generalised differently. In 
contrast, UM takes into account how values are generalised and thus captures the 
distribution of QID values more precisely.
E x am p le  3.1.2. Consider Tables 3.2 and 3.3. Since both of these tables have two 
groups comprised of four tuples each, they have the same score in the Discemability 
Metric and the Normalised Average Equivalence Class Size Metric. In contrast, Table
3.2 has a smaller UM score compared to that of Table 3.3, since Table 3.2 has smaller 
ranges in Age and Postcode. We argue that UM correctly identifies Table 3.2 as 
incurring less information loss than Table 3.3, as it is intuitively plausible.
We also note tha t UM  is fundamentally different from utility measures that are 
based on the height of DGHs [106, 19]. Recall from Section 2.1.1 that, given a group 
of tuples, these measures quantify utility based on the level to which a generalised 
value lies at a DGH. UM , on the contrary, is directly related to the probability 
of reconstructing a tuple from generalised data. The main difference between the 
measures of [106. 19) and UM is highlighted in Example 3.1.3.
E x am p le  3.1.3. Consider two tables that have a single QID Postcode and are com­
prised of two tuples each. The postcode values in the first table are {NW10,  NW13}  
and those in the second are {ATU20, NW23) .  Furthermore, assume that these ta­
bles are 2 -anonymised so that their tuples have generalised values NW[10 — 15] and 
N W [ 20 — 30). Since these generalised values lie in the second level of the DGH shown 
in Figure 3.2 the measures proposed in [106, 19] consider both tables as equally use­
ful. However, the probability of reconstructing a tuple (see the equation on p. 52) is 
1 5 - 1  o+'i' % 0-167 and 30_^Q+1 «  0.091 for the first and second table respectively. Since 
the first table allows reconstructing the postcode values more precisely than the second, 
the first table is considered to be more useful. This is the case with the UM measure, 
with the UM scores being ~  q.25 and ^  0-5 for the first and second table
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respectively.
Furthermore, unlike the utility measures proposed in [106, 19], UM  allows all 
types of QID, numerical or categorical and with or without DGHs, to be handled 
uniformly.
Finally, we should note that information loss is quantified on a per group basis. 
Thus, UM is conceptually different from the Normalised Certainty Penalty [127] and 
other metrics based on the probability of reconstructing original QID values [64, 96, 
124]. These measures all work on a per tuple basis. Thus, our approach allows to 
compare anonymisations of datasets with different characteristics in terms of their 
utility, as UM is independent of the dimensionality and cardinality of the table.
3.1 .2  P ro tection  M easure
This section presents a measure that captures the effect of data ranges on the protec­
tion of individuals’ sensitive information. Before presenting our measure, we briefly 
consider a motivating example.
As discussed in Chapter 2, A:-anonymity attempts to break harmful data linkage, 
but may not prevent sensitive information from being disclosed when the data in an 
SA is not diverse enough. To illustrate this, we applied an existing A:-anonymisation 
method [77] to the Adults dataset [59] (a benchmark dataset for A:-anonymisation 
algorithms), w'hich contains census data of approximately 30000 US citizens. We 
used different values of k and measured the range in Occupation, which was treated 
as a numerical SA in this experiment. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, when k was set 
to 2, 57% of the SA groups had a zero range. This means that sensitive information 
about individuals can be accurately inferred if we know that someone’s profile matches 
the QID values in one of these groups. Note that using a larger k may not eliminate 
the problem. For example, 21% of the SA groups still had a zero range when k was
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set to  5, as illustrated in Figure 3.4.
Ranges of groups (k=2)
9 00 0  -|
t/>Q-
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E
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Figure 3.3: #  SA groups vs. range length (k =  2)
Ranges of groups (k=5)
1000  - |
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
range length
Figure 3.4: #  SA groups vs. range length (k =  5)
As a narrower range w .r.t. SA values in a group may allow one to infer sensitive 
information more accurately, we can directly capture protection offered by a group 
by measuring the length of range w .r.t. the SA.
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D efin ition  3 .1.3 (S-diversity). Assume that a is an SA, the domain of a is Da, and
where max(VQ), m in(Va), max ( Da) and min(Da) denote maximum and minimum  
values in Va and Da respectively. I f  a DGH h exists for a, then s(Va) is the number
We note tha t S-diversity uses a similar notion of distance to the one used in 
Q-diversity (see Definition 3.1.1). This ensures that QIDs and SAs are handled uni­
formly, and is essential to generate anonymisations with a “good” trade-off between 
utility and protection in a practical way. Furthermore, S-diversity shares much of 
the flexibility with the Q-diversity measure. Different from most existing protection 
measures [85, 71, 124, 121], S-diversity is applicable to both numerical and categorical 
SAs, and can handle datasets with multiple SAs.
Based on S-diversity. we define Max-range Protection Measure (MPM) to be the 
average S-diversity across groups over all QIDs, assuming attribute independence. 
Intuitively. MPM reflects the average amount of protection that each group of tuples 
offers, and a small score is preferred.
D efin ition  3.1.4 (Max-range Protection Measure (MPM)). Assume that a table T  
comprised of m  SAs { a j , . . . ,  am} is clustered into groups {g\,g2 , • • • ,gh}, such that 
\gj\ > k, 1 < j  < h, and tuples of gj will have the same values in each QID after 
anonymisation. The Max-range Protection Measure of T  under this clustering is
Va Q Da is a subset of values obtained from a. The S-diversity of Va, denoted by 
sd(Va), is defined as
sd{Va) =
} m*nS%\ numerical values
TTlflX( Z /q  )  ™ ? 7 l t f l ( D a  /
V
! _  8(Vg) - 1 
IA.I-1 categorical values
of leaves of the subtree of h rooted at the closest common ancestor of the values in Va. 
Otherwise, s(Va) is the number of distinct values in Va. \Da\ is the size of domain
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defined as
j  m ^  m
m pm  = avg(— x V 'sd (7 rat(#i) ) , . . . ,  — x Y]sd{7rat(gh))) 
m  mi=i i=i
where sd(7Tai(gj)) denotes the S-diversity of group gj w.r.t. aiy 1 < i < m.
Example 3.1.4 illustrates how MPM can be computed.
E x am p le  3.1.4. Consider Table 3.3. Salary is a numerical SA. We first show how the 
S-diversity score for the first group in Table 3.3 w.r.t. Salary can be computed. The 
range in Salary fo r this group is [10 — 40], which is the range for the entire Table 3.3 
w.r.t Salary. Thus, the S-diversity score for this group w.r.t Salary is 1 — = 0.
Similarly, we can compute the S-diversity score w.r.t. Salary for the second group in 
Table 3.3. The range in Salary for this group is [30 — 10], hence its S-diversity score 
is 1 — | . This suggests that the first group offers better protection than the
second one does. Finally, the MPM score for Table 3.3 is mpm = avg(0, | )  =  | .
R e la tio n  o f M P M  to  e x is tin g  p ro te c tio n  m easu res
A protection measure based on the idea of maximising ranges was also independently 
proposed by Koudas et al. [71]. As discussed in Section 2.1.2, it works by maximising 
the range in a group w.r.t. a numerical SA, and therefore it is similar to our MPM 
measure. LeFevre et al. [78] proposed to “disperse” the SA values in a group, using 
the variance of an numerical SA to capture protection. None of these protection 
measures can be applied to categorical SAs. This limits their applicability, since 
many datasets that need to be A>anonymised in practice contain mixed sensitive 
attributes. In contrast, our measure uses S-diversity and can handle both numerical 
and categorical attributes in a uniform way.
Several protection measures have also been proposed by considering the distri­
bution of SA values rather than the range. These measures follow three general
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approaches. The distribution controlling approach followed by /-diversity [85] and 
other measures discussed in Section 2.1.2 [121, 113, 39], the distribution mirroring 
approach followed by /-closeness [80], and the distribution hiding approach followed 
by the measure proposed in [124]. Different from these measures, MPM is based 
on the length of ranges to capture protection, and offers a number of benefits com­
pared to the distribution-based measures. Unlike the measures which are based on 
distribution control, MPM allows the handling of SAs with ordered domains (i.e. nu­
merical SAs or categorical SAs with hierarchies). This makes our measure applicable 
to a wider class of datasets. Compared to /-closeness, MPM attempts to prevent 
inferences irrespectively of the distribution of SA values in the entire dataset. As 
mentioned in Section 2.1.2, this is more appropriate for some applications. Finally, 
MPM differs from the measure proposed in [124] in that it allows original SA val­
ues to be released. This is particularly important, as it can reduce the amount of 
information loss incurred to anonymise data.
3.2 A lgorithm ic Framework
In this section, we present our algorithmic framework which can generate anonymi­
sations with a desired utility/protection trade-off. Our method uses both clustering 
and partitioning heuristics. That is, we first partition data into suitable sub-spaces, 
and then cluster data in each sub-space separately. Section 3.2.1 explains how greedy 
clustering can be employed to achieve high-quality anonymisations, and in Section
3.2.2 we propose the use of a multi-dimensional partitioning strategy to increase 
the efficiency of our clustering method without significantly degrading the quality of 
anonymisation.
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3.2.1 T hreshold-B ased  G reedy C lustering
Protection constrained /c-anonymisation algorithms optimise data utility while sat­
isfying a certain protection requirement [85, 80], but do not always produce data 
with a good trade-off between utility and protection [85, 106]. They often produce 
anonymisations with a high level of utility but no more than the minimal required 
level of protection. To derive A>anonymisations with “optimal” trade-off, we propose 
the following heuristic.
D efin ition  3.2.1 (Max-range Weighted Tuple Diversity). Let r  C T  be a set of tuples 
over a set of attributes A = {ai, 0 2 , ■ ■., a<f}- Without loss of generality, we assume 
that the first m  attributes are QIDs and the rest are SAs. The Max-range Weighted 
Tuple Diversity of r  w.r.t. A, denoted by m r jw td(r . A ) , is defined as:
where na,(r) denotes the projection of r  on attribute aif qd(7Tat(T)) and sd(7rat(r)) 
denote the Q-diversity and S-diversity scores for 7raj(r) respectively, wu,wp G [0,1] 
are the weights, and we require wu +  wp =  1.
The idea of combining two search objectives into one using their weighted sum 
was originally proposed in multi-objective optimisation literature [33, 98]. However, 
to the best of our knowledge, such heuristics have not been used in the context of k- 
anonymisation nor incorporated into clustering algorithms. Our formulation has two 
interesting properties. First, it allows a trade-off between utility and protection to 
be made by placing different weights on Q-diversity and S-diversity measures. These 
weights can be specified by anonymisers, and changes in them can result in differ­
ent anonymisations. Second, attributes of any type are treated uniformly, therefore 
datasets with mixed attributes can be handled.
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Using this heuristic, the problem of finding an anonymisation with an optimal 
utility/protection trade-off can be formulated as in Definition 3.2.2.
D efin ition  3.2.2 (Optimal Clustering). Let T  be a table consisting of a set of at­
tributes A =  {di, 0 2 , ,  ad}. Given a set of user specified weights wu, wp as defined 
in Definitions 3.2.1, an optimal clustering o fT  is a partition P  =  {g\ , . . .  ,gh} o f T  
such that \gj\ > k, 1 < j  < h, f)j=i 9j = Uj=i 9j =  T, and its Average Max-range 
Weighted Tuple Diversity score
is minimal.
Unfortunately, solving the optimal clustering problem is NP-hard, as illustrated 
in Theorem 3.2.1.
T h eo rem  3.2.1. The optimal clustering problem given in Definition 3.2.2 is NP- 
hard.
Proof. Aggarwal et al. proved that optimally A;-anonymising T  using suppression is 
NP-hard [19]. We observe that this is a special case of our problem, where each QID 
is categorical, having a DGH with two levels (i.e. the root level corresponds to a 
suppression symbol and leaves are original QID values), and wp = 0. Furthermore, 
verification of a partition P satisfying Definition 3.2.2 can be done in polynomial 
time. □
Thus, we introduce a heuristic threshold-based greedy clustering algorithm (shown 
in Algorithm 1) which works as follows. It randomly chooses a tuple tt from a table 
T  as a seed and makes it a cluster c (steps 2-3). Then, it iteratively extends c
h
avgjm r.w td(T , A) —
h
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with a tuple tj that is closest to ti w.r.t. the Max-range Weighted Tuple Diversity 
(m r.w td ). This is repeated until the m r.w td  of the cluster formed by adding tj to c 
exceeds a threshold 6  which controls the maximally-allowed m r.w td  score of a cluster 
(steps 4-8). Since extending c may affect both data utility and protection of the 
group, 6  is used to ensure that the quality of anonymised data in c will be acceptable 
w.r.t. some specified threshold. When 6  is exceeded, the size of cluster c is checked 
(step 9). The values of tuples contained in c are recoded if c contains at least k 
tuples, otherwise they are suppressed. We note that suppression may not always be a 
feasible choice in applications. For example, suppressing data in medical applications 
is usually unacceptable, since it may result in removing important information about 
some individuals. Acknowledging this issue, we will give an alternative strategy to 
suppression later in Section 3.3.
A lg o rith m  1 Greedy Clustering with Max-Range Weighted Tuple Diversity 
1. w hile T  ^  0 do
2. c <— L e T  ;
3. T + - T - { U } ;
4. w hile  true do
5. find tj G T  s.t. mr.wtd({t i , t j } ,  A) is minimum
6. if (m r.w td(c  U {£j}, A) > (5)
ex it;
7. c <— c U {£j};
8. 1
Fi1
9. if (|c| > k)
recode(c);
10. else
suppress c;
The proposed algorithm differs from existing clustering-based methods [35, 127, 
96] in two main ways. First, it forms clusters based on both data utility and pro­
tection. Thus, it does not simply try to optimise utility, but attempts to achieve
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a "good” utility/protection trade-off. Second, it uses a quality-based instead of a 
size-based stopping criterion. That is, it restricts the maximally-allowed information 
diversity in a cluster instead of the maximum cluster size. This is because extending 
the cluster can help protection, since the maximum range of SA values in the cluster 
cannot decrease as a result of this. Thus, extending a cluster may help the Average 
Max-range Weighted Tuple Diversity.
Therefore, we use a threshold S to control the level of utility/privacy trade-off in 
a cluster. S can be selected by anonymisers according to a specified policy or in an 
automatic way using a heuristic to be discussed in Section 3.3.
On performance. Algorithm 1 has a quadratic time complexity to the cardinality 
of the dataset, since all candidate tuples are checked for insertion into a cluster every 
time a cluster is extended. However, sorting pairwise distances between the cluster 
seed and candidate tuples can speed up clustering. This is because a cluster can be 
formed by retrieving the |c| — 1 most similar tuples to a cluster seed in 0 (|c |) time 
(|c| is the cluster size), and sorting requires log-linear time to n, the cardinality of the 
dataset. Thus, assuming that each cluster is of size |c|, the complexity of Algorithm 
1 becomes
0 (|c | +  (n — 1) x log{n — 1) +  |c| +  (n — |c| — 1) x log(n — \c\ — 1) +  ...)
~  ^ ( t t  x lcl +  r r  x l°9(n )) ~  0(t~ t x l°9{n ))|c| |c| |c|
which is smaller than 0 (n2), as typically |c| > log(n).
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3.2.2 M edian-B ased  P re-partition ing
Attempts to improving clustering performance in general have been reported in the 
literature. The main idea behind these methods is to reduce the amount of compu­
tation required by pairwise distance comparisons by restricting search spaces using 
sampling [56] (i.e. they perform clustering on a data sample and then adjust clusters 
on the entire dataset), top-down bisection [127] (i.e. they use heuristics similar to 
bisecting k-means [109]) or a cheap pre-clustering step [90] (i.e. they generate clusters 
using a cheap to compute measure and subsequently refine them based on the original 
objective measure). All these methods are not efficient when a large number of small 
clusters are to be created, which is the case in /c-anonymisation, and their similar­
ity measures do not capture utility and protection, thereby affecting the quality of 
/c-anonymisations that clustering can achieve. Thus, these solutions are not directly 
useful for /c-anonymisation.
We propose a pre-partitioning step that is geared toward improving the perfor­
mance of our threshold-based clustering without significantly affecting the quality 
of the anonymisations it produces. It follows a kd-tree type of partitioning [47, 77], 
w'hich partitions data recursively into subspaces along the median of the QID with the 
largest normalised domain. Algorithm 2 shows our method. Given a set of tuples r  
(initially the entire table T)  and a size constraint s, the algorithm recursively derives 
a partition of r  as follows. First, it finds the QID attribute of r  that has the largest 
domain size and computes its median (step 2). Then, the data is partitioned around 
the median 1 (steps 3-5) until r  cannot be further divided without violating the size 
constraint (steps 6-7).
l When multiple tuples have the median value, we put half of them in each of the resultant 
subspaces.
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A lgorithm  2 Median-Based Pre-Partitioning
1. Pre-partition (r, s)
2. find attribute aj £ Q I D  s.t. values in aj have the largest range;
3. s p l i tV a l  <— f i n d j m e d i a n ( n a](T))\
4. p  <— { t  £  r  : 7ra j (£) <  s p l i t V a l };
5. p' <— {£ £ r : 7raj(i) > s p l i t V a l };
6. if (|p| > s and |p'| > s)
Pre-partition(p, s) IJ Pre-partition(p', s);
7. else return r;
Example 3.2.1 illustrates how Algorithm 2 works.
E x am p le  3.2.1. Figure 3.5 depicts microdata of 24 individuals. Age and Height are 
the QIDs, and Algorithm 2 is applied with s set to 6. First, the ranges in Age and 
Height are compared for the whole dataset. As can be seen, the range [20-70] in Age 
is larger than the range [150-190] in Height, thus data is split on the median along 
Age. This corresponds to cut C\ in Figure 3.5. Then, Algorithm 2 is applied to each 
of the two resultant subspaces. Tuples of the first and the second subspace contain 
Age values in [20,43] and [46,70] respectively. Consider the first subspace. Since the 
range [150-190] in Height is larger than the range [20-45] in Age, data is split on 
the median along Height. This corresponds to cut C2 in Figure 3.5, and results in 
subspaces S\ and S 2 ■ Finally, Algorithm 2 is applied on the second subspace. The 
range [150-190] in Height is larger than the range [46-70] in Age. Thus, cut C3 
along Height is performed, creating subspaces S3 and S 4 .  Observe that the size of 
each of the resultant subspaces S \, and S 4  is equal to the size constraint s.
Consequently, no further split is possible without violating the size constraint and 
Algorithm 2 terminates, yielding four subspaces.
A good partitioning strategy for improving the performance of clustering in k- 
anonymisation should satisfy three criteria. First, it should allow the follow-up clus­
tering to be performed significantly more efficiently. This implies that each subspace
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Figure 3.5: Illustration of Algorithm 2 with s = 6
should contain a small number of tuples. Second, it itself must be efficient, so that 
the cost of partitioning does not offset the savings gained by clustering in smaller 
subspaces. Third, the quality of clustering should not be affected too much. We now 
discuss our partitioning strategy in terms of these criteria.
Theorem 3.2.2 below shows that a significant speed up can be achieved if the 
subspaces created by pre-partitioning are relatively small, particularly when they 
are equal-sized. We note that our median-based partitioning strategy creates nearly 
equal-sized subspaces, as a result of splitting data around the median, thus is good 
for complexity reduction. Furthermore, it can be done efficiently [77]. requiring only 
0 (n  x log(n)) time to execute.
T h eo rem  3.2.2. Pre-partitioning of a dataset T  reduces the complexity of threshold- 
based clustering performed by Algorithm 1 to 0 (s  x n), where n is the size of the
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dataset and s is the size constraint.
Proof. Let P  = {p\,.. . ,Ph} be a partition of T  created by applying Algorithm 2. 
The worst-case time complexity of Algorithm 1 when applied to each pi separately is 
0 (Y li=i |Pi|2)? which is minimised, using the standard Lagrange multiplier method 
[31], to 0 (h  x | p i | 2 ) ,  when all pi are equal-sized for a fixed h. Since we have 
]Cf=i Ip* I ~  ^ x Ip* I =  n * the complexity of threshold-based clustering with pre­
partitioning becomes 0 (\pi\ x n) «  0 (s x n). □
We now consider the quality issues. First, we study the effect of pre-partitioning 
on data utility. Obviously, by partitioning data into subspaces, we restrict the number 
of tuples to be scanned while forming a cluster. Assume that S' is a subspace and 
a cluster c is to be formed using t G S  as a seed. We observe that the quality of 
c should not be affected if the nearest neighbours of t are also in S. This problem 
has been studied extensively in the context of multi-dimensional indexes [29]. To 
illustrate this, we give the following analysis.
Suppose that a dataset is cut along a QID q and two subspaces 5/, Sr are created 
as a result. It is possible that 5/ and Sr will contain the same value in q (as we split 
at the median). In such cases, we say that the two subspaces overlap, and when this 
happens, a cluster may be better formed by considering tuples of both subspaces. 
Furthermore, as splits are based on only one QID at a time, subspaces may overlap 
in the remaining QIDs. Consider applying pre-partitioning to 2-anonymise the data 
shown in Table 3.5 with s = 2, for example. Since Age has a much larger domain than 
those of Height and Postcode, all splits are done around Age when Algorithm 2 is 
used prior to clustering. As pre-partitioning resulted in creating subspaces comprised 
of k tuples, applying clustering does not change the way data is grouped. Thus, 
data is anonymised as shown in Table 3.6. This anonymisation clearly incurs more 
information loss if we compare it to tha t shown in Table 3.7 which is derived by using
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clustering alone.
Age Height Postcode Salary (K)
10 170 NW30 20
15 175 NW32 20
15 170 NW30 65
20 175 NW32 65
20 170 NW30 20
25 175 NW32 20
25 170 NW30 65
30 175 NW32 65
Table 3.5: Original data
Age Height Postcode Salary (K)
[10-15] [170-175] NW[30-32] 20
[10-15] [170-175] NW[30-32] 20
[15-20] [170-175] NW[30-32] 65
[15-20] [170-175] NW[30-32] 65
[20-25] [170-175] NW[30-32] 20
[20-25] [170-175] NW[30-32] 20
[25-30] [170-175] NW[30-32] 65
[25-30] [170-175] NW [30-32] 65
Table 3.6: Partitioning Table 3.5
Age Height Postcode Salary (K).
[10-15] 170 NW30 20
[10-15] 170 NW30 65
[15-20] 175 NW32 20
[15-20] 175 NW32 65
[20-25] 170 NW30 20
[20-25] 170 NW30 65
[25-30] 175 NW32 20
[25-30] 175 NW32 65
Table 3.7: Clustering Table 3.5
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This is because, as illustrated in Figure 3.6, good groups depicted as small rect­
angles in the 3D space of {Age,Height,Postcode}, span across subspaces and thus are 
“broken" by pre-partitioning. Consequently, this results in less utility compared to 
w hat can be achieved when clustering w ithout pre-partitioning is applied.
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Figure 3.6: Clusters span across subspaces
So, if a clustering algorithm  does not look beyond a single subspace when deriving 
clusters, a large number of overlapping subspaces may result in poor clusters. We 
observe however that the effect of overlap is significantly reduced if we use a sufficiently 
larger s than k. Our partitioning step  ensures th a t this is the case by using a suitable 
subspace size threshold s. This threshold can be set by anonymisers or autom atically 
as we will show in Section 3.3. Unclustering tuples of rejected clusters also helps, as 
they can be grouped together with their closest neighbours th a t may lie in a different 
subspace. Furthermore, we note th a t the size and shape of clusters can also affect the
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quality of anonymisations, as small (i.e. being represented as a hyper-rectangle whose 
perimeter is smaller than that of the hyper-rectangle of their corresponding subspace) 
and similar-shaped clusters are less likely to span across several subspaces created by 
median-based partitioning [94]. Algorithm 1 specifically minimises the perimeter of 
the hyper-rectangle of clusters and uses S to create clusters of similar shape.
We now examine the impact of pre-partitioning on protection. It is easy to see that 
using a size constraint and splitting on the median as in [77], can create subspaces with 
an arbitrarily low level of protection, even when subspaces are large. For example, 
the subspaces shown in Table 3.6 have all the same value in Salary and thus offer 
no protection. However, as the quality of clusters is controlled by <5, the setting of <5 
can affect the protection and its trade-off with utility. We will give an efficient and 
effective way to set up S in Section 3.3.
3.3 A utom atic Param eter Configuration and D ata  
Skewness Handling
In this section, we propose a set of heuristics that allow the parameters used in the 
method presented in Section 3.2 to be automatically configured. Furthermore, we 
present an alternative strategy to suppression that can be employed by this method. 
We begin by discussing why this may be useful in practice:
• We note that the efficiency and effectiveness of our method heavily depend 
upon the setting of thresholds. A “too small” size threshold for partitioning 
can mitigate the quality achievable by the subsequent clustering. For instance, 
partitioning the data in Figure 3.5 using s = 3 will result in four additional 
cuts C4, C 5, C6 and C 7 shown as dashed lines in Figure 3.7. This will ex­
clude some close tuples (e.g. t) from being considered for clustering and thus
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may affect quality. Also, a “too large” quality threshold for cluster (denoted 
as 8' in Figure 3.7) may group distant tuples together, resulting in too much 
information loss when generalising the group and making the anonymised data 
practically useless. Unfortunately, relying on the data anonymiser to specify 
these thresholds may not always result in optimal settings.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of thresholds s and 8
•  Suppressing tuples in clusters with less than k tuples can substantially degrade 
the overall quality of a A;-anonymisation, particularly when the thresholds are 
not optimally set. For instance, tuple t' in Figure 3.7 has to be suppressed when 
s =  3 and the given 8 is used. If many tuples are suppressed as a result of this 
policy, the anonymised data can be significantly distorted from the original one.
We now outline our methods tha t address the issues discussed above.
•  In Section 3.3.1, we propose two simple and efficient heuristics to derive “good”
and s thresholds for the method presented in Section 3.2 automatically. Our
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main observation is that the average cluster diameter of all clusters produced 
by our method is similar to that when clustering is applied to a small random 
sample of the dataset. Based on this observation, we apply clustering to a 
random sample a number of times, control and vary the 8 and s values in each 
run, and choose the values tha t result in the best grouping w.r.t. utility and 
protection.
• Section 3.3.2 discusses a more effective strategy to handle clusters with tuples 
lying far from most other tuples in their subspace w.r.t. QIDs or close to most 
other tuples in their subspace w.r.t. SAs. We un-cluster the tuples in these 
clusters and put them in their closest cluster in any subspace. This simple 
heuristic improves quality, particularly when data is skewed, and is very efficient.
3.3.1 Sam ple-B ased H euristics
In this section, we present sample-based methods for determining the quality and size 
thresholds used in the algorithmic framework presented in Section 3.2.
Setting the quality threshold 8
We begin by discussing how 8 used in the clustering part of our method (see Algorithm 
1) can be set. The optimal setting of the threshold 8 depends on data distribution. 
Intuitively, a ‘‘good” 8 should mean that data is grouped in a way that the resultant 
clusters help anonymisation quality. There are two “obvious” ways to select a 8 value. 
First, a specific data distribution can be considered, and 8 is set for that distribution. 
For example, if we assume that data in clusters is uniformly distributed, then 8 (i.e. 
the cluster diameter) can be set as a function of the distance between data items 
in the cluster and the cluster size [133]. However, there are two problems with this 
strategy: i) assuming a certain data distribution for a large number of very small
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clusters, which is the case in /c-anonymisation, implies that the entire dataset, not 
just the clustered data, must follow a certain distribution; this is quite unlikely in 
practice; and ii) assuming a certain size for all clusters is unjustified as the size of 
a cluster is not the only factor that affects the quality of a /c-anonymisation. The 
second method is to let the anonymiser perform clustering with different 8 values 
and select one that results in the best grouping. This would require a substantial 
amount of experiment time, since our method (clustering with pre-partitioning) has 
a complexity of 0 ( n  x s), where n is the size of dataset and s the subspace threshold, 
and there is a very large number of 8 values to be considered.
We propose a simple and efficient heuristic to approximate an optimal value for 
8. The idea is to take a uniform random sample of the dataset with replacement, 
apply clustering without pre-partitioning to the sample several times, each time with 
a different <5 value in [0,1], and choose the 8 that results in the best grouping w.r.t. 
the sum o iU M  and M P M  scores. The method is given in Algorithm 3.
A lgorithm  3 Sampling-based selection heuristic for 8.
1. S  «— sample{T)\
2. i <— 1;
3. w hile i < max .iterations do
4. split [0,1] into 2l equal-length intervals;
5. choose the mean of each interval as 8r\
6. for each 8r do
7. apply clustering without pre-partitioning to S;
8. choose 8r s.t. the sum of U M  and M P M  scores for S  is minimum;
Two conditions determine the success of this heuristic. First, the sum of utility 
and protection (i.e. the quality of anonymisation) achieved by clustering for the 
sample with 8r should be similar to tha t achieved when the same algorithm is applied 
to the whole dataset. Second, only a small data sample needs to be used and a small 
number of different values of 8r need to be considered. Otherwise, the heuristic will
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not be efficient.
We observed through our experim ents th a t both conditions hold. Since each tuple 
is equally likely to be included in the sam ple due to uniform random sampling, most 
clusters are well represented in the sample. This is illustrated in Figure 3.8, which 
shows the result of applying this heuristic to a 2.5% random sample of the Adults 
datase t [59], with k =  5, w u =  w p =  0.5 and a maximum of 3 iterations. As can be 
seen, S can be fairly accurately estim ated, since scores for utility and protection are 
similar when our algorithm  is applied to  the sample and to the entire dataset.
S e t t in g  up th e  th r e s h o ld  5
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Figure 3.8: S selection heuristic for Algorithm 1
Since this heuristic requires applying Algorithm 1 i times on a sample of data, its
2
time complexity is 0 ( i  x x log(ns)), where ns is the sample size.
S e ttin g  th e  size th re sh o ld  s
A  good value for s should achieve a good speed up factor for our method without 
affecting the quality of clustering too much. To find such an s , we propose the 
following heuristic. We apply clustering with pre-partitioning to the same sample
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used in Algorithm 3, using the optimal 8 value found by this algorithm and setting s 
to k. This is repeated i times, and each time we double s. This process implies that 
clustering is applied to each of the last i levels of the tree created by pre-partitioning. 
Intuitively, using a larger s improves the quality of clustering due to the larger space 
explored, but speed deteriorates. So our heuristic stops when the quality improvement 
between consecutive levels does not exceed a threshold e. Algorithm 4 illustrates our 
heuristic.
A lgorithm  4 Sampling-based selection heuristic for s.
1. S  <— sample(T)\
2 . i +- 1;
3 -  St mp  * k ,
4. w hile i < maxJterations  do
5. apply clustering with pre-partitioning to S  
using s = Simp and the 8 found by Algorithm 3;
6. if (the difference between the sum o iU M  and M P M  scores
for S  between two consecutive iterations is less than e) 
exit;
7* St mp  —  2 X  Stmpy
8. choose s = stmp\
Since our method requires 0 ( n s x s) time in each step, the complexity of this 
heuristic is 0 ( n s x s  + ns x 2 x s  + . . .  + ns x 2l~l x s) = 0 ( n s x s x (2l — 1)). However, 
we observed that quality converges typically after 3 — 4 iterations in our experiments 
and thus the efficiency of our method is not substantially affected. Figure 3.9 shows 
the result of applying this process to the Adults dataset with the same settings as the 
one for deriving 8 in Figure 3.8. As can be seen, after executing our heuristic 3 times 
(i.e. when s was 4 x A: =  20), we found tha t the utility and protection are relatively 
stable (i.e. the difference in quality scores between two consecutive levels does not 
exceed e). Thus, setting s to 4 x k = 20 can be a good choice.
Clearly, selecting a good value for s will result in grouping most tuples into the
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Figure 3.9: s selection heuristic
“right” clusters. However, since Algorithm 2 has no explicit information loss and 
protection control, a large number of clusters containing tuples that lie far from (close 
to) most other tuples in their subspace w.r.t. QIDs (SAs) can be created. This can 
have a significant effect on both data utility and protection. Theorems 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 
show the effect of using pre-partitioning with a poor s on data utility and protection 
respectively.
T h eo rem  3.3.1. The utility measure (UM) score achieved by Algorithm 1 when it is 
applied with pre-partitioning can be up to |_^ J x (p jiz j + (m — 1)) times larger than 
the UM score achieved by the same algorithm applied without pre-partitioning, where
AU TOM ATIC PARAM ETER CONFIG. AND DATA SKEWNESS HANDLING 78
I
m  is the number of QIDs and s the size constraint used in pre-partitioning.
Proof. We will first compute the worst UM score achievable by applying Algorithm 
1. This is achieved when pre-partitioning is applied with s =  k creating w subspaces 
by splitting along the same QID a\ in every iteration (assuming that the domain of 
a\ is always the largest) and these subspaces contain all possible values of Daj for all 
j  = 2, Note that although we do not know the exact value for the Q-diversity
of the splitting attribute in each subspace, we know that the maximum sum for Q- 
diversity scores over all w subspaces in this attribute is 1. That is pre-partitioning 
created neighbour subspaces with tuples that have the same value in a\ across their 
boundaries. We can also compute the maximum sum for Q-diversity scores over 
all subspaces in any of the non-splitting attributes. As each subspace contains all 
possible values of a non-splitting attribute, this sum equals w. Thus, summing up 
the Q-diversity scores for all the attributes, we get 1 +  w x (m — 1). Dividing the 
sum of Q-diversity scores for all the subspaces by w and taking the average over all 
m  QIDs (see Definition 3.1.2) we get a UM score of ^  x (T +  (m — 1)). Furthermore, 
since pre-partitioning creates at least subsPaces (each subspace can contain
up to 2s — 1 tuples to satisfy the size constraint s), we have T x (^  +  (ra — 1)) < 
i  X ( j r t f  + ( m  -  1)).
Now, consider the best UM score that we can get by applying Algorithm 1 on 
this dataset, which is achieved when the Q-diversity of each subspace (measured over 
all QIDs) is minimum. That is, the domain of each QID has a size of w, and data 
is grouped in w clusters such that their values in all QIDs apart from the splitting- 
attribute a\ are the same. Then, the best UM score is obtained when the sum of 
Q-diversity scores for ai over all the clusters is 1 (note that this sum cannot be less 
than 1, as pre-partitioning creates the best possible subspaces for ai), all tuples in 
a cluster have the same value in each aj , j  = 2, . . .  , m and all these attributes are
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numerical (so that their Q-diversity scores are 0). Thus, summing up the Q-diversity 
scores for all subspaces results in a sum of 1 +  w x (0) =  1. Dividing the sum of 
Q-diversity scores for all the subspaces by w and taking the average over all m  QIDs 
we get a UM score of -  x Therefore, since at most I - 1 clusters can be created,°  771 W  7 L 3  J 7
and only ai contributes to the UM score, we have — x -  > — xJ 1 ’ m w  — m |.^J
Dividing the worst with the best UM scores achievable by applying Algorithm 1, 
we get
£  x ( l i f e r +  ( ™ - i ) )
™ x Tfl
which gives us I -  I x ( , „ , +  (m — 1)). □
S 12s — 1 J
Theorem  3.3.2. The Max-range protection measure (MPM) score achieved by Al­
gorithm 1 when it is applied with pre-partitioning can be arbitrarily larger than the
MPM score achieved by the same algorithm when applied without pre-partitioning.
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume that a dataset is comprised of j  SAs and has 
been partitioned using pre-partitioning into w subspaces, in a way that each subspace 
has the same value in each SA. In this case, each of the SAs has an S-diversity value
of 1 (*-e- 1 -  n fep r ° r 1 -  max(Da;i-mm-(D.,) for each categorical or numerical SA) for 
each cluster. Averaging the S-diversity scores over all j  SAs, we get an MPM score 
of j  x ]TV 1 =  1, which is the maximum possible MPM score an anonymised table 
can have.
Now, consider applying clustering on the whole dataset. Observe that the best 
MPM score is obtained when the S-diversity of each subspace measured over SAs 
has the smallest possible value. This occurs when the size of the domain of each 
SA is w (recall that w is the number of subspaces created when pre-partitioning is 
used) and clustering creates w clusters s.t. each SA contains values that cover its
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whole domain. In this case, the sum of S-diversity measured over SAs is minimised to 
1 — =  o when all SAs are numerical. Thus, the smallest MPM scorem ax ( Da x)—m i n (D at ) ’ ’
is j  x £ =  0, which is the minimum possible score an anonymised table can have. 
The proof follows by comparing the MPM scores of 1 and 0 obtained by applying 
clustering with and without pre-partitioning respectively. □
As an example, consider Tables 3.9 and 3.10, which are 2-anonymisations of Table 
3.8 obtained by applying clustering with and without pre-partitioning respectively, us­
ing a size constraint s =  k. Since Age has a much larger domain than those of Height 
and Postcode, all splits are done around Age when clustering is applied with pre­
partitioning. This created the clusters shown in Table 3.9. It can be verified that the 
quality of the clusters produced is lower than those created by using clustering alone 
(see Table 3.10). We note that the UM scores are 0.75 and 0.25 for Tables 3.9 and 
3.10 respectively. That is, clustering with pre-partitioning produced an anonymisation 
with a UM score that is 3 times larger than the UM score achieved by clustering alone. 
Although Theorem 3.3.1 suggests that applying clustering with pre-partitioning can 
achieve & UM  score that is [-J  x ( ■ n . +  (m — 1)) =  (_§J x (-4r +  2) =  10 times
3 L 2 s —1J 1 L 3 J
larger than that achieved by clustering alone, this bound is not reached, since pre­
partitioning creates subspaces containing s, but not 2s — 1 in this example. Fur­
thermore, the MPM score is 1 and 0 for the clusters in Tables 3.9 and 3.10 respec­
tively, thereby confirming that the protection achieved when clustering is applied 
with pre-partitioning can be arbitrary larger than when clustering is applied without 
pre-partitioning.
3.3.2 D ata  Skewness H andling
Data skewness may also deteriorate the quality of data grouping in two cases il­
lustrated in Figures 3.10 (a) and (b) respectively. In Figure 3.10 (a), tuples t and t'
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Age Height Postcode Salary (K)
10 170 NW30 20
15 175 NW32 20
15 170 NW30 65
20 175 NW32 65
20 170 NW30 20
25 175 NW32 20
25 170 NW30 65
30 175 NW32 65
Table 3.8: Original data
Age Height Postcode Salary (K)
[10-15] [170-175] NW [30-32] 20
[10-15] [170-175] NW [30-32] 20
[15-20] [170-175] NW [30-32] 65
[15-20] [170-175] NW [30-32] 65
[20-25] [170-175] NW[30-32] 20
[20-25] [170-175] NW[30-32] 20
[25-30] [170-175] NW[30-32] 65
[25-30] [170-175] NW[30-32] 65
Table 3.9: A 2-anonymisation of Table 3.8 by clustering with 
pre-partitioning
Age Height Postcode Salary (K).
[10-15] 170 NW30 20
[10-15] 170 NW30 65
[15-20] 175 NW32 20
[15-20] 175 NW32 65
[20-25] 170 NW30 20
[20-25] 170 NW30 65
[25-30] 175 NW32 20
[25-30] 175 NW32 65
Table 3.10: A 2-anonymisation of Table 3.8 by clustering with­
out pre-partitioning
which lie across the x-axis force the pre-partitioning algorithm to split along this axis, 
separating close tuples. Similarly, as shown in Figure 3.10 (b), the pre-partitioning
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algorithm ignores how SA values are distributed in each subspace, and groups to­
gether tuples that have salary values that form a small range in the left subspace. 
These groups have a large Max-range Weighted Tuple Diversity score, and thus their 
tuples may not be grouped with other tuples after clustering, even though a generous 
6 is used.
Postcode Salary
30 - ■ ■ ■ 
■■ ■
■ ■ 
■ ■ 6 0  -
m m a m 
:■ ■ ■
■ ■ ■
20 ' 4 0  - ■ ■ ■
t t’
10 - ■ ■ 2 0  - ■ ■ ■
 1------------------ 1-----------------r  1 1  I I  n y c
0 10 20 30 40 o 10 20 30 40
(a) (b)
Figure 3.10: The effect of data skewness on partitioning
As a result, two types of group may occur: i) there are less than k tuples in a 
subspace, or ii) there are more than k such tuples, but cannot be grouped together 
to form a cluster with acceptable quality. These two cases are depicted as small 
rectangles in subspaces 3 and 2 respectively in Figure 3.11, where k is set to 4. In 
both cases, the clustering step of the method presented in Section 3.2 suppresses these 
tuples. However, this can greatly affect data utility when there is a large number of 
suppressed tuples.
We propose a heuristic which is applied after Algorithm 1 has finished with forming 
clusters, as illustrated in Algorithm 5. Steps 9-14 replace the steps 9 and 10 in 
Algorithm 1, while steps 15-16 are additional.
Clusters with at least k tuples are added into set S  in step 11, while tuples in 
the remaining clusters are added into O in steps 12-14. Then, in steps 15-16, the 
tuples in O are examined in the order they were added into O and each of them is 
inserted into a cluster from S  that is “best” for it, i.e. the one that will result in a 
minimal increment in Max-range Weighted Tuple Diversity (mr.wtd) when the tuple
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Figure 3.11: The problem of left-over tuples in subspaces
is inserted. Note that we check each tuple with all clusters with at least k tuples, since 
the nearest neighbours of a tuple can lie in different subspaces when data distribution 
is skewed [94]. It is also worth noting that choosing thresholds 8 and s automatically 
as described in Section 3.3.1 results in a small number of tuples that need to be 
handled by Algorithm 5, and thus this heuristic is efficient in practice as shown in 
our experiments described in Chapter 4. Applying this heuristic to subspaces 1,2,3 
and 4 shown in Figure 3.11, for example, results effectively in subspaces 1', 2', 3' and
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A lgorithm  5 Data skewness handling heuristic for Algorithm 1
9.
10 . 
11 . 
12 .
13.
14.
if |c| > k 
recode(c); 
S  <— S  U c;
else
for each U £ c do;
O <- Ou { U} \
15. for each U £ O do
16. find Cj £ S  s.t. c'- <— Cj U {£*} and mr.wtd(c'j, A) is minimum;
4', which retain all the tuples without significant data quality deterioration.
Motivated by the fact that existing approaches often sacrifice utility for increased 
protection and vice versa, we considered the problem of anonymising data with an 
optimal utility/privacy trade-off. We first introduced measures to capture data util­
ity and privacy protection. These measures are applicable to both numerical and 
categorical attributes, with or without domain generalisation hierarchies, and are in­
dependent of the cardinality and dimensionality of the considered dataset. Therefore, 
they can be used to anonymise datasets of different characteristics. We also devel­
oped an algorithmic framework to generate data with a good utility/privacy trade-off. 
Our method uses partitioning and clustering heuristics, attempting to combine the 
efficiency of partitioning in exploring the search space with the high quality of data 
grouping achievable by clustering. More specifically, we proposed the use of parti­
tioning to help reducing the time complexity of clustering, which is itself efficient to 
perform, and a clustering algorithm that reduces the effect of overlapping subspaces 
created by the partitioning step and uses a threshold controlled optimisation strategy.
3.4 Summary
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Finally, we examined how to enhance the applicability of this framework in practice, 
by developing a set of heuristics to optimally set up parameters and to handle data 
skewness.
Chapter 4 
Evaluation of Trade-Off 
Constrained £>Anonymisation
In this chapter, we experimentally evaluate our Trade-Off Constrained (TOC) ap­
proach to fc-anonymisation. Section 4.1 describes the experimental setup and the 
datasets used in our experiments. Section 4.2 investigates the effectiveness of our 
sample-based heuristics, while Section 4.3 examines the efficiency of our method. 
Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of our method w.r.t. the utility/protection 
trade-off and w.r.t. each of these properties in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 respectively.
4.1 Experim ental Setup and D atasets
We compare our MR Greedy (MRG) method to three benchmark algorithms: Mon­
drian [77] which is partition-based and very efficient; K-Members [35] which is 
clustering-based and can achieve very good data utility; and K-Members-p which 
is a modified version of K-members where wre changed its objective function to opti­
mise protection (based on the same protection measure used in our method) instead 
of utility, so it can achieve very good protection. Both Mondrian and K-members
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have been shown to achieve better utility than most of the other existing algorithms, 
e.g. those proposed in [76, 25, 17]. For reference, Table 4.1 summarises the methods 
included in experiments and their characteristics. All the algorithms were imple­
mented in Java and ran on a Pentium-D 3GHz machine with 1 GB of RAM under 
Windows XP.
Method Type o f  
heuristic
Objective Time Complexity
Mondrian partitioning max. utility oX£
O
K-Members clustering max. utility 0 (n2)
K-Members-p clustering max. protection 0 (n2)
MRG partitioning and 
clustering
utility/protection
trade-off
0(n  x  s) 1
Table 4.1: Evaluated algorithms
Our main objective is to investigate how the quality of solutions with a trade-off be­
tween utility and protection produced by our methods compares to those produced 
by Mondrian, K-Members and K-Members-p, which are designed to specifically op­
timise one of these properties. We note that we have not considered protection 
constrained methods [85, 80] in our experiments because these methods have been 
shown to achieve worse data utility than Mondrian and K-Members, while they do 
not optimise protection as K-Members-p does. D ata utility is evaluated using the 
Utility Measure (UM), Discernability Measure (DM) [25], and the accuracy of ag­
gregate query answering [77, 124, 123]. We also quantify protection using our MPM 
measure. In addition, we study the efficiency and scalability of our method.
We have used both benchmarking and synthetic datasets in the experiments. First, 
we used the Adults dataset [59], which has become a benchmark for A:-anonymisation
1 Recall that s in Table 4.1 denotes the size constraint used in pre-partitioning.
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Attribute Domain size Type
Age 74 Numerical QID
Gender 2 Categorical QID
Race 5 Categorical QID
Salary 2 Categorical QID
Country 41 Categorical QID
Work class 7 Categorical QID
Marital status 7 Categorical SA
Occupation 14 Numerical SA
Table 4.2: Summary of attributes for Adults dataset
algorithms [64, 77, 127, 35, 76, 96]. This dataset contains demographical information 
of US citizens, and was configured in a way similar to that described in [64], as 
shown in Table 4.2. Occupation was treated as a numerical attribute by mapping 
semantically close values into consecutive numbers. For a fair comparison, we used 
the same recoding model for all the methods. Specifically, we recoded values by using 
ranges and sets for numerical and categorical QIDs respectively. We also removed 
tuples with missing values, leaving 30162 tuples in the dataset. Furthermore, we used 
a normally distributed 8-dimensional synthetic dataset with 100000 tuples, which was 
generated using the Apache Commons-Math library 2. The attributes were integers 
with values in the range [0,19]. 6 attributes were treated as QIDs and the remaining 
as SAs.
4.2 Sample-based H euristics Evaluation
In this section, we investigate the effectiveness of our sample-based heuristics (see 
Section 3.3.1). This was done by measuring the relative difference in quality between 
the anonymisations produced by our MRG method with our heuristic method and
2http://commons.apache.org/math/
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with an “optimal” threshold setup. For the optimal threshold setup, we configured 
parameters empirically by trying a large number of different values and then chose 
one that resulted in the best quality (i.e. minimum sum of UM and MPM scores). 
In order to be able to control data characteristics, we used synthetic datasets in 
this set of experiments. We note however that results of using our heuristics on the 
benchmarking dataset will also be demonstrated later in Sections 4.4 and 4.5.
Evaluating the selection heuristic for £
In order to examine the impact of our heuristic for choosing the S value on anonymisa- 
tion quality, we measured the difference in quality between anonymisations generated 
by applying MRG on the entire dataset when S was set “optimally” and “heuristi- 
cally” as described above, and then measured the relative quality loss, defined as
R q L = \ ( u t  +  P t ) ~ (us +  Ps) 1 
u t  +  Pt
where ut ,Pt  and us,ps  are the UM and MPM scores obtained from applying MRG 
with the optimal and heuristic <5 threshold respectively. Intuitively, RQL indicates 
percentage of quality decrease from the optimal. We measured RQL with respect to 
the sample size, data dispersion (measured using standard deviation), k and number of 
iterations. Default values for these parameters were 2% of dataset, standard deviation 
a = 2.5, k = 5 and 3 iterations respectively.
We first studied the effect of sample size on the efficiency of our heuristic. We 
generated a set of samples from our synthetic dataset with various sizes ranging from 
y/n to 10%, where n is the cardinality of the synthetic dataset. The results are 
illustrated in Table 4.3. RQL was particularly low, even for a sample of y /n  tuples. 
Hence, the proposed heuristic can find a good 6 using a small sample. Obviously, 
small samples are good for execution efficiency.
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Sample size
In to 3* 5% 7.5% 10%
RQL 0 0.04 0.04 0 0.04
Table 4.3: RQL w.r.t. sample size.
Then, we examined the impact of data  dispersion by varying the standard de­
viation of the dataset. As can be seen in Table 4.4, increasing dispersion did not 
substantially affect the quality. For this experiment we used a 2% sample of the 
dataset, k = 5 and 3 iterations. The ability of our heuristic to handle data dispersion 
was also verified using the Adults dataset in our experiments, which achieved a low 
RQL of 0.043.
Standard deviation
0.5 1 2.5 5
RQL 0 0 0.041 7.62E-4
Table 4.4: RQL w.r.t. data dispersion.
We also ran MRG with various values of k , to investigate how cluster size affects 
quality. Table 4.5 illustrates RQL for several values of k. Our heuristic achieved a 
negligible loss in quality, even when clusters were very small. This is because most 
clusters were of similar size and diameter and thus were well represented in the sample.
Minimum cluster size k
2 5 10 50 100
RQL 1.47E-5 0 1.47E-5 0 0.0075
Table 4.5: RQL w.r.t. k.
The effect of the number of iterations used to derive the 6 value from the sample 
was examined as well, by varying the maximum allowed number of iterations in 
Algorithm 3. As depicted in Table 4.6, our heuristic found a 6 equal to the optimal 
when this parameter was set to 6, and a good enough result was obtained when 3
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iterations were used. This again suggests that our heuristic is efficient, as only a small 
number of 6 values need to be checked.
Number of iterations
2 3 4 5 6
RQL 0.041 2.99E-5 2.99E-5 2.99E-5 0
Table 4.6: RQL w.r.t. number of iterations.
E v a lua ting  th e  selec tion  h eu ris tic  for s
The effectiveness of our heuristic for setting up the size threshold s used in Algorithm 
2 was also tested. Recall that this heuristic implies applying MRG on the same sample 
used to select 6 many times. The first time s is set to k, and each time the value of s 
is doubled until quality converges. Table 4.7 reports the RQL scores between setting 
up s optimally (by applying the aforementioned process on the entire dataset) and 
heuristically on the sample. Each column of the table includes RQL values after a 
number of iterations for a specific minimum cluster size k. Since RQL values were 
particularly low, our heuristic can be considered as capable of accurately finding a 
good value for s. We also note that quality converged after 4 iterations in all cases, 
suggesting that selecting s using this heuristic can be done efficiently.
Minimum cluster size k
It. 2 5 10 50 100
1 2.53E-4 0.0169 0.0257 0.0551 0.0556
2 2.57E-4 0.0188 0.0260 0.0413 0.0552
3 2.49E-4 0.0116 0.0218 0.0402 0.0505
4 0 4.27E-4 0.0106 0.0221 0.0204
5 0 4.23E-4 0.0106 0.0221 0.0204
Table 4.7: RQL w.r.t. k in selecting s
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4.3 Efficiency Evaluation
We also evaluate the runtime performance of M ondrian, K-Members and MRG (with 
and w ithout the pre-partitioning step). We do not show the result for K-Members-p 
in this experiment, as its performance was identical to K-Members because these two 
algorithms differ only in the measure they optimise. For this experiment, we used 
random samples of the Adults dataset w ith a cardinality n ranging from 500 to 10000, 
k =  5, and w u =  wp =  0.5. The efficiency of the algorithms is mainly determined 
by the cardinality of the dataset, and not by the overhead of metric com putation 
[35, 77, 127]. Thus, different datasets and values of k , w u and wp could have been 
used, but they would not have affected the results of the comparison significantly. 
Param eters <5 and s were set using our sample-based heuristics. A 2.5% sample was 
used and quality converged after 3 iterations when setting  s.
time (sec) 
1000 - |
Runtime - size of dataset
10
0.1
1
tuples
500 1000 2 5 0 0  5000  10000
— MRG (nopre-p.) 
■ ♦— Mondrian
a  K-Members 
—□- MRG
Figure 4.1: R untim e vs. size of dataset
As illustrated in Figure 4.1, M ondrian is faster by a t least one order of m agnitude 
than  the methods which use clustering-based heuristics (i.e. K-Members and MRG
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w ithout pre-partitioning). This is because, in contrast to these algorithms which 
have a quadratic time complexity, the complexity of Mondrian is log-linear with 
respect to the cardinality of the dataset. However, MRG without pre-partitioning 
is a t least 6 times faster than K-Members. This is attributed  to two factors. First, 
our method uses sorting to  speed up cluster formation, having a time-complexity 
of 0 ( j ^  x log(n)),  which is better than  the 0 ( n 2) complexity of K-Members when 
|c| > log(n).  Second, seeds in our m ethod are selected randomly rather than based 
on a furthest-first heuristic as in K-Members. In fact, K-Members requires 0 { n  x / )  
time to select seeds [35, 22], where /  is the number of seeds, which is not negligible 
when the number of seeds is com parable to the cardinality of the dataset as in this 
experiment. Finally, our MRG m ethod w ith the  pre-partitioning step is only 8% 
slower than M ondrian.
time (sec) Runtime - subspace size threshold
400 -
300  -
200  -
100  -
a- “■
5000  10000 3016250 500 1000  2 500
MRG (no pre-p.) —a- MRG
Figure 4.2: Runtim e of MRG vs. size threshold s
To study the improvement in efficiency th a t the pre-partitioning step brings to our 
method, we applied MRG to the A dults datase t (30162 tuples) setting k to 10. In this
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experiment, the number of subspaces created by pre-partitioning was reduced in each 
execution and varied from 512 (size constraint s is set to 50) to 1 (size constraint s 
is set to 30162). Figure 4.2 shows that the efficiency improvement is significant when 
pre-partitioning is used. For instance, pre-partitioning reduced the runtime of our 
method from 7.5 minutes to 18 seconds when s was set to 50.
4.4 Effectiveness o f U tility /P ro tection  Trade-off
We then examined whether MRG is able to produce anonymisations with a good 
utility/protection trade-off, as it is captured by the weighted average of UM and 
MPM scores. The individual scores achieved in these measures will be studied later 
in Section 4.5.1. For this experiment, we set the weights wu and wp to 0.5, assuming 
that anonymisers treat utility and protection as equally important. Furthermore, we 
set 8 and s using our sample-based heuristics as in Section 4.3. Figure 4.3 illustrates 
the result for various values in k ranging from 5 to 100.
As can be seen, Mondrian and K-Members performed poorly in this test, as by 
optimising utility they failed to achieve good protection. K-Members-p did not per­
form well either, since it produced anonymisations with a good protection but low 
utility. On the other hand, MRG was able to generate anonymisations with a good 
utility/protection trade-off, substantially outperforming all other methods. This is 
attributed to the fact that our method groups data based on both utility and pro­
tection, and uses a powerful optimisation algorithm based on both partitioning and 
clustering heuristics. Finally, it can be observed that using pre-partitioning did not 
significantly affect the quality of anonymisations. This is because partitioning and 
clustering heuristics are combined in a way that the improvement in efficiency brought 
by partitioning does not harm the quality of anonymisations constructed by cluster­
ing.
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Figure 4.3: Utility/protection trade-off for equal wu and wp values
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Figure 4.4: Utility/protection trade-off for various wu and wp values
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We also examined whether our m ethod can achieve a good trade-off when different 
combinations of weights w u and wp are used. Param eter k was set to 10 and thresholds 
s and <5 were set using our sample-based heuristics. As illustrated in Figure 4.4, MRG 
achieved a good trade-off, substantially  outperform ing all other methods for all tested 
values of weights, when applied with or w ithout pre-partitioning.
Furtherm ore, we studied how weights used in our method affect utility and pro­
tection separately by varying w u and wp. All param eters were set as in the previous 
experiment. The result for MRG in term s of utility and protection is reported in 
Figure 4.5 and 4.6 respectively. T he result for MRG without pre-partitioning was 
quantitatively similar, and thus it is not reported here. As is evident from these fig­
ures, weights are able to lead our m ethod finding a desired utility/protection trade-off. 
The same experiment was also repeated using the  synthetic dataset. The results re­
ported in Figures 4.7 and 4.8 were qualitatively similar to  those derived when the 
Adults dataset was used.
UM
0.5 -i Utility weight (Wu) - UM
0.4 - \
\
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0.3 -
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Figure 4.5: The impact of weights on utility (Adults dataset)
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Figure 4.6: The impact of weights on protection (Adults dataset)
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Figure 4.7: The impact of weights on utility (synthetic dataset)
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Figure 4.8: The impact of weights on protection (synthetic dataset)
4.5 U tility  and P rotection  Evaluation
We investigated the quality of anonymisations derived by MRG in terms of utility and 
protection separately. In Section 4.5.1, we captured utility and protection using three 
measures: UM, DM and MPM. We chose to use both DM and UM, as they capture 
data utility in fundamentally different ways; DM is based on group size and UM on 
reconstruction probability. Utility measures based on DGH height are not used, since 
they cannot be applied to the Adults dataset. This is because QIDs in Adults do not 
have associated DGHs. We also note that protection criteria, such as /-diversity [85], 
/-closeness [80] and the measure used in [124] are not applicable, since none of them 
can handle categorical and numerical SAs simultaneously. For completeness, we also 
used task-based criteria to capture quality in Section 4.5.2. We used aggregate query 
answering as an indicative task and measured the utility following [77]. We did not 
use the CM measure, as we are not specifically interested in classification accuracy.
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4.5.1 Effectiveness w.r.t. standard metrics
Figures 4.9 and 4.10 present the results for the UM and DM measures respectively, 
for M ondrian, K-Members and our m ethod with and without pre-partitioning. The 
weights wu, w p were set to 0.5 and the thresholds 6 and s were set as in the previous 
experiment. The result for K-Members-p was not included in these figures, as it was 
substantially worse than th a t achieved by all other methods. As illustrated in Figure 
4.9, MRG substantially outperform ed M ondrian w.r.t. the UM measure. For instance, 
the UM score achieved by our m ethod for k =  25, is comparable to that of M ondrian 
when it ran with k =  5. Figure 4.10 showrs th a t MRG outperformed Mondrian using 
the DM measure as well although by a small margin. This is because Mondrian 
specifically restricts the size of the group to 2 x k — 1. Furthermore, the scores for 
MRG in term s of both UM and DM were close to th a t achieved by K-Members.
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Figure 4.9: UM comparison
We also studied the level of protection offered by the MRG method using the
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Figure 4.10: DM comparison
M ax-range Protection Measure (M PM ), for the same run of the algorithms. The 
result is illustrated in Figure 4.11. As can be seen, both  M ondrian and K-Member, 
which optimise only data  utility, offer little protection, particularly when k is small. 
In contrast, our algorithm achieves a significantly be tte r result than both of these 
methods, and is comparable to K-Members-p for all levels of k used.
These results indicate tha t our m ethod is able to  achieve a high level of both data  
utility and privacy protection. Furtherm ore, they show th a t pre-partitioning does not 
significantly affect quality, as scores in all the measures were close to MRG without 
pre-partitioning. Finally, it can be seen th a t our m ethod is easy to use, since our 
sample-based heuristics required only a small sample of d a ta  and few iterations to 
configure the thresholds used in our m ethod reasonably well.
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4.5.2 Aggregate query answering accuracy
We now dem onstrate the perform ance of MRG using query answering as an indicative 
application. To examine the effect of balancing utility and protection, we configured 
our method using i) equal weights for utility  and protection (wu =  wp =  0.5), ii) 
(wu =  1, a/p =  0) for maximum utility, and iii) (wu =  0 , w p =  1) for maximum pro­
tection. We refer to these configurations as MRGB, MRGU and MRGP respectively. 
MRGU optimises utility, as M ondrian and K-Members do, whereas MRGP optimises 
protection, as K-Members-p does. MRGB trea ts  da ta  utility and privacy protection 
as equally im portant. O ther configurations are possible, but are not reported here, 
as the impact of weights on query answering is similar to tha t reported in Section 
4.4. We considered COUNT-queries for our experiments following [77, 124, 123, 71]. 
Each of these queries has the following form.
A ttributes a l f ..., are QIDs, and the number of attributes used in a query is con­
trolled by param eter d (query dim ensionality) and their values r !,..., are selected
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select COUNT(*) 
from anonymised table 
w here a\ = r\, ...,ad = Td
uniformly at random. We used two types of query on the Adults dataset in our experi­
ments. A type-1 query retrieves the number of tuples satisfying {Age, Gender, Income} 
predicates, while a type-2 query additionally uses {Race, Work class} predicates. Ta­
ble 4.8 summarises the parameters and values used in our experiments.
Parameters Values
Estimated Selectivity 0.5 or 1.5
Query Dimensionality 3 or 5
Query Workload Size 10000
Predicate Selection uniformly at random
Table 4.8: Parameters and values used in query answering experiments
Given a workload of queries W  = {<7i, •••, <7f}, a table T  and its anonymisation 
T*, we capture query answering accuracy by computing the average relative error 
(A.R.E.) [124]. Let act{ql),est(qi) be the actual and estimated result derived when a 
query £ W  is applied on T  and T* respectively. The relative error is defined by 
^er v^e we compute, for each tuple t £ T*, the probability p
that t satisfies qi using p = Rq£ R ; where R qi and R  denote the areas covered by 
and the qualifying tuples in T* respectively, and Rqi D R  denotes the overlap between 
R Ql and R. After computing the probability p, est(qi) is set to the sum of such 
probabilities of all tuples. Then, the A.R.E. score for table T* w.r.t. the workload 
W  can be computed as
ARE(W , T X )  = \ * Y  7  £f % ) lI act(qi)
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Figure 4.12 reports the normalised A.R.E. for a workload containing 10000 type-1 
queries, for various k levels, for all the methods except K-Members-p (its performance 
in query answering was significantly worse than that of all other methods, hence not 
included here) 3. The normalised A.R.E. is defined to be where x  is the A.R.E. 
achieved by a method, and a, b are the best and worst A.R.E. values achieved for
a specific k. As can be seen, all configurations of MRG outperformed Mondrian
and K-Members when k was up to 15. This result confirms that our method does 
not incur an excessive amount of information loss, which is largely attributed to the 
quality-based stopping criterion used. This is in contrast to both Mondrian and K- 
Members, which can form groups containing 2 x k — 1 tuples at most. As result, these 
methods may exclude some “close” tuples from a group to satisfy size requirement, 
thereby increasing information loss. For k larger than 15, the performance of MRGB 
was slightly worse than Mondrian, but still better than K-Members, while MRGP 
performed poorly in this test. This is because MRGP traded-off some utility for 
increased protection. It is also worth noting that the normalised ARE for MRGB and 
MRG without pre-partitioning were similar, confirming that pre-partitioning does not 
significantly affect anonymisation quality.
For type-2 queries, which are more difficult to be accurately answered than type-1 
queries due to the higher dimensionality and lower selectivity, all configurations of 
our algorithm outperformed both Mondrian and K-members, as illustrated in Figure 
4.13 4. This is because using clustering with a quality-based stopping criterion can 
preserve correlations between QIDs better, which minimises the level of information 
loss that is incurred to generalise QID values.
3The zero scores in normalised A.R.E. are not shown in Figure 4.12.
4The zero scores in normalised A.R.E. are not shown in Figure 4.13.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, the efficiency and effectiveness of our Trade-Off Constrained (TOC) 
approach to /c-anonymisation was studied through extensive experiments. We have 
confirmed that the use of both partitioning and clustering heuristics helps our method 
to achieve good scalability and runtime that is comparable to that of the state of the 
art methods. We have also showed that a good utility/protection trade-off can be 
achieved by our method. In particular, it performs equally or even better than the 
state of the art method in terms of achieving data utility, as well as a substantially 
better level of privacy protection. In addition, we have shown that our method is 
practical, since the parameters used in our method can be easily configured using our 
sample-based heuristics.
Chapter 5 
Range D isclosure and Quality 
Guarantees
In Chapter 3, we introduced a Trade-off Constrained (TOC) method which uses 
uniformly formulated criteria for capturing data utility and privacy protection, and 
is capable of producing anonymisations with balanced utility and protection. This 
method however has two limitations. First, it may still allow sensitive information to 
be disclosed in the form of ranges. This is because it attempts to create groups that 
have a large maximum range, but ignores how the values are distributed within the 
group. When a group contains a large number of similar SA values, an attacker can 
still infer a sensitive range for an individual, even though the maximum range of this 
group is large. Second, the TOC method cannot guarantee that anonymised data will 
have a minimal required level of both data utility and protection. This is because 
groups incurring excessive information loss or containing badly protected data can 
still be created, even when their utility/protection trade-off is acceptable. This may 
not be acceptable in practice.
This chapter addresses these two issues. In Section 5.1, we analyse the problem of 
range disclosure in /c-anonymised data and present our protection mechanism. Section
106
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5.2 discusses heuristics and algorithms that can guarantee a minimal level of utility 
and protection required when anonymising data.
5.1 Range D isclosure
To guard against the problem of range disclosure, anonymised data should make the 
inference of any sensitive range for an individual “sufficiently” difficult. Note that this 
protection requirement cannot be met by using our MPM measure, the mean squared 
error [78], or t-closeness [80]. For example, if we have {t\, t2 , t§, tn} in Table 5.1 as 
an anonymised group, then the interval is sufficiently large ([IK  — 90/C]), but it is 
still possible to infer low income for any individual represented in this group with 
a probability of If the requirement is such that no one should be able to infer 
that someone has a low income with a probability higher than 0.5, then this is not 
acceptable.
The personalised anonymity approach proposed by Xiao and Tao [124] can achieve 
protection for range disclosure. It allows individual range disclosure protection re­
quirements to be specified, and met by generalising SA values when necessary. For 
instance, if the requirement is that no one should be able to infer whether an individ­
ual has low or high income with a probability higher than 0.5 when the data in Table
5.1 is 3-anonymised, their method will produce Table 5.2. This offers guarantees for 
required range disclosure protection, but may generate data that has an unacceptably 
low level of utility. In Table 5.2, for example, some income values have been gener­
alised completely, i.e. replaced by [0 — 99]/C, the most general value in the hierarchy 
given in Figure 5.1. This may render the anonymised data practically useless.
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Figure 5.1: Hierarchy for the Income attribute
Id Age In c o m e
ti 30 IK
22 4K
h 29 22K
U 29 23K
h 31 24K
h 35 9K
h 37 OK
39 9K
U 41 25K
110 42 26K
^ 1 1 44 90K
tl2 45 90K
Id Age Incom e
t\ [20-30] [0-99] K
2^ [20-30] [0-99] K
3^ [20-30] [0-99] K
u [20-30] [0-99] K
£ 5 [30-40] [0-99] K
[30-40] [0-99] K
£ 7 [30-40] [0-99] K
[30-40] [0-99] K
£ 9 [41-45] 25K
£ 1 0 [41-45] 26K
fn [41-45] 90K
tl2 [41-45] 90K
Table 5.1: Original microdata Table 5.2: Anonymised data using
Personalised anonymity
In this thesis, a criterion called Range Disclosure that can quantify protection 
against range disclosure is proposed. In what follows, we first discuss range disclosure 
and then describe this new criterion.
Let T ( a i , ...,am, sa) be a table containing microdata, where a i,.. . ,a m are QIDs 
and sa is an SA. Multiple SAs are possible, but present additional challenges that 
are beyond the focus of this thesis (see [80] for an extended discussion). We assume
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that each tuple in T  represents only one individual and takes a value from a finite 
domain Dat (Dsa) in each a* (sa). If a* (sa) is categorical, we assume that there is a 
domain hierarchy Hai (Hsa) associated with it, similar to the one shown in Figure 5.1. 
Domain hierarchies are specified by the anonymiser.
Central to our notion of range protection is the concept of sensitive range.
D efin ition  5.1.1 (Sensitive Range). Given a value u in sa, the Sensitive Range for 
u, denoted by SR(u), is defined as:
• an interval [w,v] s.t. w < u < v and w ,v  G Dsa, if  sa is numerical, or
•  a node on the path from the root to u in Hsa, if sa is categorical.
So, for a numerical value, its sensitive range is simply an interval containing it, 
and for a categorical value, its sensitive range is a more general concept for this value 
according to the hierarchy Hsa. For example, the sensitive range for the value IK  
in the categorical SA Income in Table 5.1 can be [IK, IK], [0K,4K], [OK, OK] or 
[OK, 99K], i.e. any node on the path from the root ([0 — 99]K) to the leaf (IK )  with 
respect to the hierarchy shown in Figure 5.1. In contrast, if Income is considered 
as a numerical attribute, the sensitive range for this value can be any interval in its 
domain containing the value IK ,  e.g. [OK, 7K] or [IK, 90K].
Given T, an anonymiser can specify what range information should not be dis­
closed about each individual, by setting a minimum sensitive range around the SA 
value associated with the individual. We assume that this is done by anonymisers 
using a policy that has been decided before anonymisation [85, 80], e.g. the sensitive 
range for every distinct value in a numerical sa to have a certain length.
Given a /c-anonymised table T* two types of range attack are possible. The first 
involves an attacker attempting to identify a sensitive range for an individual with 
high probability by using T* only. The second involves an attacker attempting to infer
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the range information associated with an individual by using additional background 
knowledge to eliminate the ranges that are known to be irrelevant to this individual. 
These cases are referred to as positive and negative range disclosure respectively, and 
are analogous to those studied for the value disclosure problem in [85]. We illustrate 
them using the following example.
Assume that an attacker uses the 6-anonymisation of Table 5.1 given in Table
5.3 and attem pts to infer range information for ^ • The sensitive ranges for values 
OK, I K ,4 K ,9 K  and 90K  denoting low and high income respectively are set to their 
closest ascendants shown in the hierarchy in Figure 5.1, while for other values their 
sensitive ranges are set to be the values themselves. Using Table 5.3 and through 
positive disclosure attack, an attacker may identify the sensitive range [OK, OK) for 
t2 with a probability of | .  Furthermore, using the same table and through negative 
disclosure attack, an attacker can infer the sensitive range of ^  with an increased 
probability of |  if he/she knows tha t the individual represented by ^  does not have 
a high income (i.e. in the range [80/U, 99/U]), since this knowledge allows tuples t\\ 
and t u  in Table 5.3 to be excluded from his/her consideration.
It is worth observing that range disclosure is a more general case than the value 
disclosure problem we discussed in Chapter 3. In fact, value disclosure becomes range 
disclosure if for every value u in a categorical sa we set the sensitive range SR(u) to 
the value itself. This implies tha t by preventing a sensitive range from being disclosed, 
we effectively prevent any value in this range from being disclosed as well. However, 
as in the value disclosure case, it may be impossible to release data when an arbitrary 
amount of adversarial knowledge is assumed [85]. Thus, given a table T, we assume 
that a data publisher is willing to release a /c-anonymisation T* of T  when the risk of 
associating each tuple t £ T* to SR(u)  is lower than a required level.
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Id Age In co m e
ti [22-45] IK
£ 2 [22-45] 4K
[22-45] 9K
ts [22-45] 9K
in [22-45] 90K
tl2 [22-45] 90K
h [29-42] OK
£ 3 [29-42] 22K
U [29-42] 23K
h [29-42] 24K
£ 9 [29-42] 25K
£ 1 0 [29-42] 26K
Table 5.3: A 6-anonymisation of Table 5.1
5.1.1 R ange P ro tectio n  Q uantification
We now propose a function tha t can be used to capture the risk of range disclosure. 
It works by measuring the amount of protection offered to an individual’s tuple t in a 
A:-anonymous group G based on the distribution and semantic distance of SA values 
included in the sensitive ranges contained in G, and takes into account both positive 
and/or negative disclosure attacks.
We observe that the amount of protection offered to t is small when these ranges 
have a large number of semantically close values. This is because the more tuples are 
associated with one sensitive range, the greater the danger for privacy breach, since 
they either allow the sensitive range to be established with high probability or to be 
excluded from attacker’s consideration. In addition, it is natural to expect that an 
attacker with knowledge about a value u is more likely to have knowledge about a 
value u' that is closely related to u. Thus, if one of these ranges is “narrow” it may 
be eliminated easily.
To see this, consider Income in Table 5.3 as a numerical SA and an attacker
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who wants to establish how likely the income of an individual represented by t7 
in this table is in the range [OK, AK). Also assume that the sensitive range for 
values 22K ,23K ,24K ,2bK  and 2OK (associated with tuples U ,t4 , t 5, t 9 and iio) is 
the interval [\0K, 30A]. Observe tha t these tuples are semantically close, so they 
allow an attacker to eliminate them if he/she knows that an individual’s income is 
not in the range [22A', 2OK]. This makes it possible for the attacker to infer sensitive 
range information for t7.
Before formulating our protection criterion, we define our notion of semantic dis­
tance between a pair of values in sa using Pairwise Contribution, as illustrated in 
Definition 5.1.2.
D efin ition  5.1.2 (Pairwise Contribution). Given a pair of values (u,u') obtained 
from Dsa, the Pairwise Contribution for {u,u') is defined as:
where m ax(D sa) and m in(D sa) denote maximum and minimum values in Dsa respec­
tively, and \Daa\ is the size of domain D sa. I f  there is a hierarchy Hsa, then s({u, u'})
the values u and u ' .
Pairwise Contribution is based on the same notion of distance as the S-diversity 
measure (see Definition 3.1.3) and can be computed similarly. For instance, the 
pc score for the values IK  and 4K  in U and t2 in the first group of Table 5.3 is 
1 — »  0.96, since the subtree rooted at the closest common ancestor ([0 — 4]K)
of these values according to the hierarchy shown in Figure 5.1 has 5 leaves, and there 
are in total 100 distinct values in the domain of Income. If the data publisher treats
m a x (D sa) —m in (D Sa) numerical values
categorical values
is the number of leaves of the subtree of Hsa rooted at the closest common ancestor of
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Income as a numerical attribute, the pc score for these values can be computed as 
1 — Y5 5 3 Y «  0.96. Pairwise Contribution penalises semantically close values in a group, 
since they help prevent range disclosure. For example, when Income is treated as a 
numerical attribute, the pc score for the values IK  and 90K  in t\ and t n in the first 
group of Table 5.3 is 1 — «  0.1, which is smaller than 0.96, reflecting the fact
that the distance between values I K  and 90K  is larger than that between I K  and 
4 K.
We also introduce Disclosure Confidence, a practical metric to assess the level of 
risk of associating a tuple t to its sensitive range in a /c-anonymous group.
D efin ition  5.1.3 (Disclosure Confidence (dc)). Given a k-anonymous group G and 
a tuple t having a value u € G w.r.t. sa, the disclosure confidence dc(u, SR(u)) is 
given by
. . .  CD(„Y, _  / ( " )  X E v x ( /(X) x p c(tt,s ))dc(u, SR(u))  |^ |
where x is a value (u included) that lies in SR(u), f ( x )  and f(u )  denote the frequency 
of x and u in G respectively, |G| is the size of G, and pc is as defined in Definition 
5.1.2.
It should be noted that Disclosure Confidence takes into account both the fre­
quency of the SA value u in G, as well as the semantic closeness between u and SA 
values in other tuples that fall in SR(u). This is because its computation is based on 
f(u ) ,  and the level of semantic similarity between u and any value x G G in SR(u)  
captured by pc(u, x). A high score in dc implies that many tuples in G whose SA 
values are semantically close to u will have the same sensitive range as t , and thus t 
can easily be associated with its sensitive range.
To illustrate the computation of Disclosure Confidence, we evaluate this measure 
for the income value 22K  in i3, which lies in the second group of Table 5.3. We
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consider Income as numerical and assume that the sensitive range for value 22K  is 
an interval [10K,30K]. Then, the Disclosure Confidence score can be computed as
dc(22K,SR(22K) = [10K -  30/C)) =
pc(22K, 22K) + pc(22K, 23K) + pc{22K, 24K) + pc{22K, 2bK) + pc{22K, 26K)  n
=     %  0.82
6
Furthermore, we make the standard random worlds assumption [24, 85]. That is, 
in the absence of any further knowledge, each t can have any of the sensitive values 
in G equally likely. Therefore, we measure the level of protection G offers for range 
disclosure by computing the average level of risk of associating a tuple in G with its 
sensitive range. We call this measure Range Diversity.
D efin ition  5.1.4 (Range Diversity (rd)). Given a k-anonymous group G containing 
distinct values iq ,...,iq  w.r.t. sa and their sensitive ranges SR(u\), ...,SR(u{), the 
Range Diversity of G, denoted by rd{G), is defined as:
where dc(ui, SR(ui)) is given in Definition 5.1.3 and |C?| denotes the size of G.
Based on Range Diversity, we propose a metric called Worst-Group Protection 
(W GP)  to capture the amount of protection for the least protected group in T*. 
Limiting W G P  can naturally be used to ensure that T* offers a sufficient level of 
protection for range disclosure.
D efin ition  5.1.5 (Worst-Group Protection). Given a k-anonymous table T* com­
prised of groups {#i, <7 2 , • • • 1 9 h}, the Worst-Group Protection for T*, denoted with 
WGP(T*) is defined as W GP(T*) — max(rd(gi) , . . . ,  rd(gh)).
HEURISTICS AND ALGORITHMS FOR GUARANTEEING QUALITY  115
i
5.2 H euristics and Algorithm s For Guaranteeing  
Quality
As mentioned in the Introduction, there are applications in which some minimal 
data utility and protection requirements have to be met. Consider for example a 
pharmaceutical company which requires the anonymised data it gets from a hospital 
to have a minimal level of data utility, e.g. to allow a certain level of classification 
accuracy when building classifiers from the data. Since anonymisations with the level 
of data utility below what is required are practically useless for the company, the 
hospital will need to observe that this requirement is met. In addition, released data 
must not give away sensitive information about individuals, according to the stated 
privacy policy that the hospital promises to its patients. Thus, the hospital requires 
this data to have a minimal level of protection too.
Unfortunately, existing approaches to /c-anonymisation are not able to meet these 
requirements. The group-size and utility constrained approaches discussed in Section
2.1.3 are inapplicable, since they do not consider protection. The protection con­
strained approach is not applicable either, since it guarantees the protection but not 
the utility requirement. The TOC approach presented in Chapter 3 does consider 
both but provides no guarantees for either.
To generate anonymisations with utility and protection guarantees, we propose 
a Utility and Protection Constrained (UPC) /c-anonymisation approach. That is, 
we require anonymised data to satisfy three constraints: minimum group size k, 
maximum level of acceptable information loss incurred (£/), and minimum level of 
acceptable protection exercised (P). We develop a method that allows anonymised 
data with a controlled amount of information loss and protection for range disclosure 
to be generated. This is achieved by designing a new heuristic, which is incorporated
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into an algorithm that uses partitioning and clustering in a similar way to our TOC- 
based method presented in Chapter 3.
5.2.1 U P C  /c-Anonym isation H euristics
Before formulating our heuristic, we introduce a modified version of our Utility Mea­
sure (UM) given in Definition 3.1.2. This is necessary because the UM and other 
utility criteria discussed in Section 2.1.1 control the total or the average distortion 
of the table, not the level of distortion of the most generalised group. On the other 
hand, we require the level of distortion in individual groups of the anonymised dataset 
to be limited, so as to ensure that no groups contain data that may violate the utility 
requirement.
Our alternative criterion is based on Q-diversity introduced in Chapter 3, which 
is reproduced below for convenience of reference.
D efin ition  5.2.1 (Q-diversity). Assume that a is a QID, the domain of a is Da, and 
Va C Da is a subset of values obtained from a. The Q-diversity of Va, denoted by 
Qd(Va), is defined as
q d { y a) =  <
ma,x(va ) rm n(\^ i  numerical values 
m a x (D a )—m in (D a)
categorical values
where max(Va), min(Va), m ax(D a) and m in(D a) denote maximum and minimum 
values in Va and Da respectively, and \Da\ is the size of Da. I f  a is categorical, 
then s(Va) is the number of leaves of the subtree of Ha rooted at the closest common 
ancestor of the values in Va.
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Our modified criterion is called Worst-Group Utility (WGU) and is given in Def­
inition 5.2.2. An upper bound on WGU, i.e. the maximum allowed amount of infor­
mation loss of the most heavily distorted group, can be used to constrain the utility 
loss of a table.
Definition 5.2.2 (Worst-Group Utility). Assume that a tableT comprised o fm  QIDs 
{a1?. . .  ,am} is clustered into groups {g\,g2 , • • • ,9h}, such that \gj\ > k, 1 < j  < h, 
and tuples in each gj will have the same values in each QID after anonymisation. 
The worst group utility of T  under this clustering is defined as
- m .. m
W GU(T) = m a x(— y2qd(7rai(gl ) ) , . . . ,  — 'S2qd(7rai(gh))) 
m  m  L 'i= i
where qd(irai(gj)) denotes the Q-diversity of group gj w.r.t. a*, 1 < j  < h and 
I < i < m.
We now formally define the concept of UPC-optimal k-anonymisation, as illus­
trated in Definition 5.2.3.
D efinition 5.2.3 (UPC-optimal fc-anonymisation). Given a table T  and two con­
straints U, P  for utility and protection, a partition a = {gi,...,gh} of T  is a UPC- 
optimal k-anonymisation if \gj\ > k , j  = l , . . . , h ,  Hj=i 9j =  \Jj=\9j =  T,
and there does not exist a partition g of T  s.t. WGU(<f) < WGU {a) < U or 
WGP(g*) < WGP(a*) < P, where U and P  are in [0,1], cr* and c* are the k- 
anonymised versions of a and <; respectively, and \gj\ denotes the size of gj.
A UPC-optimal /c-anonymisation is thus a grouping of data with minimal WGU 
and WGP scores that satisfy some specified utility and protection requirements. Find­
ing a UPC-optimal fc-anonymisation requires the generation of Pareto optimal solu­
tions [40], i.e. the fc-anonymous partitions which dominate the search space in at 
least utility or protection and satisfy both constraints. Related problems have been
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reported in multi-criteria optimisation literature, and are typically solved by consen­
sus clustering techniques [92, 41, 82]. Such methods first find a set of partitions each 
of which optimises a different optimisation criterion, and then construct a “good” 
partition with respect to all of the criteria based on these partitions. Consensus clus­
tering techniques have been applied successfully to genomic data integration [45] and 
to improving traditional clustering techniques [92], but they are not useful to solving 
our problem, since they assume that the final partition is not “radically different in 
terms of number of clusters and cluster composition” than the ones that optimise a 
single criterion [92]. Unfortunately, this is not the case in A;-anonymisation, as exper­
iments reported in Sections 4.4 and 4.5 have shown. Therefore, we take a different 
approach [33, 98]. Instead of combining multiple partitions, we combine our two 
search objectives into one using the following heuristic.
D efin ition  5.2.4 (Group Diversity). Let r  C  T  be a set of tuples over a set of 
attributes A = {ai , . . . ,  am, sa}, a i , . . . , am are QIDs and sa is an SA. The Group 
Diversity of r  w.r.t. A, denoted by gd(r,A), is defined as:
where 7ra i ( r )  and 7rs a ( r )  denote the projection of r  on attribute at and sa respectively,
Diversity of t w.r.t. sa l .
The Group Diversity heuristic is similar in principle to the Max-range Weighted 
Tuple Diversity heuristic (see Definition 3.2.1), but it uses the Range Diversity mea­
sure providing stronger protection for range disclosure. Using this heuristic, we can 
define a gd-optimal UPC partition.
*We slightly abuse the notation by writing rd(nsa(T)) for a group r  instead of rd(nsa(r*), where 
r* is the A>anonymised version of r. We note that rd(nsa(r))  =  rd(7rsa(r*)), since SA values are 
not perturbed after Ar-anonymisation.
qd(iTai( t ) )  denotes the Q-diversity of r  w.r.t. aif and r d ( 7 r s a ( r ) )  denotes the Range
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D efin ition  5.2.5 (Gd-Optimal UPC Partition). Let T  be a table consisting of a set 
of attributes A  =  {a i , . . .  ,am,sa}, and U and P  be specified utility and protection 
constraints. A gd-optimal UPC partition of T  is a partition a = {gi, . . . ,  gh) such 
that \gj \ > k , j  = l , . . . , h ,  n*_, 9) =  0, U?=i 9j =  T, WGP(a) < U, W G P (a ')  < P, 
and gdjmax(a, A) =  maXj=\^^h(gd{gj,A)) is minimal, where a* is the k-anonymised 
version of a.
Thus, a gd-optimal UPC partition is a grouping of data with a minimal gd score 
and satisfies utility and protection requirements. However, finding such a partition is 
NP-hard, as shown in Theorem 5.2.1.
T h eo rem  5.2.1. Finding a Gd-optimal UPC partition is NP-hard.
Proof. We observe that the problem considered by Aggrawal et al. [19] is a special 
case of our problem, where utility and protection constraints U, P  are set to the 
maximum allowed level (i.e. U = 1 and P = l) ,  QID attributes are categorical and 
their hierarchies are as considered in Theorem 3.2.1. □
5.2.2 U P C  k-A n on ym isation  A lgorithm
We now present an algorithm for deriving a UPC k-anonymisation heuristically. Our 
solution employs partitioning and clustering similarly to the one given in Section 3.2, 
but it differs from it in a number of ways.
The method illustrated in Algorithm 6 works in three steps. First, the entire 
dataset is partitioned into a set of subspaces (step 1), which is the same as the one 
presented in Chapter 3 (see Algorithm 2). Second, for each subspace 0 6 $ ,  Algorithm 
6 performs the following steps. It randomly picks up a tuple ti as the seed of a cluster 
and removes it from 0 in step 4. In steps 5-10, it repeatedly finds the closest tuples to 
this cluster, one at time, and adds them into the cluster while utility and protection 
constraints are satisfied. We find a tuple tj that is closest to the cluster in step 6
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A lgorithm  6 Greedy method with Group Diversity heuristic
1. $  4-  M BP(T,s);
2. for each subspace 0 G $ do
3. w hile 0 0 do
4. c <— ii € 0; 0 <— 0 —{*};
5. w hile true do
6. find tj € 0 s.t. gd({cU {t/}}, A) is minimum;
7. d  c U {tj}\
8. if (dc7! < k and gd(d ,Q ID ) < U )
or (gd(d,QID) < U and gd(c',SA) < P))
9. c <— d\ 0 <— 0 —{ d } ’
10. else exit;
11. if |c| > k
12. recode(c);
13. S  4-  5  U c;
14. else
15. for each L e e  do;
16. O «- OU {*<};
17. for each L e 0  do
18. find Cj e S  s.t. dj <— Cj U {ii} and gd(c'j, Q ID ) <  U
and gd(dj,SA) < P  and gd(c'j,A) is minimum;
19. if Cj does not exist
20. suppress L\
by computing gd({c U {ij}}, A) according to Definition 5.2.4. In steps 8 and 9, tj is 
temporarily added into the cluster and two conditions are checked: i) the cluster size 
is smaller than k and the utility constraint U is satisfied, or ii) both constraints U 
and P  are satisfied. If either of these two conditions holds, we add t3 into the cluster 
and remove it from T  (step 9). Otherwise, we stop extending the cluster (step 10). If 
condition (i) fails, there is no need to extend the cluster, as this cannot help utility. 
This is because gd(d , Q ID ) can only increase as a result of extending the cluster. If 
condition (ii) fails, there is again no need to extend the cluster, since doing so will 
increase gd(d, QID), but may not necessarily reduce gd(d , SA). After finishing with
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creating a cluster, we check its size in step 11. If it is greater than k, tuples in the 
cluster are recoded, otherwise this cluster is marked (steps 15-16). The process is 
repeated until all tuples of T  are processed.
Marked clusters either contain less than k tuples and lower utility than the re­
quired constraint, or at least k tuples and lower protection (higher WGP score) than 
the protection constraint. Thus, marked clusters can be regarded as bad local op­
tima, as they resulted by extending them in the hope of getting sufficient protection. 
Therefore, in the final stage, tuples belonging to such clusters are un-clustered and 
re-grouped (steps 17-18). Each of these tuples is added into a non-marked cluster 
when its insertion will not violate the quality constraints for the cluster. If there is 
more than one cluster that a marked tuple can be added into, the cluster that will 
result in a minimal increment in Group Diversity when the tuple is inserted into it is 
selected and the marked tuple is added into it. If no such clusters can be found, we 
suppress the tuple.
Having presented our method, we discuss how it differs from the TOC-based 
method presented in Chapter 3. First, the search of the method presented in this 
chapter is guided by the Group Diversity heuristic, which is different from that used 
in the TOC-based method. This allows better protection for data, as it handles range 
disclosure too. Second, we use an alternative linkage strategy in clustering. More 
specifically, we extend a cluster with the best tuple according to Group Diversity, 
and not with the one that is closest to the seed, as in the TOC-based method. The 
former strategy is known to be more effective when seeds are randomly selected [127, 
84]. Finally, a new stopping criterion is used to guarantee that all clusters will 
have an acceptable amount of information loss and protection. In particular, in an 
attem pt to avoid creating over-generalised clusters, we stop extending a cluster when 
its size is less than k and utility gets worse than its associated constraint U . This 
is because extending the cluster cannot reduce the amount of information loss that
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will be incurred when data in it is k-anonymised. In addition, we also stop extending 
the cluster when its size is at least k and any of the constraints U or P  is violated. 
This is because, a cluster needs to have at least k tuples and to satisfy both of these 
constraints to be released.
On performance, Algorithm 6 has the same time complexity as the TOC-based 
method, which is 0 ( n  x s), where n is the cardinality of the dataset and s the 
minimum subspace size created by MBP (a small constant in practice). This is 
because clustering is performed in each subspace separately, so a significantly smaller 
number of tuples are checked for insertion into a cluster, compared to clustering-based 
methods [127, 35, 96] whose complexity is quadratic.
5.3 Summary
In this chapter, we addressed the limitations of the Trade-Off Constrained (TOC) 
approach by proposing Range Diversity, a measure that can be used to guard against 
range disclosure, and the UPC approach that allows /c-anonymised data with a re­
quired level of data utility and privacy protection to be generated. Range Diversity 
quantifies the amount of protection by taking into account both positive and negative 
range disclosure, based on frequency and semantic closeness of values in ranges. Fur­
thermore, it can ensure that SA values in both numerical and categorical attributes 
are protected from range disclosure. Based on the UPC approach, we also devel­
oped an effective /c-anonymisation method. Our method employs Range Diversity to 
produce anonymisations that prevent range disclosure and allows original SA values 
to be released. This allows much more information contained in the original data 
to be retained. In addition, it can generate anonymisations efficiently as a result of 
combining partitioning and clustering heuristics.
IChapter 6 
Evaluation of Perform ance 
Enhancem ent
In this chapter, we experimentally evaluate the performance enhancement we pro­
posed in Chapter 5. We first examine how our UPC method compares against the 
Trade-Off Constrained (TOC) approach described in Chapter 3. We then analyse 
the quality of anonymisations produced by our Utility and Protection Constrained 
(UPC) method in terms of utility and protection achieved by comparing them to 
those derived by some protection constrained and benchmark methods that specifi­
cally optimise data utility or privacy protection. We also study the effect of policies 
for specifying protection for range disclosure and constraints used in our algorithm. 
Finally, we examine the efficiency of our method.
6.1 Experim ental Setup and D atasets
To compare the UPC method with existing protection constrained methods, we 
chose three popular methods: the Incognito algorithm with (c,l)-diversity [85] and t- 
closeness [80] protection criteria, and the Personalised anonymity method [124] which
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all attem pt to guarantee one specific form of disclosure. Incognito is a global recod­
ing /c-anonymisation algorithm that follows a principle similar to the a-priori search 
heuristic used in association rule mining [21]. When combined with privacy principles 
such as (c, /)-diversity or /-closeness, it can generate anonymisations with an “opti­
mal” level of utility and bounded level of protection. In contrast, the Personalised 
method does not employ /c-anonymity (i.e. groups can have less than k tuples), but 
resorts to generalising SA values for protection. This algorithm performs a single­
dimensional global recoding search in the space of QIDs first, to generate groups 
with optimal utility, and then performs generalisation of SA values in each group for 
protection.
To examine the quality of anonymisations produced by our method in terms of util­
ity and protection achieved, we compared them to those generated by K-Members [35], 
K-Members-p and Incognito with /-closeness. These algorithms were used as bench­
marks, due to their ability to achieve good quality in terms of utility (K-Members) 
or protection (K-Members-p and Incognito with /-closeness).
We used publicly available implementations of the Incognito algorithm and the 
Personalised method, and our own implementations of the algorithm proposed in 
Chapter 5, K-Members, K-Members-p and Mondrian. The environment for imple­
menting the algorithms and performing these experiments is the same as the one used 
in Chapter 4.
We used both real and synthetic datasets in our experiments. First, we used the 
CENSUS dataset *, which contains demographical information of 100000 US citisens. 
This dataset is comprised of 5 QIDs, namely Age, Gender, Education, Marital status, 
Occupation, and an SA Income, and was configured as shown in Table 6.1. The 
CENSUS dataset is similar to the Adults dataset used in Chapter 4, and has been 
used in [124, 85] to evaluate the Personalised method and Incognito with /-diversity.
1 http: /  /  www.ipums.org
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Attribute Domain size Type
Age 79 Numerical QID
Gender 2 Categorical QID
Education 17 Categorical QID
Marital status 6 Categorical QID
Occupation 26 Categorical QID
Income 50 Categorical SA
Table 6.1: Summary of attributes for CENSUS dataset
The main reason for us to use this dataset instead of Adults is that there are 
publicly available domain hierarchies associated with all its attributes. Thus, we 
could use CENSUS to compare our method with Incognito and the Personalised 
method which require hierarchies to work, as well as with benchmark methods. The 
hierarchy for Income is illustrated in Figure 6.1 2, while the hierarchies for all QID 
attributes are given in Appendix A. We also note that Age is handled as a numerical 
QID by the Personalised method and our UPC method. However, as the Incognito 
algorithm cannot handle numerical QIDs, Age is handled using a hierarchy shown in 
Appendix A.
We also used a synthetic dataset containing 50000 tuples, which was generated 
from a standard normal distribution using the Apache Commons-Math library 3. This 
dataset is comprised of 5 QIDs and 2 SAs, all having integer values in [0,19]. All of 
the attributes are associated with the hierarchy shown in Figure 6.2.
6.2 Trade-Off vs. Guarantees
To demonstrate the effectiveness of our UPC approach, we show how it outperformed 
the Trade-Off Constrained (TOC) method in cases where generating data with a
2The codes for the hierarchy in Income (see Figure 6.1) follow the classification used in [124].
3http: /  /  com m ons.apache.org/m ath/
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Figure 6.1: Hierarchy for Income
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Figure 6.2: Hierarchy for attributes in the synthetic dataset
bounded level of utility and protection for range disclosure is required. We used a 
data publishing scenario illustrated in Figure 6.3 in experiments.
dataset: CENSUS
data  u tility  requirem ent (max. acceptable W GU level): 0.7 
privacy pro tection  requirem ent (max. acceptable W G P level): 0.5 
Sensitive Range (SR): level-2 4 ascendant for a value in the hierarchy 
of Figure 6.1
Figure 6.3: D ata publishing scenario
4A level-2 ascendant for a value is the ascendant that lies in the path between a leaf value and the 
root at a height of 2, where height 0 corresponds to a leaf value. For example, the level-2 ascendant 
for the value 0 in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6.1 is the value 0 - 9 .
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The selected data utility and protection requirements should allow the TOC ap­
proach trade-off some utility for protection. To meet these requirements, we config­
ured the UPC method by setting U = 0.7 and P  = 0.5. The sensitive ranges were set 
as in Figure 6.3, and the subspace size constraint s used in Algorithm 2 was set using 
a sample-based heuristic similar to the one presented in Section 3.3.1. Although we 
could have used our sample-based heuristic given in Section 3.3.1 to set the thresh­
old 8 automatically, we used various manually selected 8 values in this experiments. 
This was done to investigate whether a “good” 8 can help TOC satisfy utility and 
protection requirements, even though it does not help TOC achieve the best util­
ity/protection trade-off. We also configured the TOC method by setting wu = 0.5, 
wp = 0.5, s using the heuristic presented in Section 3.3.1.
We first examined whether the two methods satisfy the minimum acceptable utility 
requirement. As can be seen in Figures 6.4 and 6.5, both methods achieved an 
acceptable utility when k is set to 2 for most cases. However, the TOC method 
incurred lowrer information loss according to the UM measure (see Definition 3.1.2) 
when the threshold 8 is at least 0.3. In all other cases, the TOC method suppressed 
all tuples in the dataset, and thus the WGU and UM scores are undefined and not 
shown in Figures 6.4 and 6.5 respectively. Furthermore, we report the percentage 
of suppressed tuples in Figure 6.6. Note that the result for the UPC method is not 
shown in Figure 6.6, as our method did not suppress any tuples. The results for k = 5 
are qualitatively similar and are shown in Figures 6.7, 6.8 and 6.9 respectively. Thus, 
although both methods satisfied the specific utility requirement, the UPC method 
did so without suppressing any tuples.
TRADE-OFF VS. GUARANTEES
TOC
UPC
U (Utility Constraint)
1 . 0 -
0.8-
z>0
1  06 -
♦3
z>
CL
g  0 . 4 -
<5
oo
0.2-
0.0-
0.6 0.8 1.00.0 0.2 0 4
threshold 5
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Figure 6.7: Worst Group Utility scores for A: =  5
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Figure 6.9: Percentage of suppressed tuples for k =  5
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We also studied whether the two methods can achieve acceptable protection. Fig­
ures 6.10 and 6.11 report the percentage of the released tuples that do not meet the 
protection requirement when k is set to 2 and 5 respectively. Combining the results of 
these figures with those shown in Figures 6.6 and 6.9 respectively, we can see that the 
TOC approach failed to meet the protection requirement even though a large fraction 
of tuples have been suppressed. Since our UPC method guarantees protection for all 
tuples in the dataset, the corresponding scores are 0, and are not reported in the 
figures.
In summary, this set of experiments confirmed that while the TOC method may 
not guarantee protection for all tuples, the UPC approach to fc-anonymisation can 
always meet the quality requirements.
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Figure 6.10: Percentage of unprotected released tuples for k = 2
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Figure 6.11: Percentage of unprotected released tuples for k = 5
6.3 Quality of Anonym isation Against Protection  
Constrained M ethods
For this set of experiments, our UPC method was configured as in Section 6.2, while 
Incognito ran with c = 2 and / =  2 for (c, /)-diversity and t =  0.9 for ^-closeness. The 
Personalised method was configured as in [124],
6.3.1 U tility  of A nonym isations
We first tested the utility of anonymisations using aggregate query answering as an 
indicative application [77, 127, 124]. We considered two types of COUNT queries as 
illustrated below.
Attribute q is a QID, selected uniformly at random. Following [124], we chose r
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select COUNT(*)
from anonymised table
where q = r and s between u and
u + 10
Figure 6.12: A type-1 query
select COUNT(*) 
from anonymised table 
where q = r and s = u
Figure 6.13: A type-2 query
to be an interval of range 15 for Age (covering 19% of the domain for this attribute), 
a leaf value for Gender, or a level-1 value for any other QID. Attribute s denotes the 
SA Income and u is a randomly selected value in [0,40).
We considered a workload of 10000 queries of each type, which was applied on 
original and anonymised data, and measured the relative error (RE) [77, 127, 124] 
as in Section 4.5.2. For ease of reference, we briefly describe how to compute RE 
again. RE is defined as R E  — , where act(q) is the answer of a query q
on original data and est(q) the estimated answer of the same query on anonymised 
data. We derive est(q) by counting the probability an anonymised tuple answers q 
and summing these probabilities for each one of these tuples [77, 124]. Assuming that 
data is uniformly distributed, the probability a tuple answers q is given by p' = $3™, 
where Rq and R  denote the areas covered by q and the qualifying tuples in the 
generalised table, respectively, and Rq Pi R  denotes the overlap between Rq and R.
Figures 6.14 and 6.15 report the RE values for type-1 queries in descending or­
der, when k is set to 2 and 10 respectively. As can be seen, the RE values for our 
UPC method were an order of magnitude lower than that achieved by the Incog­
nito algorithm for both (c, /)-diversity and ^-closeness measures for most queries, and 
comparable to that of the Personalised method.
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Figure 6.15: R.E. for type-1 queries and k — 10
QUALITY VS. PROTECTION CONSTRAINED 135
t
We also com puted RE values for type-2 queries using the same anonymisations. 
The results are illustrated in Figures 6.16 and 6.17 for k set to 2 and 10 respectively. 
The UPC method again preserved more utility than  Incognito for both (c, /)-diversity 
and f-closeness measures, while outperform ing the Personalised method as well. This 
is because generalising SA values incurred additional information loss, degrading the 
accuracy of answering type-2 queries th a t retrieve specific SA values. In contrast, our 
method offers protection w ithout generalising SA values, thereby avoiding the asso­
ciated information loss and answering queries requiring specific sensitive information 
more accurately.
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 Personalised
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Figure 6.16: R.E. for type-2 queries and k =  2
We then evaluated the utility  of anonym isations using our W orst-Group Utility 
measure, for various values of k. Recall th a t WGU captures the information loss of all 
QIDs of the most heavily generalised group, as explained in Definition 5.2.2. As can 
be seen in Figure 6.18, the U PC m ethod achieved a WGU score of less than 0.7 for all 
values as the threshold U was set to  0.7. This result was similar to the Incognito with
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Figure 6.17: R.E. for type-2 queries and k =  10
both (c,/)-diversity and ^-closeness and much better than  the Personalised method 
when k was larger than 10. In fact, the  Personalised method completely generalised 
all QIDs in these cases. We also m easured the average information loss of all groups 
for the same runs using our UM measure. The result shown in Figure 6.19 confirms 
th a t our algorithm achieved a b e tte r  result in term s of utility than the Incognito, 
and a comparable one to the Personalised method, despite adopting the requirement 
of /c-anonymity. The remarkably good performance of our algorithm in term s of 
the incurred information loss is a ttr ib u ted  to the use of combined partitioning and 
clustering heuristics and the powerful local recoding generalisation model [127].
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Figure 6.18: Worst Group Utility scores
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6.3.2 P ro tec tio n  from  R ange D isclosure
In this set of experiments, we aim to confirm that our method is able to offer pro­
tection for range disclosure. Given the anonymisations produced during the previous 
experiments, we first evaluated how easily sensitive ranges may be disclosed. This 
was done by measuring the Range Diversity (rd ) (see Definition 5.1.4) of all groups 
and assigning this score to every tuple of a group, assuming that these tuples are 
equally likely to be inferred. Figures 6.20 and 6.21 illustrate the rd scores for each 
of the 100000 tuples in the dataset in descending order when k was set to 2 and 10 
respectively. Clearly, the Incognito algorithm with (c, /)-diversity fails to meet the 
protection requirement, since every tuple is able to be identified with an rd score of 
more than 0.85. Similarly, the Personalised method was unable to protect all tuples 
from range disclosure, since SA values in some groups can be identified with an rd 
score of 0.9 as well. This is because the level of protection required to prevent range 
disclosure is higher than tha t specified by personal preferences. In contrast, our UPC 
method guarantees tha t no tuple can be inferred with a score greater than 0.5, as 
the protection threshold P  has been set to 0.5 in our scenario. In these experiments, 
Incognito with t-closeness performed sufficiently well, achieving a similar level of pro­
tection to our method. This was because the dispersion of values in Income was 
rather low. As it will be elaborated later, t-closeness cannot prevent range disclosure 
in cases where higher data dispersion is present. It is however worth noting that a 
good level of protection was achieved at the cost of utility, as t-closeness was the 
worst method in our utility tests (see Figures 6.14 - 6.17).
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Figure 6.21: Range Diversity scores for k = 10
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We then measured how likely the less protected group can be identified using our 
W orst-Group Protection measure (W G P) (see Definition 5.1.5) by varying k from 2 
to 50. As shown in Figure 6.22, Incognito w ith (c, /)-diversity and the Personalised 
method performed poorly when k  was up to  10. It is also worth noting tha t the 
Personalised m ethod achieved the  m axim um  possible protection for SA values when 
k was 25 or 50. Recall th a t in these cases this m ethod completely generalised QIDs 
(see Figure 6.19), thereby effectively creating only one group containing all possible 
SA values. On the o ther hand, our m ethod achieved stronger protection (the W G P  
score was at most 0.5) w ith a much be tte r utility across all values of k , while t- 
closeness achieved strong protection b u t considerably lower utility (see Figure 6.19).
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Figure 6.22: Worst-Group Protection
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6.4 Q uality o f A nonym isations Against Bench­
mark M ethods
Having shown that our method is able to guarantee utility and protection better than 
protection constrained methods, we now proceed to compare it to some other bench­
mark algorithms in terms of how they fare in achieving better utility and protection. 
For this set of experiments we used the synthetic dataset as described in Section 6.1, 
and used K-Members [35], K-Members-p and Incognito with 2-closeness. K-Members 
is a powerful local recoding algorithm based on clustering, which has been shown to 
outperform both partition-based [77] and other clustering-based [83, 84] algorithms 
in terms of data utility. K-Members-p is a modified version of K-members, which 
uses Range Diversity as its objective function. Different from these two algorithms, 
Incognito with 2-closeness optimises utility subject to a protection constraint. How­
ever, it was included in these experiments due to its good protection scores in our 
experiments discussed in Section 6.3.
We configured our method as described in Section 6.3, but set the sensitive range 
for each value to its level-2 ascendant in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6.2, U to the 
Worst-Group Utility score achieved by K-Members for the same k and P  = 0.7. This 
set-up was simply chosen to investigate whether our algorithm can achieve the utility 
that is achievable by K-Members in addition to the required protection. We also 
configured Incognito with 2-closeness setting 2 to 0.8, so as to achieve a “good” trade­
off between utility and protection. Furthermore, we extended this method to handle 
two SA attributes, by requiring this constraint to hold for both of these attributes.
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6.4.1 U tility  o f  A nonym isations
The utility of anonymisations was evaluated using a workload consisting of 10000 
queries of the form illustrated in Figure 6.23.
select COUNT(*)
from anonymised table
w here q = r and si = u\ and S2  = U2
Figure 6.23: A query applied on synthetic data
These queries are similar to type-2 queries used in Section 6.3. Attribute q is a 
QID, selected uniformly at random and r  is a randomly chosen interval which covers 
20% of its domain. A ttributes s i, S2  are SAs and U\,ii2 are randomly selected values 
in [0,19].
We first produced anonymisations using K-Members, Incognito with t-closeness 
and our UPC method, and estimated the relative error (RE) in query answering, 
when k is set to 2 and 10. K-Members-p was excluded from this set of experiments 
as it does not optimise data utility. Figures 6.24 and 6.25 show the results.
It is apparent from these figures tha t our method was able to preserve more utility 
than the Incognito algorithm with 2-closeness, producing a qualitatively similar result 
to that of K-Members in terms of utility.
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In addition, we m easured utility  using W orst-Group Utility and the Utility Mea­
sure (UM). Figures 6.26 and 6.27 dem onstrate the results as k varies from 2 to 50.
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Figure 6.26: W orst Group U tility scores
The WGU scores for K-M em bers and the UPC m ethod were the same, as the 
threshold U was m anually set to  the  W GU score of K-Members, while the UM scores of 
these two m ethods were com parable. In contrast, Incognito with t-closeness incurred 
much higher inform ation loss, which was not reduced even when t was set to 1 thereby 
ignoring the protection constraint. These results, combined with the results of Figures
6.24 and 6.25, indicate the effectiveness of local recoding clustering-based methods 
for minimising inform ation loss com pared to the global recoding methods. It is also 
worth noting th a t our m ethod did not need to  suppress any tuples.
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6.4.2 P rotection  for R ange D isclosure
To examine how our algorithm  performs against benchm ark methods in term s of 
protection for range disclosure, we conducted similar experim ents to those in Section 
6.3 on the synthetic dataset, using K-Members-p and Incognito with t-closeness as 
benchmark algorithms. These m ethods differ in term s of how protection is achieved:
1. K-Members-p optimises our W orst-G roup Protection measure attem pting to 
offer protection for range disclosure, while Incognito with t-closeness protects 
SAs by controlling the d istribution in each group (see Section 2.1.2).
2. K-Members-p does not ensure a minimum protection level in all groups, unlike 
Incognito with t-closeness th a t requires each group to have an acceptable level 
of t-closeness.
3. K-Members-p restricts the group size to /c, while Incognito with t-closeness
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allows larger groups to  be formed.
We also assume th a t the requirem ent for protection is such th a t no group can have 
a Range Diversity score of more than  0.7 and th a t the sensitive ranges for each SA 
value is set to its level-2 ascendant in the hierarchy shown in Figure 6.2 (the effect 
of using various protection requirem ents will be investigated in Section 6.5). Figures 
6.28 and 6.29 illustrate the rd  scores for the same anonymisations studied in Figures
6.24 and 6.25, when k was set to  2 and 10 respectively.
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Figure 6.28: Range Diversity scores for k =  2
These results show th a t K-M embers-p does not offer protection for range disclo­
sure. More specifically, approxim ately 83% failed to satisfy the protection requirement 
when k was set to 2. The result is sim ilar when k was set to 10; 65% of tuples did not 
meet the protection requirem ent. The reason for this is two-fold. First, K-Members 
does not constrain protection, thus some groups of unacceptable protection can be
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Figure 6.29: Range Diversity scores for k =  10
constructed. Second, limiting the group size to k is too restrictive for protection. 
On the other hand. Incognito w ith f-closeness performed particularly well in terms 
of protection for most groups. However, this m ethod did not meet the protection re­
quirement for either value of k , for some groups. In fact, satisfying this requirement 
required lowering t and resulted in completely generalising 4 out of 5 QIDs, while 
using a larger value for t resulted in unprotected groups. The reason tha t t -closeness 
did not meet the protection requirem ent in this experiment is related to the highly 
dispersed data distribution we used to  generate our synthetic dataset. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, f-closeness cannot achieve protection for range disclosure, even when 
values in all groups follow the d istribution of original data  with respect to their SAs. 
It is evident therefore th a t solely constraining the distribution of SA values in each 
group is neither sufficient nor practical to  achieve protection for range disclosure. In 
contrast, our algorithm bounds the protection of a group using P , which was set to 
0.7, in order to achieve acceptable protection for all groups.
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The superiority of the UPC m ethod in achieving protection for range disclosure 
compared to benchm ark algorithm s was also confirmed using the W orst-Group Pro­
tection measure (W GP). As shown in Figure 6.30, K-Members-p was unable to satisfy 
the protection requirement in any case, while Incognito with t-closeness was only able 
to do so when k was a t least 25. In contrast, UPC satisfied the protection require­
ment across all values of k and incurred significantly less information loss than other 
methods did (see Figure 6.27). Furtherm ore, our m ethod did not need to suppress 
any tuples.
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Figure 6.30: W orst-Group Protection
6.5 Effect of Param eters
We first considered the im pact of specifying different policies for setting the sensitive 
ranges on utility. We sim ulated five different policies Pi to P5, which are numbered 
from 1 to 5 in ascending order of the specified level of protection required. The
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mappings between an SA value u and its sensitive range for Pi to P5 are illustrated 
in Table 6.2. For this experiment we used a synthetic dataset obtained by discarding 
one SA of the dataset used in Section 6.4. Our method ran with U =  0.5 and P = 0.5.
Policy SA value u SR(u)
Pi u e [0,19] u
P 2 u G [10,15] [10,15]
u $  [10,15] u
P 3 u g [10,15] [10,15]
u G [16,17] [16,17]
u t  [10,17] u
P4 u e [0 ,4] [0,9]
u G [5,9] [0,9]
u G [16,17] [16,19]
u G [18,19] [16,19]
u(£ [0,9] U [16,19] u
P 5 u G [0,9] [0,9]
u G [10,15] [10,15]
u G [16,19] [16,19]
Table 6.2: Mappings between values in Income and their sensitive ranges
The utility of anonymisations was evaluated using a workload consisting of 10000 
queries. Each query is similar to those used in Section 6.4, but retrieves only one SA 
as depicted in Figure 6.31.
select COUNTH 
from  anonymised table 
w here q = r and s = u
Figure 6.31: A query applied on synthetic data
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 show the average and maximum RE values respectively, for 
various values in k from 2 and 50. Clearly, there is a trade-off between utility and
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the strictness of policy, suggesting that some utility needs to be given away when 
increased protection is required. This confirms that not specifying how well certain 
ranges need to be protected, as practised by the t-closeness may result in unnecessary 
degradation of the utility. For instance, in the case of P5  the average and maximum 
RE illustrated in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 is 10 and 85 times larger respectively, compared 
to those when P4 was used instead.
k Pi P 2 P3 P a P5
2 3.728 3.755 3.763 4.164 42.661
5 3.805 3.806 3.906 4.220 42.661
1 0 3.839 3.861 3.902 4.220 42.646
25 3.855 3.879 3.934 4.247 42.667
50 5.686 5.594 5.621 5.718 43.227
Table 6.3: Average RE values
k Pi P 2 P3 P a P5
2 65.5 66 69.5 148 12693
5 68 64 64 162 12692
10 67.5 67 66 166 12685
25 64 65.5 72 169 12694
50 143 92 97 136 12363
Table 6.4: Maximum RE values
We additionally studied how different policies affect information loss as captured 
by the utility measure (UM). As can be seen in Table 6.5, most groups continue 
to retain a similar amount of information across all policies, as the UPC method 
builds groups with bounded information loss and protection, thereby avoiding over­
generalising data. Furthermore, we note that in this experiment UPC did not need 
to suppress any tuples.
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k Pi P2 Pz Pi Ps
2 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.180 0.182
5 0.180 0.182 0.181 0.180 0.181
10 0.180 0.180 0.179 0.179 0.181
25 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.179 0.181
50 0.232 0.233 0.233 0.233 0.234
Table 6.5: Utility Measure scores
Next, we examined the effect of the thresholds U and P  on utility. For this 
experiment k was set to 25, U to 0.3, and P  varied from 0 (no range disclosure is 
allowed) to 1 (no protection against range disclosure is offered). UM scores and the 
percentage of suppressed tuples are reported in Figures 6.32 and 6.33 respectively. 
Observe that the information loss incurred to provide protection for most values of 
P  is relatively low, compared to when no protection is required. This implies that 
protection for a wide range of attackers with sufficient data utility retained is feasible. 
Furthermore, the UM scores are bounded by U, as long as such anonymisation can 
be derived from the given dataset. In all other cases the UM scores are undefined 
and not shown in Figure 6.32.
For the same k , protection was constrained setting P  to 0.5 and U varied from 
0 (no information loss) to 1 (maximum information loss). Figure 6.34 shows the 
scores in UM measure in relation to U . Since the protection constraint is particularly 
tight (compared to the'one used in Section 6.4), low values of U may result in tuple 
suppression. We report the percentage of suppressed tuples in Figure 6.35. As can 
be seen, average utility scores are always bounded by U, implying that no more 
information loss than acceptable is incurred by generalisation to meet the protection 
constraint P.
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6.6 Efficiency o f C om putation
In this section, we studied the efficiency of our UPC method by comparing it to 
four methods: Incognito algorithm with (c, /)-diversity, Incognito algorithm with t- 
closeness, the Personalised method and Mondrian [77]. Mondrian is an algorithm 
based on median-based partitioning, which is the current state of the art in terms of 
runtime efficiency. K-Members was excluded from this set of experiments, since it is 
inefficient for large datasets due to its quadratic complexity (for a performance evalu­
ation of this algorithm see [35, 84] and Section 4.3). All algorithms were implemented 
in Java, except the Personalised method which is implemented in C++.
Our first experiment evaluated how the UPC algorithm scales with cardinality. 
We used randomly selected tuples of the CENSUS dataset to construct the datasets 
used in these experiments. All the methods were configured as in Section 6.3 and 
ran with k set to 5. Figure 6.36 reports execution time as cardinality varies from 
10000 to 500000 tuples. As can be seen, our method outperforms both versions of the 
Incognito algorithm, as well as the Personalised method 5 by orders of magnitude. 
These algorithms needed approximately 15 to 45 minutes to anonymise 500000 tuples 
while the UPC method needed only 1 minute, a performance which is comparable 
to that of Mondrian. As discussed in Section 5.2.2, our method has a complexity of 
0 (s  x n) «  0 (k  x n), when s «  k. As typically A; is a small constant, our algorithm 
scales much better compared to the Incognito and Personalised methods, which have 
an exponential time complexity with respect to cardinality. This is validated in Figure 
6.36 which illustrates that our method scales as well as Mondrian does in practice.
The efficiency of the UPC method with respect to dimensionality is also examined 
using the CENSUS dataset (100000 tuples). We configured all methods as in the 
previous experiment and varied the number of QIDs from 2 to 7. The result is shown
5The Personalised m ethod is favoured against other methods here as it is implemented in C + +  
which is faster than Java. However, the UPC m ethod is still significantly faster.
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Figure 6.36: Efficiency comparison w.r.t. cardinality
in Figure 6.37. Again, our algorithm  significantly outperformed both versions of 
Incognito and the Personalised m ethod. More specifically, these algorithms required 
from 22 minutes to 1 hour to anonymise the dataset and their efficiency increased 
by a factor from 3 to 6 for an increase of dimensionality of 1. In contrast, our 
algorithm needed only 20 seconds to anonymise the dataset, while it scales linearly to 
the dimensionality, achieving sim ilar performance to th a t of the Mondrian algorithm.
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6.7 Summary
Our extensive experiments using both  real and synthetic datasets confirmed that 
our method is the only one th a t guarantees protection for range disclosure, while 
preserving sufficient utility in anonymised data. More specifically, it outperformed 
existing approaches by orders of m agnitude in many cases in terms of utility, and 
was comparable to K-Members, which is capable of achieving very good utility in 
/c-anonymisation. Furtherm ore, we showed th a t our method scales very well to large 
datasets with respect to both cardinality and dimensionality.
Chapter 7
Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The wide collection and use of m icrodata in a variety of applications enunciates the 
need for protecting private information about the individuals represented in the data. 
In the thesis, we studied this problem under a setting where a data publisher uses 
A:-anonymisation to mask m icrodata before its release. The contributions can be 
summarised as follows:
• /c-A nonym isation ap p ro ach es: This thesis proposed two novel approaches
for /c-anonymisation: the Trade-Off Constrained (TOC) approach that allows re­
leased data to have a good balance between data utility and privacy protection, 
and the Utility and Protection Constrained (UPC) approach that guarantees 
that anonymised data will have a minimum level of utility and protection.
These two approaches address a significant limitation of existing approaches 
outlined in Section 2.1.3, as they attem pt to produce solutions that do not 
incur an excessive amount of information loss and protect sensitive information 
about individuals sufficiently. The experimental results presented in the thesis
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suggest th a t anonymisations with a very good level in both data utility and 
privacy protection can be generated when the TOC or the UPC approach is 
used.
This result is im portant for many real-world applications, such as medical data 
analysis and location-based systems. This is because these applications require 
anonymised data to be useful for analysis (e.g. to allow users to study the demo­
graphic profile of patients suffering a certain disease or to determine a location 
point of interest accurately), while being protected against sensitive informa­
tion disclosure (e.g. to prevent a pharmaceutical company from identifying an 
individual’s disease or a location-service provider from learning an individual’s 
exact location). Thus, generating anonymisations tha t satisfy both of these re­
quirements using our proposed approaches, may alleviate the privacy concerns 
that individuals may have and help the development of these applications in 
practice.
• U tility  criteria: Measuring the level of data utility is essential to ensure
that anonymised data  is useful for analysis. In our work, we introduced new 
criteria to capture data utility offered by anonymised data based on the amount 
of information-loss incurred by generalisation. Our criteria are informative, 
since they are based on the probability of reconstructing original values from 
generalised data, and practical, as they can be applied to both numerical and 
categorical attributes, and are independent of the dimensionality and cardinality 
of the considered dataset.
The importance of our criteria is two-fold. First, they can be used by anonymis- 
ers or data users to assess the level of data utility provided by anonymised data, 
regardless of the anonymisation method. For instance, they may suggest that 
anonymisers should change the way data is anonymised in cases where the utility
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level is not appropriate for the application, e.g. lowering the level of k. Second, 
our utility metrics can be used as optimality criteria by existing anonymisation 
algorithms tha t employ partitioning [77], clustering [127, 96] or genetic search 
strategies [64], guiding them towards producing more useful anonymisations.
• P rotection  criteria: While A>anonymisation can make data linkage difficult, 
it may not prevent sensitive information disclosure completely [85]. Motivated 
by the need to guard against attacks on anonymised data, we proposed two 
protection criteria. 5-diversity, which attem pts to quantify protection by mea­
suring the maximum range between SA values in anonymised groups, and Range 
Diversity, which allows detailed protection specification and quantifies protec­
tion against disclosing sensitive information of individuals through ranges.
Our criteria make an im portant step towards accurately measuring the level of 
privacy protection provided by anonymised data. This is because, as explained 
in the thesis, they can capture attacks that are not prevented by existing privacy 
principles. Thus, they can be a valuable tool for anonymisers who want to make 
sure that a data release is well protected according to their policy. Furthermore, 
our measures are based on the same notion of distance as our utility criteria, 
and thus share much of their flexibility, i.e. they can handle attributes of both 
types, and datasets of different cardinality and dimensionality. Again, this is a 
feature that anonymisers should find helpful. Finally, we have shown that it is 
possible to incorporate our protection criteria into a clustering-based algorithm, 
so that anonymised data  with a controlled level of privacy protection can be 
produced.
• A> A nonym isation algorithm s: While many algorithms for A;-anonymising
data have been proposed, they either construct low quality anonymisations fast 
or focus purely on effectiveness and require a large amount of time to produce a
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result. Motivated by this, we designed an algorithmic framework that allows the 
generation of high quality anonymisations efficiently, by using both partitioning 
and clustering search strategies.
The main technical challenge was to combine these strategies in a way that 
the speed offered by partitioning in exploring the search space does not harm 
the quality of data grouping derived by clustering. To address this issue, we 
made a number of technical contributions. We proposed to use a partitioning 
strategy that helps reducing the time complexity of clustering and is efficient 
to perform, we developed a clustering algorithm that specifically reduces the 
effect of overlapping subspaces created by the partitioning step, and devised a 
number of heuristics based on sampling that allow our method to be configured 
automatically.
This algorithmic framework was used to produce anonymisations following both 
the TOC and the UPC approaches in an effective and efficient way. Extensive 
experiments confirmed tha t it outperformed in majority of cases the state of 
the art method in terms of da ta  utility, and was substantially better in terms 
of achieving privacy protection. In addition, we have shown that it is practical 
to use, since it can be easily configured using our sample-based heuristics and 
scales very well to large datasets.
7.2 Future Work
In this section we outline a number of issues in the area of data publishing that worth 
further investigation.
Similar to most existing works [106, 25, 76, 124, 80, 71, 127, 35, 96], we have in fact 
made a number of simplifying assumptions in our study. Removing these assumptions
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may help the effectiveness and scalability of our methods, allowing them to be used 
in a wider class of today’s applications. However, it involves tackling a number of 
challenges which we outline below:
• Static vs. dynam ic datasets: Our methods assume that a static view of a 
dataset needs to be published. However, releasing a new anonymisation of the 
same dataset when data is updated (i.e. tuple insertions or deletions occur) may 
be required. For instance, a hospital may need to release a dataset containing 
patients’ demographic and medical information to a pharmaceutical company 
periodically. In this case, anonymised data may include tuples that did not 
appear in previous releases (i.e. when patients tha t were not hospitalised before 
are included in the dataset) or it may not include some of the tuples that were 
released before (i.e. when patients have recovered and left the hospital).
Unfortunately, dealing with data  insertion and deletion turns out to be chal­
lenging, since directly anonymising the updated dataset may lead to individual 
identification when different anonymous releases are stitched together [36, 125]. 
For example, assume tha t k has been set to 2 and tha t three patients are aged 
10,15 and 16 respectively. Assume also that the tuples representing these pa­
tients form a group and th a t their values have been generalised using the range 
[10 — 16] before release. Then, consider that the patient aged 16 leaves the 
hospital, and tha t data  needs to be republished. Obviously, replacing the re­
maining values (i.e. 10 and 15) with the range [10 — 15] before data is released 
again is possible, as 2-anonymity still holds. However, the tuple representing 
the patient who left the hospital may be revealed when an attacker intersects 
the two data releases. Currently, the only method that can handle dynamic 
datasets works by inserting fake data values to make sure that combining tables 
will not reveal any sensitive information [125]. However, inserting fake values
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may not be acceptable by applications such as medical research, where data 
needs to be truthful to be useful for analysis [110].
Since anonymising dynamic datasets is important for applications, we believe 
that studying this problem is worthwhile. Our utility and protection criteria can 
be used to measure and compare the quality of the generated solutions, but a 
new model to track possible ways of breaching privacy by combining anonymised 
dataset needs to be developed. This can possibly be done using some ideas from 
the work of Byun et al. [36], which studies how dynamic datasets with insertion 
updates can be anonymised, and the work of Yao et al. [130] which examines 
whether a set of views derived from a static dataset maintain /c-anonymity.
• Using utility  m easures in applications:
Our work developed utility criteria to capture information loss, but did not 
focus on how anonymisers can use these criteria in an optimal way. In partic­
ular, our Utility Measure (UM) (see Definition 3.1.2) computes the amount of 
information loss across all QID attributes and values of the dataset, and thus ef­
fectively assumes tha t the entire dataset will be used in applications. However, 
this assumption does not hold when users are only interested in a part of the 
dataset (e.g. use queries th a t need certain attributes or values to be answered). 
Consequently, our UM measure may not capture the data utility accurately in 
this case.
To alleviate this problem, we observe tha t collaboration between users and 
anonymiser can be beneficial. More specifically, a user can provide anonymisers 
with a sample of the queries he/she intends to use. This enables anonymisers 
to know which QID attributes and values are of more importance to this user 
and tune anonymisation methods to minimally generalise them, thereby helping 
this user’s analysis. Incorporating a query workload into anonymisation process
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requires modifying the way both data partitioning and clustering steps in our 
method work. LeFevre et al. [78] studied how anonymised groups that help 
answer a query workload comprised of selection and projection queries can be 
derived using a data partitioning strategy. Extending their methods to work 
for different types of query (e.g. join queries) and developing similar heuristics 
for clustering algorithms may be helpful towards achieving this goal.
However, it may not be feasible to expect users to disclose their queries, due to 
privacy concerns. For instance, an advertising company using a location-based 
service may not be willing to reveal its queries to a service owned by a rival 
company. Alternatively, users may be willing to disclose which QID attributes 
they want to be minimally generalised. Based on this knowledge, anonymisers 
can perform feature selection using split attribute selection (i.e. specifying 
the QID attribute along which data is partitioned) or attribute weighting (i.e. 
specifying which a ttribute values are more important in measuring similarity 
between tuples during clustering). Although methods that use feature selection
[63] and attribute weighting [127] have been proposed, they require anonymisers 
to specify a number of parameters which are dependent on data distribution (e.g. 
the split attribute selection order or attribute weights). Thus, they are generally 
difficult to use in practice. Furthermore, the method proposed in [63] depends 
on a certain A:-anonymisation algorithm, and cannot be applied when different 
algorithms are used. Therefore we believe that developing generic and practical 
feature selection methods tha t allow utility requirements to be incorporated in 
anonymisation is worthwhile.
• Main vs. secondary m em ory-resident data:
Although we currently assume that the table to be anonymised fits in main 
memory, real-life database applications often deal with large datasets that need
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to be stored in secondary memory. Reading data directly from the secondary 
memory in our method is possible, but is very inefficient, since communication 
between the main and secondary memory is slow due to the large difference 
in their access times. Thus, our method needs to deal with memory and I/O  
management effectively to avoid thrashing and performance degradation.
We note that the work of LeFevre et al. [75] proposes a way to modify the par­
titioning step of our method so tha t large datasets can be handled efficiently. 
The main idea is to perform partitioning by computing the split points based 
on aggregate statistics tha t are computed efficiently and are small enough to 
fit in main memory. For instance, computing the median value in an QID a 
to perform a split in a subspace S  can be performed by loading the frequency 
sets (u\, f \ ),..., (w/, fi) into main memory, where i =  1,..., I are distinct val­
ues in the domain of a QID a and fi  are their associated frequencies in S  [75]. 
While this allows us creating subspaces with little I/O  overhead, our method 
requires further modifications to be able to handle secondary memory-resident 
data efficiently. This is because the heuristics proposed in Section 3.3 work 
by considering all subspaces to find out where each left-over tuple “fits” best 
(see Section 3.3.2), which essentially means that the entire dataset needs to 
be transferred into the main memory if our method is directly applied. Find­
ing a compact representation of partitioned dataset that fits in main memory, 
would be helpful to minimise the overhead of this transfer. However, this is not 
straightforward, and is considered as a subject for future research.
In this thesis, we have focused on relational data. However, in many cases indi­
viduals’ private information is contained in unstructured data, i.e. data that lacks 
a well-defined schema. Common examples of unstructured data include documents, 
web content and log files. Preventing individual identification in unstructured data
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is particularly challenging. First, it is difficult to analyse or add a schema to such 
data in a completely automated way. For example, logs are often stored as text files 
and are analysed using information retrieval techniques. Second, unstructured data 
is often distributed across a number of sites which may not be willing to share unper­
turbed data due to privacy concerns [88]. For instance, assume that the registry and 
the finance departments of a university want to identify whether a certain employee 
is entitled to a salary increase. To perform this check, the documents containing 
this person’s employment details which are held by the registry need to be examined 
together with his/her financial information contained in documents held by the fi­
nance department. Preserving privacy requires examining both the employment and 
financial details of this person without revealing information about other employees. 
Third, unstructured data is often continuously updated, and sensitive information 
may be leaked as a result of combining separate releases, as explained above. Thus, 
the privacy preserving techniques surveyed in Chapter 2, which assume that data 
is structured, centrally stored and static, are not applicable under this setting. To 
address this issue, we believe tha t developing algorithms that are based on the secure 
function evaluation paradigm [129] tha t can work on unstructured and continuous 
data is required.
A ppendix A  
Hierarchies and G eneralisation  
Codes for QID A ttributes In the  
CENSUS D ataset
This appendix includes the hierarchies and generalisation codes for the QID attributes 
in the CENSUS dataset, which was used in the experiments presented in Chapter 6.
*
15-29 30-39 40-49 50-69 70-93
/ A  /K A\ A\ A\
15 ... 2 9  3 0  ... 3 9  4 0  ... 49  50  ... 69  70  ... 93
Figure A .l: Hierarchy for Age
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Male Female
Figure A.2: Hierarchy for Gender
1-8 9-10 11-13 14-16
/K  A  .4\ A
1 ... 8 9  10 11 12 13 14 15 16
Figure A.3: Hierarchy for Education
1-3 4-5 6
/ A  /A
1 2 3 4 5
Figure A.4: Hierarchy for Marital sta­
tus
Symbol Value
1 Pre-school
2 lst-4th
3 5th-6th
4 7th-8th
5 9th
6 10th
7 11th
8 12th
9 High school grad
10 Some college
11 Bachelors
12 Prof. school
13 Academic assoc, degree
14 Occup. assoc, degree
15 Masters
16 Doctorate
Table A.l: Values for Edu­
cation attribute
Symbol Value
1 Spouse present
2 Spouse absent
3 Separated
4 Divorced
5 Widowed
6 Single
Table A.2: Values for Mari­
tal status attribute
The codes for the hierarchy in Occupation shown in Figure A.5 refer to aggregate 
occupation values [6]. For example, 0 refers to individuals under the age of 16 or
0 1-11 12-16 17-19 20-22 23-25
A \ y 7 \  y1 \
1 ... 11 12 ... 16 17 18 19  2 0  21 22  23  24  25
Figure A.5: Hierarchy for Occupation
those not in the labor force, who last worked more than 5 years ago.
A ppendix B
R elated P ublications
1. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Preventing range disclosure in k-anonymised data. 
Under preparation for a journal submission.
2. G. Loukides and J. Shao. An empirical study of utility measures for k-anonymi- 
sation. In BNCOD ’08, pages 15-27, 2008.
3. G. Loukides and J. Shao. D ata utility and privacy protection trade-off in k- 
anonymisation. In ED B T Workshop on Privacy and Anonymity in the Infor­
mation Society (PAIS ’08), 2008.
4. G. Loukides and J. Shao. An efficient clustering algorithm for k-anonymisation. 
Journal of Computer Science and Technology, Vol. 23(2): 188-2002, 2008.
5. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Greedy clustering with sample-based heuristics for k- 
anonymisation. In the First IEEE International Symposium on Data, Privacy, 
and E-Commerce (ISDPE ’07), pages 191-196, 2007. (Selected as one of the 
best four papers)
6. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Clustering-based k-anonymisation algorithms. In 
DEXA ’07, pages 761-771, 2007.
169
170
7. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Speeding up clustering-based k-anonymisation algo­
rithms with pre-partitioning. In BNCOD ’07, pages 203-214, 2007.
8. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Capturing data usefulness and privacy protection in 
k-anonymisation. In SAC  ’07, pages 370-374, 2007.
9. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Towards balancing data usefulness and privacy pro­
tection in k-anonymisation. In IEEE International Conference on Computer 
and Information Technology (CIT), page 15, 2006. (Excellent paper award)
10. G. Loukides and J. Shao. Query-driven data anonymisation. In BNCOD ’06 
PhD Forum, 2006.
References
[1] Anonymizer web-site. http://www.anonym izer.com .
[2] DoubleClick web-site. http://www.doubleclick.com.
[3] Electronic Privacy Information Center DoubleClick complain, 
http://ep ic .org /privacy/internet/ ftc/DCLK_complaint.pdf, 2000.
[4] Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 United States 
Public Law.
[5] HMRC leak, http://www.itweek.co.uk/itweek/news/2204126/hmrc-leak-raises- 
prospect-rules.
[6] Integrated public use microdata series, occupation codes, 
http: /  /  usa.ipum s.org/usa/volii/OOoccup.shtml.
[7] Report of The Independent Investigation: breach of data se­
curity in the VFS online UK visa application facility, op­
erated through VFS websites in India, Nigeria and Russia.
http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/IndependentInvestigation26July2007.pdf, 
2007.
[8] Stanford encyclopaedia of philosophy, http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/privacy/.
171
172
[9] The National DNA Database Annual Report 2005-2006. 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/DNA-report2005-
06.pdf?view=Binary.
[10] U.S. department of health and human services privacy act regulations. 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/nara/cfr/waisidx_04/45cfr5b/_04.html.
[11] European Union Directive 95/46/EC. Official Journal of the European Com­
munities, 281:31, 1995.
[12] Roy Morgan research report for the office of the Federal Pri­
vacy Commissioner: Community attitudes towards privacy.
http://www.privacy.gov.au/publications/rcommunity/index_print.html, 2004.
[13] U.S. department of health and human services office for civil rights. HIPAA 
administrative simplification regulation text. 2006.
[14] StorageTek software information guide.
http: / / www.sun.com /  storagetek/tape_storage/tape_media/volsafe/VolSafe.pdf, 
2007.
[15] N. R. Adam and J. C. W orthmann. Security-control methods for statistical 
databases: a comparative study. ACM  Comput. Surv., 21(4):515-556, 1989.
[16] C. C. Aggarwal. On k-anonymity and the curse of dimensionality. In VLDB 
’05, pages 901-909, 2005.
[17] C. C. Aggarwal and P. S. Yu. A condensation approach to privacy preserving 
data mining. In ED B T ’04, pages 183-199, 2004.
[18] G. Aggarwal, T. Feder, K. Kenthapadi, S. Khuller, R. Panigrahy, D. Thomas, 
and A. Zhu. Achieving anonymity via clustering. In PODS ’06, pages 153-162,
2006.
173
[19] G. Aggarwal, F. Kenthapadi, K. Motwani, R. Panigrahy, D. Thomas, and 
A. Zhu. Approximation algorithms for k-anonymity. Journal of Privacy Tech­
nology, 2005.
[20] R. Agrawal, A. Evfimievski, and R. Srikant. Information sharing across private 
databases. In SIGMOD ’03, pages 86-97, 2003.
[21] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant. Fast algorithms for mining association rules in large 
databases. In VLDB ’94, pages 487-499, 1994.
[22] R. Agrawal and R. Srikant. Privacy-preserving data mining. SIGMOD Rec., 
29(2):439-450, 2000.
[23] M. T. Almeida, G. Schiitz, and F. D. Carvalho. Cell suppression problem: A 
genetic-based approach. Comput. Oper. Res., 35(5): 1613-1623, 2008.
[24] F. Bacchus, A. J. Grove, J. Y. Halpern, and D. Roller. From statistical knowl­
edge bases to degrees of belief. Artif. Intel., 87(l-2):75-143, 1996.
[25] R. J. Bayardo and R. Agrawal. D ata privacy through optimal k-anonymization. 
In ICDE ’05, pages 217-228, 2005.
[26] N. Beckmann, H. Kriegel, R. Schneider, and B. Seeger. The r*-tree: An efficient 
and robust access method for points and rectangles. In SIGMOD ’90, pages 
322-331, 1990.
[27] D. E. Bell and L. J. La Padula. Secure computer systems: Mathematical foun­
dations. MTR-2547, Vol. I, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, 1 March 
1973.
[28] M. Ben-Or, S. Goldwasser, and A. Wigderson. Completeness theorems for non­
cryptographic fault-tolerant distributed computation. In ACM Symposium on 
Theory of Computing (STO C  '88), pages 1-10, 1988.
174
[29] S. Berchtold, C. Bohm, and H. Kriegel. Improving the query performance of 
high-dimensional index structures by bulk-load operations. In ED BT ’98, pages 
216-230, 1998.
[30] E. Bertino, B. C. Ooi, Y. Yang, and R. H. Deng. Privacy and ownership 
preserving of outsourced medical data. In ICDE ’05, pages 521-532, 2005.
[31] D. Bertsekas. Constrained optimization and Lagrange Multiplier methods. Com­
puter Science and Applied Mathematics, Boston: Academic Press, 1982.
[32] C. Bettini, X. S. Wang, and S. Jajodia. The role of quasi-identifiers in k- 
anonymity revisited. CoRR , abs/cs/0611035, 2006.
[33] S. Bistarelli, U. Montanari, and F. Rossi. Semiring-based constraint satisfaction 
and optimization. J. AC M , 44(2):201-236, 1997.
[34] J. Brickell and V. Shmatikov. Efficient anonymity-preserving data collection. 
In KDD ’06, pages 76-85, 2006.
[35] J. Byun, A. Kamra, E. Bertino, and N. Li. Efficient k-anonymity using cluster­
ing technique. In DASFAA ’07, pages 188-200, 2007.
[36] J. Byun, Y. Sohn, E. Bertino, and N. Li. Secure anonymization for incremental 
datasets. In 3rd Third VLDB Workshop on Secure Data Management, pages 
48-63, 2006.
[37] R. Canetti, U. Feige, O. Goldreich, and M. Naor. Adaptively secure multi-party 
computation. In ACM  Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’96), pages 
639-648, 1996.
[38] D. Chaum. Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital 
pseudonyms. Commun. ACM, 24(2):84—90, 1981.
175
[39] B. Chen, R. Ramakrishnan, and K. LeFevre. Privacy skyline: Privacy with 
multidimensional adversarial knowledge. In VLDB ’07, pages 770-781, 2007.
[40] C. A. Coello, G. B. Lamont, and D. A. Van Veldhuizen. Evolutionary Algorithms 
for Solving Multi-Objective Problems (Genetic and Evolutionary Computation). 
Springer-Verlag, 2006.
[41] W. H. E. Day. Foreword: Comparison and consensus of classifications. Journal 
of Classification, 3(2):183-185, 1986.
[42] D. Denning. Cryptography and Data Security. Addison-Wesley, 1982.
[43] J. Domingo-Ferrer and J. M. Mateo-Sanz. Practical data-oriented microaggre­
gation for statistical disclosure control. IEEE Trans, on Knowledge and Data 
Engineering, 14(1):189—201, 2002.
[44] J. Domingo-Ferrer and V. Torra. Ordinal, continuous and heterogeneous k- 
anonymity through microaggregation. Data Mining and Knowledge Discovery, 
11 (2): 195—212, 2005.
[45] V. Filkov and S. Skiena. Heterogeneous data integration with the consensus 
clustering formalism. In Data Integration in the Life Sciences (DILS ’0J), pages 
110-123, 2004.
[46] M. Fischetti and J. J. S. Gonzalez. Models and algorithms for optimizing cell 
suppression in tabular data  with linear constraints. Journal of the American 
Statistical Association, 95(451):916-928, 2000.
[47] J. Friedman, J. Bentley, and R. Finkel. An algorithm for finding best matches 
in logarithmic time. ACM  Trans, on Mathematical Software, 3(3), 1977.
176
[48] B. C. M. Fung. Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing. PhD thesis, Simon Fraser 
University, Burnaby, BC, Canada, May 2007.
[49] B. C. M. Fung, K. Wang, and P. S. Yu. Top-down specialization for information 
and privacy preservation. In ICDE ’05, pages 205-216, 2005.
[50] S. Garfinkel. PGP: Pretty Good Privacy. O ’Reilly, 1994.
[51] G. W. Gates and N. A. Potok. D ata stewardship and accountability at the u. s. 
census bureau. Federal Committee on Statistical Methodology: working paper.
[52] R. Gavison. Privacy and the limits of law. Yale law journal, 89(3):421—471, 
1980.
[53] B. Gedik and L. Liu. Location privacy in mobile systems: A personalized 
anonymization model. In ICDCS ’05, pages 620-629, 2005.
[54] L. Geng and H. J. Hamilton. Interestingness measures for data mining: A 
survey. ACM Comput. Surv., 38(3):9, 2006.
[55] P. P. Griffiths and B. W. Wade. An authorization mechanism for a relational 
database system. AC M  Trans. Database Syst., l(3):242-255, 1976.
[56] S. Guha, R. Rastogi, and K. Shim. Cure: an efficient clustering algorithm for 
large databases. In SIGMOD ’98, pages 73-84, 1998.
[57] A. Guttman. R-trees: A dynamic index structure for spatial searching. In 
SIGMOD ’84, pages 47-57, 1984.
[58] J. A. Hartigan. Clustering Algorithms. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1975.
[59] S. Hettich and C. J. Merz. Uci repository of machine learning databases. 1998.
177
[60] B. Hore, S. Mehrotra, and G. Tsudik. A privacy-preserving index for range 
queries. In VLDB ’04, pages 720-731, 2004.
[61] House of Commons Health Commity. The Electronic Patient Record. 
http://www.publications.parliam ent.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cm health/422/422.pdf, 
2007.
[62] B. A. Huberman, E. Adar, and L. R. Fine. Valuating privacy. IEEE Security 
and Privacy, 3(5):22—25, 2005.
[63] T. Iwuchukwu and J. F. Naughton. K-anonymization as spatial indexing: to­
ward scalable and incremental anonymization. In VLDB ’07, pages 746-757,
2007.
[64] V. S. Iyengar. Transforming data  to satisfy privacy constraints. In KDD ’02, 
pages 279-288, 2002.
[65] E. T. Jaynes. Probability Theory The Logic of Science. Cambridge University 
Press, 2003.
[66] M. Kantarcioglu and C. Clifton. Privacy-preserving distributed mining of asso­
ciation rules on horizontally partitioned data. IEEE Trans, on Knowledge and 
Data Engineering, 16(9): 1026-1037, 2004.
[67] H. Kargupta, S. D atta, Q. Wang, and K. Sivakumar. On the privacy preserving 
properties of random data  perturbation techniques. In ICDM ’03, page 99,
2003.
[68] K. Kenthapadi, N. Mishra, and K. Nissim. Simulatable auditing. In PODS ’05, 
pages 118-127, 2005.
178
r
[69] D. Kifer and J. Gehrke. Injecting utility into anonymized datasets. In SIGMOD 
’06, pages 217-228, 2006.
[70] A. Kobsa. Privacy-enhanced personalization. Commun. ACM , 50(8):24—33,
2007.
[71] N. Koudas, Q. Zhang, D. Srivastava, and T. Yu. Aggregate query answering on 
anonymized tables. In ICDE ’07, pages 116-125, 2007.
[72] V. Koutsonikola and A. Vakali. LDAP: framework, practices, and trends. IEEE  
Internet Computing, 8(5):66-72, 2004.
[73] G. Ramesh L. V. S. Lakshmanan, R. T. Ng. To do or not to do: The dilemma 
of disclosing anonymized data. In SIGMOD ’05, pages 61-72, 2005.
[74] E. Larkin. Anonymizer safe surfing suite. 
http://ww w .pcw orld.com /article/id, 128186/article.html, 2007.
[75] K. LeFevre and D. DeW itt. Scalable anonymization algorithms for large data 
sets, university of Wisconsin computer sciences, technical report 1590. 2007.
[76] K. LeFevre, D. J. DeW itt, and R. Ramakrishnan. Incognito: efficient full- 
domain k-anonymity. In SIGMOD ’05, pages 49-60, 2005.
[77] K. LeFevre, D. J. DeW itt, and R. Ramakrishnan. Mondrian multidimensional 
k-anonymity. In ICDE ’06, page 25, 2006.
[78] K. LeFevre, D. J. DeW itt, and R. Ramakrishnan. Workload-aware anonymiza­
tion. In KDD ’06, pages 277-286, 2006.
[79] J. Li, R. Wong, A. Fu, and J. Pei. Achieving k-anonymity by clustering in at­
tribute hierarchical structures. In Data Warehousing and Knowledge Discovery 
(DaWaK ’06), pages 405-416, 2006.
179
[80] N. Li, T. Li, and S. Venkatasubramanian. t-closeness: Privacy beyond k- 
anonymity and 1-diversity. In ICDE ’07, pages 106-115, 2007.
[81] T. Li and N. Li. Towards optimal k-anonymization. Data Knowl. Eng., 
65(1):22—39, 2008.
[82] T. Li, M. Ogihara, and S. Ma. On combining multiple clusterings. In ACM  
Conference on Information and Knowledge Management (CIKM ’04), pages 
294-303, 2004.
[83] G. Loukides and J. Shao. Capturing data usefulness and privacy protection in 
k-anonymisation. In SA C  ’07, pages 370-374, 2007.
[84] G. Loukides and J. Shao. Clustering-based k-anonymisation algorithms. In 
DEXA ’07, pages 761-771, 2007.
[85] A. Machanavajjhala, J. Gehrke, D. Kifer, and M. Venkitasubramaniam. 1- 
diversity: Privacy beyond k-anonymity. In ICDE ’06, page 24, 2006.
[86] A. Machanavajjhala, D. Kifer, J. M. Abowd, J. Gehrke, and L. Vilhuber. Pri­
vacy: Theory meets practice on the map. In ICDE ’08, pages 277-286, 2008.
[87] B. Malin, E. Airoldi, S. Edoho-Eket, and Y. Li. Configurable security protocols 
for multi-party data analysis with malicious participants. ICDE ’05, pages 
533-544, 2005.
[88] B. Malin and E.M. Airoldi. Confidentiality preserving audits of electronic med­
ical record access. World Congress on Health (Medical) Informatics (MED- 
INFO), 2007.
[89] J. M. Mateo-Sanz, A. Martfnez-Balleste, and J. Domingo-Ferrer. Fast genera­
tion of accurate synthetic microdata. In Privacy in Statistical Databases, pages 
298-306, 2004.
180
[90] A. McCallum, K. Nigam, and L. Ungar. Efficient clustering of high-dimensional 
data sets with application to reference matching. In KDD ’00, pages 169-178, 
2000.
[91] A. Meyerson and R. Williams. On the complexity of optimal k-anonymity. In 
PODS ’0 4 , pages 223-228, 2004.
[92] S. Monti, P. Tamayo, J. Mesirov, and T. Golub. Consensus clustering: A 
resampling-based method for class discovery and visualization of gene expres­
sion microarray data. Machine Learning, 52(1-2):91—118, 2003.
[93] M. Naor and K. Nissim. Communication preserving protocols for secure function 
evaluation. In ACM  Symposium on Theory of Computing (STOC ’01), pages 
590-599, 2001.
[94] B. L. Narayan, C. A. Murthy, and S. K. Pal. Maxdiff kd-trees for data conden­
sation. Pattern Recogn. Lett., 27(3): 187-200, 2006.
[95] M. E. Nergiz, M. Atzori, and C. Clifton. Hiding the presence of individuals 
from shared databases. In SIGMOD ’07, pages 665-676, 2007.
[96] M. E. Nergiz and C. Clifton. Thoughts on k-anonymization. Data Knowl. Eng., 
63(3):622-645, 2007.
[97] J. Nin, J. Herranz, and V. Torra. Rethinking rank swapping to decrease disclo­
sure risk. Data Knowl. Eng., 64(l):346-364, 2008.
[98] A. P. Punnen. On combined minmax-minsum optimization. Computers and 
Operations Reseach, 21(6):707-716, 1994.
[99] V. Rastogi, S. Hong, and D. Suciu. The boundary between privacy and utility 
in data publishing. In VLDB ’07, pages 531-542, 2007.
181
[100] S. P. Reiss. Practical data-swapping: the first steps. ACM Trans, on Database 
Syst., 9(l):20-37, 1984.
[101] M. K. Reiter and A. D. Rubin. Anonymous web transactions with crowds. 
Commun. ACM, 42(2):32-48, 1999.
[102] S. Rizvi, A. Mendelzon, S. Sudarshan, and P. Roy. Extending query rewriting 
techniques for fine-grained access control. In SIGMOD ’04, pages 551-562,
2004.
[103] S. J. Rizvi and J. R. Haritsa. Maintaining data privacy in association rule 
mining. In VLDB ’02, pages 682-693, 2002.
[104] W. Rjaibi and P. Bird. A multi-purpose implementation of mandatory access 
control in relational database management systems. In VLDB ’Of, pages 1010— 
1020, 2004.
[105] D. B. Rubin. Discussion of statistical disclosure limitation. Journal of Official 
Statistics, 9(2):461-468, 1993.
[106] P. Samarati. Protecting respondents identities in microdata release. IEEE  
Trans, on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 13(9): 1010-1027, 2001.
[107] R. S. Sandhu, E. J. Coyne, H. L. Feinstein, and C. E. Youman. Role-based 
access control models. Computer, 29(2):38-47, 1996.
[108] R. Smith and J. Shao. Privacy and e-commerce: a consumer-centric perspective. 
Electronic Commerce Research, 7(2):89-116, 2007.
[109] M. Steinbach, G. Karypis, and V. Kumar. A comparison of document clustering 
techniques. In KDD Workshop on Text Mining, 2000.
182
/■
[110] L. Sweeney, k-anonymity: a model for protecting privacy. International Journal 
on Uncertainty, .Fuzziness and Knowledge-based Systems, 10(5):557-570, 2002.
[111] Z. Teng and W. Du. Comparisons of k-anonymization and randomization 
schemes under linking attacks. In the Sixth International Conference on Data 
Mining (ICDM ’06), pages 1091-1096, 2006.
[112] W. Trappe and L. C. Washington. Introduction to Cryptography: With Coding 
Theory. Pearson Education, 2005.
[113] T. M. Truta, A. Campan, and P. Meyer. Generating microdata with p -sensitive 
A:-anonymity property. In f th  Third VLDB Workshop on Secure Data Manage­
ment, pages 124-141, 2007.
[114] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton. Privacy preserving association rule mining in vertically 
partitioned data. In KDD ’02, pages 639-644, 2002.
[115] J. Vaidya and C. Clifton. Privacy-preserving top-k queries. In ICDE ’05, pages 
545-546, 2005.
[116] V. S. Verykios, E. Bertino, I. N. Fovino, L. P. Provenza, Y. Saygin, and 
Y. Theodoridis. State-of-the-art in privacy preserving data mining. ACM SIG­
MOD Record, 3(l):50-57, 2004.
[117] J. Vogel. When cards come collecting. Seattle Weekly, September 23 1998.
[118] Y. Wang and Y. Zheng. Fast and secure magnetic worm storage systems, the 
Second International Security in Storage Workshop (SISW  ’03), 2003.
[119] A. Westin. Privacy and Freedom. New York: Atheneum, 1967.
183
f
[120] A. Westin. Opinion surveys: W hat consumers have to say about information 
privacy, prepared witness testimony, the house committee on energy and com­
merce. 2001.
[121] R. Wong, J. Li, A. Fu, and K.Wang. alpha-k-anonymity: An enhanced k- 
anonymity model for privacy-preserving data publishing. In KDD ’06, pages 
754-759, 2006.
[122] M. Wright, M. Adler, B. N. Levine, and C. Shields. Defending anonymous 
communications against passive logging attacks. In Proceedings of the 2003 
Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP ’03), page 28, 2003.
[123] X. Xiao and Y. Tao. Anatomy: simple and effective privacy preservation. In 
VLDB ’06, pages 139-150, 2006.
[124] X. Xiao and Y. Tao. Personalized privacy preservation. In SIGMOD ’06, pages 
229-240, 2006.
[125] X. Xiao and Y. Tao. M-invariance: towards privacy preserving re-publication 
of dynamic datasets. In SIGMOD ’07, pages 689-700, 2007.
[126] L. Xiong, S. Chitti, and L. Liu. Topk queries across multiple private databases. 
In ICDCS ’05, pages 145-154, 2005.
[127] J. Xu, W. Wang, J. Pei, X. Wang, B. Shi, and A. Fu. Utility-based anonymiza- 
tion using local recoding. In KDD ’06, pages 785-790, 2006.
[128] Z. Yang, S. Zhong, and R. N. Wright. Anonymity-preserving data collection. 
In KDD ’05, pages 334-343, 2005.
[129] A. C. Yao. How to generate and exchange secrets. In IEEE Symposium on 
Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS ’86), pages 162-167, 1986.
184
[130] C. Yao, X. S. Wang, and S. Jajodia. Checking for k-anonymity violation by 
views. In VLDB ’05, pages 910-921, 2005.
[131] N. Zhang, S. Wang, and W. Zhao. A new scheme on privacy-preserving data 
classification. In KDD ’05, pages 374-383, 2005.
[132] T. Zhang, R. Ramakrishnan, and M. Livny. Birch: An efficient data clustering 
method for very large databases. In SIGMOD ’96, pages 103-114, 1996.
[133] J. Zhou and J. Sander. D ata bubbles for non-vector data: Speeding-up hier­
archical clustering in arbitrary metric spaces. In VLDB ’03, pages 452-463, 
2003.
[134] Q. Zhu and W. W. Hsu. Fossilized index: the linchpin of trustworthy non- 
alterable electronic records. In SIGMOD ’05, pages 395-406, 2005.
